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Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism aim to account for modality. 
Dispositional Essentialism takes properties to account for laws. In particular, it takes 
determinate properties to account for laws of nature (Bird, 2007), which are 
determinable. Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. According to Steven French, 
Ontic Structural Realism takes laws and symmetries to be part of the fundamental 
structure of the world. Determinate properties are “dependent” on laws (2014, p. 264). 
The core difference between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s 
accounts of modality is the direction of the dependence between properties and laws. As 
a result, French describes Ontic Structural Realism as a reverse-engineering of 
Dispositional Essentialism (2014, p. 264), and Chakravartty differentiates them by 
saying that Dispositional Essentialism gives a bottom-up account of modality whereas 
Ontic Structural Realism’s is top-down (2019). Both views face significant problems.  
The main problems these views face stem from relational individuation. Properties are 
individuated by their relations to further properties. As such, it is hard to see how they 
can be metaphysically prior to those relations as per Dispositional Essentialism. 
Equally, laws are relations between properties. As such, it is hard to see how they could 
be metaphysically prior to the properties they relate as per Ontic Structural Realism. 
Both properties and laws seem dependent on each other. By requiring one to come first 
and explain the other, dispositional essentialists and ontic structural realists end up in 
a chicken-egg scenario. 
I propose a hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. 
My hybrid view does away with the dogma of ontological priority between properties and 
laws. Instead, properties and laws symmetrically depend. I argue that my hybrid view is 
the way out of the chicken-egg-property-law conundrum. It paves a new way for making 
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The evidence of nature’s lawfulness is everywhere. Even the smallest human task relies 
on an intricate web of laws, like gravitation, which we consciously or unconsciously rely 
on. There is a predictable order to our world.1 How we explain this predictability is 
another matter.  
There are philosophers who see laws as brute or accidental regularities, others who see 
them as immutable and necessary and, of course, there is everything in between. I will 
be particularly interested in theories that take properties and laws to be metaphysically 
linked. In particular, I will examine Dispositional Essentialism, which takes properties 
to explain laws, and Ontic Structural Realism, which according to Steven French does 
the reverse (2014, p. 264). In other words, Ontic Structural Realism takes properties to 
depend on laws. I will look at these with the aim of forwarding a novel view – a hybrid 
between the two. My view will take properties and laws to be symmetrically dependent 
so that they explain each other. I argue that this avoids many of the pitfalls of 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism while providing a more 
coherent account of the relationship between properties and laws.  
Talk of properties and laws often come together. I like to use the example of the 
property of charge and the respective law (Coulomb’s law). Coulomb’s law tells us how 
charged objects interact. It explains why like charges repel each other whereas opposite 
charges attract. In much of the property and law discourse, what properties do (what 
laws they follow) has been separate from what properties are.  
In chapter 2, I survey the most popular views on properties and their relation to laws. I 
start with Categoricalism. Broadly, Categoricalism is the view that properties have 
some sort of intrinsic identity. Intrinsic here can be understood in opposition to modal. A 
property’s modality refers to what that property does, what laws it follows and how it 
manifests in the world. For categoricalists this is separate from what the property is. As 
we shall see, identifying properties intrinsically rather than by their modality leads to 
 
1 It is worth noting that John Dupré (1995) argues that there is also much disorder to the world 
and in science. However, his arguments and examples mainly stem from the special sciences, 
particularly biology. I will not debate the status of laws across these sciences here. My main focus 




interesting consequences. For instance, it opens the possibility that properties like 
charge and mass could have had different roles, maybe even swapped roles entirely. 
One of the two key players in this thesis, Dispositional Essentialism, arose in opposition 
to Categoricalism. Broadly, Dispositional Essentialism is the view that at least some 
properties have dispositional essences. In other words, they get their essence and 
identity from their modal links to further properties. Dispositional Essentialism 
promises to account for all modality from the nature of properties. Dispositional 
properties give rise to laws of nature. Back to our example, the nature of charge is 
responsible for the existence of Coulomb’s law. Any world with a charged object will be a 
world where Coulomb’s law applies.  
In chapter 2 we see that Dispositional Essentialism has great appeal. It explains the 
lawfulness of nature via the nature of properties, an ingredient most philosophers carry 
in their ontology. However, few philosophers have appreciated that this view still faces 
some problems accounting for laws of nature: 
A) the properties dispositional essentialists are realists about are often determinate 
whereas some laws of nature are determinable 
B) laws are more complex than some dispositional essentialists allow 
C) certain laws – global principles – seem to apply to everything in existence not 
just a specific property 
The first problem will be the main topic of chapter 3 which starts by laying out what 
determinates and determinables are. Very briefly, a determinable is a broad property 
that encompasses determinates. So, for instance, “scarlet”, “maroon” and “crimson” are 
determinates of the determinable “red”. At the same time, “red”, “blue” and “yellow” are 
determinates relative to the determinable “colour”. The issue is that the properties 
dispositional essentialists are realists about are typically specific instantiations of 
properties in our world e.g. the charge of an electron, the mass of my phone, the maroon 
of this coat. These are maximally determinate. Alexander Bird (2007) goes as far as to 
say that dispositional properties are single-track so that they have one stimulus and one 
manifestation possibility. The problem is that many laws of nature are not determinate. 
Coulomb’s law would not be very informative if it could only tell us how an object with a 




determinable or functional. They tell us how a range of properties under broad 
determinables interact. That is what makes them so impressive. 
Chapter 3 focuses on how we get from properties to laws within Dispositional 
Essentialism, answering A) and B). In particular, I will endorse realism about the 
determinable properties, seeing these as what explains the determinable laws of nature. 
Following Jessica Wilson (2012), I will argue there is need for both determinates and 
determinables in our ontology. Determinates provide ‘existential witness’, or tell us 
what is instantiated in our world. Determinables provide us with the modal information, 
they ground laws of nature. I will look at the arguments against realism about 
determinables but will show that they do not apply or are overruled by determinables 
having a unique explanatory role to fill. Additionally, following Vetter (2012, 2015) I will 
argue that we need to be a bit more flexible than the likes of Bird with regard to laws. 
Bird suggests laws codify a single manifestation and stimulus relation. However, laws 
come in all shapes and sizes, relating different numbers of variables and constants. 
In chapter 4 I tackle what I see as the biggest problem for Dispositional Essentialism – 
accounting for global principles. Global principles are laws that appear too broad to be 
accounted for from the bottom-up, based on the dispositional essence of a single 
property. Global principles are often not seen at the local level, where a property is 
instantiated. They require taking a step back and looking at the bigger picture. 
Examples include: the principle of least action, symmetry laws and conservation 
principles. It is not merely a particular object that conserves mass-energy, rather it is in 
all objects and interactions that we see this conservation. 
Dispositional essentialists have not done much to address the problem of global 
principles. In 1992, they forwarded the world-kind explanation of these laws (Bigelow, 
Ellis and Lierse). According to this hypothesis, the world is a member of the world-kind 
and, as a member of this kind, it has certain (dispositional) properties which give rise to 
laws of nature. This suggestion seems ad hoc and has taken a toll on the credibility of 
Dispositional Essentialism (Livanios, 2010; Smart and Thébault, 2015, p. 390). 
However, there are more modern ways of approaching the issue. 
Anjan Chakravartty (2019) forwarded what I see as a more modern version of the world-
kind hypothesis. He argued that we have good evidence from science that certain 




global principles. Say physically closed systems have properties. The universe is the only 
physically closed system in existence so it could have properties in virtue of its causal 
closure. If these properties are dispositional, they would give rise to laws. These laws 
would be global, universe-level, laws.  
I forward a third and novel possibility. I see it as a more minimal and palatable 
adaptation of Chakravartty’s view. Chakravartty makes a good case for systems having 
properties. I accept that there is excellent evidence for high-level properties but I argue 
that there is no need for high-level entities to accompany them. We can explain global 
principles via high-level properties without postulating an ad hoc universe-wide 
property bearer. I argue for collective properties. In other words, I argue that things can 
come together and jointly or collectively bear a property. For instance, two electrons can 
have a joint spin. We don’t need two electrons and a third object which is the system of 
the two electrons. The two suffice if we see the property as collectively borne by them. 
In chapter 5 I look at case studies of global principles. In particular, I look at 
conservation laws and the principle of least action. I look at why the kind of account 
Dispositional Essentialism gives of regular laws fails here. Further, I look at the various 
ways we can account for these laws within Dispositional Essentialism. My hybrid view 
does not hang on any specific approach to global principles. However, I argue that 
Chakravartty’s view and my view are preferable for a number of reasons. 
Chakravartty’s view seems like a clear improvement on the world-kind view. My view 
provides a new, unexplored, way of making sense of global principles without 
postulating questionable high-level entities at all. Until now global principles have not 
been thoroughly explored within Dispositional Essentialism. They are usually avoided 
or used to mock the view. I hope to breathe new life into the debate, showcasing new 
views which are less ontologically loaded. I show that these principles are not 
insurmountable for Dispositional Essentialism. Further I will show that, despite claims 
to the contrary, global principles are no more a problem for Dispositional Essentialism 
than for the view we look at next – Ontic Structural Realism. 
In chapter 6 I move onto the second main player in this thesis – Ontic Structural 
Realism. I start by looking at the historical context for this view. Structural Realism 
started as an epistemic view, about what we know. Epistemic Structural Realism is the 
view that all we know is structure. Briefly, the idea is that we can only know objects and 




cannot know a thing’s intrinsic or categorical nature. Ontic Structural Realism takes 
this up a level. It says that all there is is structure. There is nothing more to reality.  
Ontic Structural Realism is a controversial view. This is partially because what 
structure is is a matter of controversy, ranging from mathematical or abstract structure 
to modal structure in more moderate iterations. I discuss a few versions of it, but even 
at its most moderate, it requires radical revisions to our view of objects. Traditionally, 
we think of objects as existing independently of their relations to further things, 
however, on this view they are reduced to their structural components. They are at most 
nodes in the structural web of reality. That said, as we shall see, there are many good 
scientific and metaphysical arguments for this view.  
Generally Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structuralism have kept very different 
company. Dispositional Essentialism has been discussed in the property literature in 
traditional metaphysics, as an alternative to Categoricalism. Ontic Structural Realism 
has been discussed in the philosophy of science literature, often alongside quantum 
concerns. However, recently a growing number of philosophers have pointed out that 
these two views are much closer than they may seem (Esfeld, 2004, 2009; Esfeld and 
Lam, 2011; French 2014; Chakravartty, 2019). These philosophers have tried to pin 
down and explain the ontology of Ontic Structural Realism. In the process, it becomes 
clear that the underlying ontology of this view is reasonably close to that of 
Dispositional Essentialism. I will look at the work of these philosophers as it sets the 
scene for my own hybrid view. 
Steven French claims that Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structuralism are so 
close that they are a reverse engineering of each other (2014). Both views share a 
common goal to account for modality. Further, they have similar starting materials – 
properties and laws. However, they differ in a very important way. Dispositional 
Essentialism takes properties to be fundamental, and to account for laws. According to 
French – who is as representative a spokesperson of Ontic Structural Realism as any – 
Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. It takes laws to be part of the fundamental 
fabric of the universe, properties are dependent on laws. This leads Chakravartty to 
claim that the difference between these two views is the direction of the property-law 
explanation (2019). Dispositional Essentialism gives a bottom-up account of modality 
(from properties to laws), Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. It gives a top-down 




In chapter 7 I forward my own hybrid view. Where Dispositional Essentialism gives a 
bottom-up and Ontic Structural Realism gives a top-down account of reality, my account 
is level. Properties and laws are equifundamental and symmetrically dependent. I argue 
that this view makes the most sense of the relationship between properties and laws. It 
is worth clarifying that my view is only a hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and 
Ontic Structuralism’s views on modality and the relationship between properties and 
laws specifically. Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism have very 
different approaches to other issues, like objects. Famously, Ontic Structural Realism 
has a revolutionary and revisionary approach to objects, where Dispositional 
Essentialism tends to ruffle fewer feathers. My view will be neutral on such issues. My 
solution to the issue of accounting for modality from a structuralist/dispositionalist 
perspective will be compatible with the plethora of views on the status of objects. 
Within Dispositional Essentialism, properties get their essence and identity from the 
relations they bear to further properties. Yet, the properties are supposed to ground the 
laws of nature. Laws of nature are relations between properties. If properties get their 
identity and essence from their relations, they cannot ground those relations. A thing 
cannot be essentiality and identity dependent on that which it grounds (Jaag, 2014). 
Ontic Structural Realism also raises eyebrows by putting laws first and seeing 
properties as dependent. If laws are relations between properties, how can they be 
metaphysically prior to properties? It is not clear how relations could unilaterally 
explain their relata. 
Within dispositionalism/structuralism properties and laws are enmeshed in such a way 
that it is hard to see how one could explain the other. As David Yates (2018) put it, 
choosing whether to give properties or laws priority lands us in a chicken-egg scenario. I 
propose that we drop claims of ontological priority between properties and laws and let 
properties and laws symmetrically depend. 
In order to argue for and flesh out my view, chapter 7 touches on many issues. A major 
theme will be ontological dependence, particularly symmetric dependence. I look at why 
philosophers have shied away from this sort of dependence. I argue that there are good 
reasons to allow for symmetric dependence, especially in this case. Another theme is 
exactly how I flesh out my ontology – what properties or laws I need in it. This takes us 
back to earlier chapters where I argued that we need determinable properties in our 




Briefly, dispositional essentialists have traditionally discussed determinate properties 
and determinable laws in their theory. Ontic structural realists, at least according to 
French, have done the same. Very briefly, he follows Wilson (2012) in saying that we 
need determinables to account for modality as well as determinate properties to provide 
existential witness and explain the universe as we know it.  
For my part, in chapter 3, I conceded to Wilson the need for determinable properties 
which ground determinable laws. Similarly, I will say that determinate properties 
contain the modality of determinate laws within them. So, my modal ontology will 
incorporate determinate properties, determinate laws, determinable properties and 
determinable laws. Naturally, another key theme will be the relationship between 
determinates and determinables. 
Where Wilson and French talk about determinables as modal and determinates as 
‘existential witnesses’, I think this can be a bit too quick. Determinate properties are 
also modal in a sense. After all, within Dispositionalism they get their identity and 
essence from their dispositions. In my view, they give us non-modal information about 
what is instantiated. However, that is not to say they are non-modal per se, they have a 
limited – determinate - modality. If we want the big picture modal facts, and to explain 
laws of nature, we need determinable properties. Their role is not threatened by 
allowing determinate properties a limited modality. 
Determinates and determinables clearly have a special relationship. Determinates 
under the same determinable resemble each other in special ways – “red” resembles 
“blue” in a way that it cannot resemble “circle” or “square”. Further, determinates of the 
same determinable are mutually exclusive and fix their determinables. Yet, to say that 
we can do away with determinables is premature. As we saw, determinables tell a 
broader modal story, and there is a sense in which they too constrain what determinates 
do. While I cannot settle the issue of the relationship between these two here, I show 
that neither can be given priority over the other. They are both needed to give the full 
picture of reality and to fully account for the evolution of our universe. 
In chapter 8, I address some final lingering concerns that may arise in response to my 
view. In section 8.1, I look at the potential worry that my hybrid view will be a bad 
combination of the previous two views. The worry is that it would be subject to the 




Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism have unique selling points and 
shortcomings. I will be arguing that the hybrid view avoids the shortcomings of these 
views while retaining and superseding the best they have to offer. So, it is in fact the 
best of both worlds.  
Finally, in section 8.2, I address the worry that my view is less parsimonious than 
Dispositional Essentialism, Ontic Structural Realism, and even a basic hybrid of the 
two. I argue that my hybrid view is worth the trade-off. It has a massive explanatory 
edge (it fully accounts for modality) for a very low price: accepting determinable 
properties and determinate laws into an ontology that already had determinables (laws) 
and determinate properties. However, the motivation for my view is deeper. 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s ontologies have holes. These 
holes are left by relational individuation. Properties are relationally individuated yet the 
individuators of determinate properties are missing. Laws of nature are relations 
between properties yet the properties they relate (determinable properties) don’t exist. 
This places the very coherence of these views into question. My hybrid view fills these 
holes, offering a coherent and thorough account of properties, laws and the relationship 
between them. 
Having dealt with potential objections to my view, my case for the hybrid view is 
complete. Dispositional Essentialism gives a bottom-up account of reality. It takes 
properties to get their identity and existence from the relations they bear to further 
properties. At the same time, it expects properties to ground laws, which is problematic. 
Ontic Structural Realism gives a top-down account of reality. It takes laws to be 
fundamental and properties to need explaining. But if laws are relations between 
properties, it is not clear how can they be prior to the things they relate – the things 
which give them their identity and existence. In my view, if you are a structuralist you 
would do better to reject priority claims between properties and laws, allowing them to 
be equifundamental and mutually dependent. My hybrid view offers an escape from 
chicken-egg structuralism. My hybrid view offers the structuralist a positive account of 





2. Laws in Dispositional Essentialism 
Broadly, Dispositional Essentialism aims to ground natural modality in properties. 
Properties are dispositional. They are dispositions to certain manifestations given 
certain stimuli. These dispositions account for the lawfulness of nature. In this chapter, 
I will look at various criticisms of the dispositional essentialist project of accounting for 
laws via dispositions. I will start by giving some historic perspective on the nature of 
properties and laws via a discussion of Categoricalism. This view takes properties to 
have no essential modal character and laws to be contingent, allowing for worlds where 
properties change, swap, or invert nomic roles. I will show how Dispositional 
Essentialism arose in opposition to this view, with a promise of explaining modality via 
properties and allowing for necessary laws of nature. After I have done this, I will lay 
out the main criticisms of the dispositional essentialist account for laws, which I will 
respond to in the next chapters. 
 
2.1 Categoricalism and laws of nature 
Dispositional Essentialism is a relatively recent view. In the past, the debate about laws 
of nature aligned with a Categoricalist perspective. Here, by Categoricalism I mean the 
view that properties do not have essential modal features. They are not identified by 
what they do, or what laws they follow. These are contingent facts about properties. By 
contingent I mean that they could have been different or are different in other possible 
worlds.  
There are two main views of laws within Categoricalism. The first, which is still popular 
today, is the regularity view of laws. This view was popularised by David Lewis, 
inspired by David Hume’s influential work on causation. Hume says that we never see 
the necessary connection between events, we only witness a regular association of 
events (2007). This leads to what is known as the problem of induction whereby we have 
no proof of our inductive inferences. Famously, we have no proof that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. All we have are a bunch of observations of the sun rising, nothing more. 
David Lewis was a strong advocate of Humean Supervenience – the view that “all there 




another” (1986, p. ix). He described the universe as a system of points with spatio-
temporal relations between them, with local properties. His view is called Humean 
Supervenience because he believes that all else, laws included, simply supervene on that 
mosaic. There are regularities which we observe but they could have been otherwise. 
Elizabeth Miller describes Lewis’s view as a pointillist painting where any point could 
have been placed elsewhere (2014). We can infer laws from the overall harmony of the 
painting, but they supervene on the points rather than dictating their arrangement. 
According to the regularity view laws are not independent ontological entities. In fact, 
they are not even fixed. Rather, our universe happens to display certain regularities. 
These regularities are brute, unexplained, and contingent. Laws of nature are simply 
higher order regularities, which track fundamental regularities and systematise where 
possible. We infer laws from regularities, but they could be broken at any point. The 
properties they relate are freely recombinable. This view is associated with the BSA – 
best system analysis – of laws. The BSA contends that there are many different possible 
laws we could use to explain the world around us. We ought to assent to those which 
feature in the best system account – the account with the best predictive power. 
The second categoricalist view of laws is the DTA view, named after Fred Dretsky 
(1977), Michael Tooley (1977) and David Armstrong (1978) who expressed similar views 
around the same time. On this view, laws are relations between properties. Here 
properties are taken to be universals – abstract properties which individuals 
instantiate. In a way their view is almost a middle ground between the Lewisian view 
(which has contingent laws) and dispositionalist views (where laws are necessary). DTA 
take laws to be contingently necessitated. 
When philosophers speak of things being necessary they usually refer to trans-world 
necessity. In other words, the necessary thing occurs in every single possible world. For 
instance, 2+2=4 is true in every possible world. Conversely, a thing being contingent 
means that it could have been otherwise. For instance, I could have got a cat rather than 
a dog. Thus, there are worlds where the thing occurs and worlds where it does not. It 
could have not been the case. As a result, the idea that laws are contingently 
necessitated can seem strange or paradoxical.  
In the DTA, laws are relations between properties, for instance the universals Q and P. 




otherwise. The contingent aspect comes from the fact that the relations between 
universals may be different in different worlds. This is a natural consequence of their 
Categoricalism about properties. As a categorical view, properties (universals) do not 
have intrinsic modal characteristics, as such their relations to other properties may be 
different in other worlds. So, in what sense are they necessary? The necessity here 
refers to the idea that, if two universals are connected in a world, the law is necessary 
within that world. So, every instance of Q relates to an instance of P, they cannot be 
separated in a world where the universals are connected in this lawlike fashion. Thus, 
when advocates of the DTA view say that laws are contingently necessitated they do not 
mean trans-world necessity. Instead, they mean to say that laws are intra-world 
necessary, they apply without exception within each world. Laws are fixed at worlds 
according to the relations between universals in that world. 
The two major downsides of Categoricalism, which fuel Dispositional Essentialism 
(which we will turn to soon), are the fact that it implies quidditism and humility about 
properties (Esfeld, 2009). This creates a gap between properties and laws which makes 
laws accidental or contingent. Regarding quidditism, recall how properties are viewed 
within Categoricalism. They have no essential modal characteristics. Rather their 
essence is internal to them, and not given by their relations to anything else. As I said, 
Categoricalism is associated with quidditism, whereby properties are individuated by 
their quiddity or their intrinsic aspect or nature.2 A property is what it is because of this 
quiddity. Humility refers to the fact that the real essence of properties is inaccessible to 
us.  
David Lewis explains quidditism via the notion of Combinatorialism (2009, p. 208). In 
his view, properties can be freely combined and recombined. Two properties could swap 
roles without us noticing (more on this soon). However, there is something inherent in 
properties which means that the two scenarios would be distinct. This is the quiddity of 
the property – its intrinsic nature or intrinsic this-ness. Again, consider a world where 
we have swapped a property out for another, but no one can tell. These two worlds are 
still distinct. Their being distinct has nothing to do with whether we can tell them apart, 
 
2 Dustin Locke (2012) argues that there are forms of quidditism so austere that properties are 
individuated by their numerical identity. However, for the most part quidditism seems to refer to 




epistemic considerations do not enter the picture. They are distinct because the 
properties are distinct.  
The notion of Combinatorialism and Quidditism are closely tied to that of Humility to 
the point that Lewis says “Given Combinatorialism and quidditism, our argument for 
Humility is complete.” (2009, p. 209) Within Categoricalism we cannot know the essence 
of properties via powers, or what they do, the essence of properties is hidden from us. 
We cannot know charge via our observations of charge, its behaviour is contingent and 
so our observations tell us nothing about its intrinsic nature. In fact, as we saw, 
properties can be swapped around (Combinatorialism) without us knowing. They are 
only differentiated via an intrinsic nature which is beyond our acquaintance 
(Quidditism). As a result, we are left in perpetual ignorance about the true nature of 
properties. This ignorance is what is referred to as humility. Humility highlights the 
fact that we can never know the character of the properties that populate our world. No 
amount of interaction with said properties will let us know what they are like or how 
they differ from any other property intrinsically. 
The fact that the nomic roles of properties are non-essential and contingent leads to a 
gap between properties and laws. Laws vary from world to world and, as such, there is 
always a degree of contingency to them – they are not necessary. Combinatorialism 
within Categoricalism allows for counterintuitive inverted or I-worlds. These are worlds 
where properties behave slightly differently or even fully invert their nomic roles. So, for 
instance, mass and charge could swap roles. Charge could obey mass-laws and mass 
could obey charge-laws. In Lewis’s words: 
“Suppose, for instance, that we start with the actual world, and we permute two 
fundamental monadic properties F1 and F2… Then F2 will be found in exactly 
those places in space and time (or, more generally, in the pattern of the places 
where F1 was found originally; and vice versa. And the laws of nature governing 
F1 in the permutation will be just the same as the laws governing F1 originally 
(more precisely, the laws governing F2 vis-à-vis F1 in the permutation will be the 
same as those governing F1 vis-à-vis F2 originally) and vice versa.” (Lewis, 2009, 
p. 208) 
For the dispositional essentialist I-worlds are unthinkable. A world where F1 plays the 




possible. This is a world where we have swapped the labels F1 and F2 and/or “mass” and 
“charge”. This is because, for the dispositional essentialist, what a property does is 
essential to it. 
 
2.2 Dispositional Essentialism and laws 
Dispositional Essentialism arose in opposition to Categoricalism. It arose in opposition 
to the view that properties have no intrinsic modal characteristics, to contingent laws 
and I-world. Dispositional essentialists do not accept regularity views or contingent 
views of laws. Dispositional essentialists aim to ground all modality in dispositional 
properties.  
It is worth noting that ontologies with dispositional properties and categorical properties 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some dispositional essentialists (like Ellis, 2001) 
allow for categorical properties in their ontology. However, I set this aside as it has no 
impact on my argument. This is because I am concerned with how dispositional 
essentialists account for laws of nature. While the possibility of categorical properties is 
contentious within Dispositional Essentialism, the fact that dispositional properties 
ground laws is not. Alexander Bird (2007), Brian Ellis (2001) both claim that 
dispositions ground laws and Stephen Mumford (2004) says that dispositions are 
responsible for the lawfulness we see in nature despite not being a realist about laws per 
se.  
Broadly, Dispositional Essentialism is the view that there are dispositional properties. 
Those properties account for laws of nature. As a view, it is quite liberal as it is 
compatible with many kinds of realism about properties. Most dispositional essentialists 
have traditional ontologies, viewing properties as universals. Some see those universals 
as immanent (Ellis, 2001; Mumford, 2004) meaning that the universals only exist when 
instantiated. Others see them as Platonic, meaning they exist regardless of 
instantiation (Bird, 2007 leans this way; Tugby, 2013). It is worth noting that 
Dispositional Essentialism can also make compatible with trope views of properties 
(Molnar, 2003), however I will not be delving into that view here. 
When Dispositional Essentialists talk about properties, and how they give rise to laws, 




dispositional properties that account for laws of nature. Sparse or fundamental 
properties are those which play an important role in our ontology and are needed in 
fundamental science. This notion is inherited from David Lewis. According to Lewis:  
Fundamental properties are… not at all disjunctive, or determinable, or 
negative. They render their instances perfectly similar in some respect. They are 
intrinsic; and all other intrinsic properties supervene on them.” (Lewis, 2009, p. 
204) 
According to Lewis, fundamental properties cannot be disjunctive or determinable. I 
take Bird to have a similar view, on the basis that he claims that only single-track 
properties are fundamental. By single-track Bird means properties with a single 
stimulus and manifestation condition. We will look at this in detail later in this chapter 
as well as in the next chapter. For now, suffice to say that which properties are 
fundamental is debatable and this kind of Birdian-Lewisian view is on the narrow side. 
Further, and directly in contrast with Bird, we will see that there is a compelling case to 
be made for the view that dispositions may be inherently multi-track (Vetter, 2015) or 
determinable (Wilson, 2012). 
The core of Dispositional Essentialism is that dispositional properties exist and are 
responsible for the lawfulness we witness in nature. This remains true regardless of 
your stance on controversial issues like which properties we ought to be realists about. 
These properties have no categorical basis or quiddity. When I say that properties have 
dispositional essences, I mean that properties are identified, and their nature exhausted 
by their nomic roles. These properties are inherently modal. 
Generally, dispositional essentialists take the nature and identity of a property to be 
rooted in its disposition to manifestation M given stimulus S. For instance, for 
something to have the property of being fragile it must be able to break. Further, it must 
be quite susceptible to breakage. Of course, something could be fragile and never break 
provided that, if it were put under a certain amount of stress, it would break. On the 
standard approach, properties are identified by their stimulus-manifestation conditions 
(Bird, 2007, pp. 138-46). However, it is worth noting that there are other ways of 
characterising dispositions. Barbara Vetter argues that dispositions ought to be 
identified solely by their manifestations (2015, chapter 3) and Anna Marmodoro rejects 




reciprocal (2017). I will not focus on how exactly to define or identify dispositions. In 
fact, my ultimate view will leave this sort of interpretation of dispositions open. 
However, I take the view that dispositions are dispositions to certain manifestations 
given certain stimulus as standard and as my starting point for exploring how 
Dispositional Essentialism can account for modality. In the process, I will show that it is 
oversimplified. The idea that we can codify dispositions (and laws of nature) into simple 
single-stimulus-single-manifestation conditions is too restrictive. Some departure from 
this strict model will be needed to account for laws of nature. 
One of the greatest appeals of Dispositional Essentialism is that it avoids the 
troublesome I-worlds I spoke about earlier. To reiterate, Dispositional Essentialism is 
averse to views where laws are brute regularities or contingent features of our world. 
These views are associated with Categoricalism and the gap Categoricalism affords 
between properties and laws. This gap does not exist in Dispositional Essentialism. This 
is because, what a property does – what laws it follows – is essential to that property. 
The property’s nature and essence are given by its relation to other properties. Thus, the 
relations between properties are fixed across worlds. Any world with charge is a world 
which follows Coulomb’s law – the law which outlines how charged objects interact. So, 
laws are necessary – fixed across worlds. There is no room for mass to do what charge 
does and vice versa. The very nature of mass and charge is to act as they do. Their 
dispositions are fixed. 
One of the main attractions of Dispositional Essentialism is that it provides an easy 
account of laws of nature in terms of properties. By referencing modal properties, 
lawfulness is explained. No regularities are left brute or contingent – happy accidents of 
our world. However, where does this leave laws of nature? 
Within Dispositional Essentialism, properties are identified by their relations to further 
properties. However, these relations “look uncommonly like laws.” (Swoyer, 1982, p. 214) 
After all, as we saw above, “laws” is often taken to refer to or to mean “relations between 
properties”. This is true in both Categoricalism and Dispositional Essentialism, both of 
which commonly see laws as relations between universals (Tugby, 2015). Given that 
properties are identified by their relations to further properties, the very nature of 
properties is sufficient to explain laws within Dispositional Essentialism. Properties 
have essential and unchangeable ties to each other, so the laws of nature are necessary 




invert their roles are not possible within Dispositional Essentialism. Any world with 
charge is a world where Coulomb’s law applies. The nature of charge mandates it. 
The proximity between properties and laws is clear within Dispositional Essentialism. It 
lends itself to at least four interpretations of the relationship between properties and 
laws: 
 (P1) there are only properties as we have no need for laws 
(P2) properties are fundamental and ground laws which are ontologically 
secondary 
 (P3) properties are constituted by laws which govern how properties behave 
 (P4) properties and laws are symmetrically dependent 
I will go through these in turn. 
The view that there are only properties and no laws (P1) is argued for in Mumford’s 
book Laws in Nature (2004). He argues that either a) laws have a governing role or b) 
laws do not have a governing role. If a) is true, Dispositional Essentialism is false. This 
is because if laws have a governing role, properties are not doing the modal work and 
Categoricalism (as opposed to Dispositional Essentialism) is the case. So, if you endorse 
Dispositional Essentialism you must endorse b) – that laws do not play a governing role. 
Mumford argues that in light of b) – that laws do not play a governing role – we ought to 
eliminate them on the basis that they needlessly inflate our ontology.  
There is some tension between Dispositional Essentialism’s desire to ground all 
modality in properties and its commitment to laws. On the one hand, Mumford points 
out that properties seem to be doing all the work already. However, dispositional 
essentialists are rarely eliminative about laws of nature. This may be partially 
motivated by the fact that talk of laws is so embedded in the scientific discourse, 
eliminating them is quite a radical move. The biggest motivator for holding onto laws, in 
my view, is that laws provide a unifying explanation for why so many individual 
dispositions act in such predictable laws. Often many dispositions (e.g. magnitudes of 
charge, mass, etc.) neatly act in accordance with a single equation. Laws provide a way 
of explaining this cohesion. Next, I will look at two ways in which dispositional 
essentialists have tried to retain laws by saying that laws are derived from properties 




The most popular and representative view of laws among dispositional essentialists is 
(P2) – the view that dispositional properties give rise to laws (Ellis, 2001; Bird, 2007). 
Properties are fundamental and metaphysically prior. Bird sees “…the motor and 
cement of the universe as residing ultimately not in the laws themselves but rather in 
the dispositional nature of properties. The laws are, in a sense, epiphenomenal.” (2007, 
p. 47). At the same time, the laws – as the relations between properties – are a crucial 
part of the dispositional essentialist story. 
Laws are entailed by properties – the properties require the existence of relations to get 
their identity. Apart from being entailed by properties and being the glue that holds 
properties together, laws are very useful in scientific practice and in our prediction and 
navigation of the world. As such, I take P2 to be the most representative view of laws 
within Dispositional Essentialism. The fundamentality of properties and their 
metaphysically explaining laws is standard Dispositional Essentialism. As a result, this 
view will be my focus for the next chapters. In particular, I will be concerned with the 
problems facing this view and how we can respond to them in order to better account for 
laws of nature. 
Another, though less popular, alternative to eliminating laws is to say that properties 
are constituted by laws (P3). Matthew Tugby (2015) has argued that this view is 
plausible given Mumford (2004) and Bird (2007). The idea is that laws are not 
eliminable. They are fundamental parts of the world. Laws constitute the properties of 
dispositionalists.  
Tugby’s argument starts by pointing out that laws within Dispositional Essentialism are 
structurally very similar to laws within the DTA view mentioned above. To recap, the 
DTA view is the view that laws are relations between universals which are contingently 
necessitated. The similarity lies in the fact that within Dispositional Essentialism laws 
are also treated as relations between universals (Mumford, 2004; Ellis, 2001; Bird, 
2007). However, in this case they will not be contingently necessitated but rather are 
necessary. As we have seen, the nature of dispositional properties is fixed by their 
relations to other properties. As a result, those relations – the laws of nature – are fixed 
across all worlds. 
Dispositional essentialists regularly talk of laws as relations between properties. 




And, on the pure dispositions view whereby properties are purely dispositional without a 
categorical basis (Bird, 2007; Mumford, 2004; Tugby, 2015) there is nothing more to 
dispositions than these relations. In light of this, Tugby argues that within Mumford 
and Bird’s framework, laws constitute properties. Naturally, on this view it makes no 
sense to eliminate laws in favour of properties. Properties cannot exist without laws and 
laws dictate how particular instantiations behave. 
Finally, I mentioned a fourth picture of the relationship between properties and laws 
that is compatible with Dispositional Essentialism. This is the view that properties and 
laws symmetrically depend on each other (P4). While I do not know of any philosopher 
who explicitly endorses this view, I find it to be highly motivated from a dispositionalist 
or structuralist perspective. 
As we saw earlier, in Categoricalism there is a gap between properties and laws. This 
gap allows for laws to be contingent and for I-worlds where properties change, swap or 
invert nomic roles. Dispositional Essentialism closes this gap between properties and 
laws. Properties are like the relata and laws are the relations between them. (This 
image will re-surface in the following section where we look at how Bird represents 
properties and laws using graphs). What I envision here is that the relata and the 
relations symmetrically depend on each other. 
Most philosophers assume that relations cannot exist without relata by definition. 
Mumford rejects the relations (laws) on the basis that the relata (properties) contain all 
the modal information. However, the existence of the relata is never questioned. In my 
view, it is not clear that the dependence goes from relata to relations – from properties 
to laws. The relata – properties - here are peculiar. The nature of the relata is relational. 
The nature and essence of properties is exhausted by the relations they enter into. This 
is exactly what leads Tugby to say that properties are constituted by laws (2015). At the 
same time, the laws are the very relationship between properties. They are constituted 
by properties.  As such it is hard to see how we could have one – relations or relata - 
without the other. They both get their identities and essences in virtue of each other. 
Thus, it is hard to see how one could be metaphysically prior to the other. 
 Properties and laws are so close in Dispositional Essentialism that the project of pulling 
them apart, and giving one ontological priority over the other, is messy. I will go into 




For now, I set P4 aside. My focus is on P2 – the standard view within Dispositional 
Essentialism, that  properties are fundamental and laws secondary. I will explore the 
problems this picture faces and how Dispositional Essentialism must change in order to 
address them. 
 
2.3 Problems for Dispositional Essentialism’s account of laws  
2.3.1 Functional laws 
Dispositional Essentialism’s view of properties as fundamental, and laws as 
supervenient, has much appeal. Prima facie, taking properties with necessary nomic 
roles to be fundamental does away with the need to account for laws. Within 
Dispositional Essentialism laws cover the dispositions of properties. According to Bird, 
laws are of the type ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) (2007, p. 46), which is to say that given a property 
P and its stimulus S, manifestation M will follow. However, this account is overly 
simplistic. In what follows I cover a few important problems Dispositional 
Essentialism’s account of laws faces. 
The first and main difficulty that Dispositional Essentialism faces in accounting for laws 
is the fact that contemporary physics is built out of functional laws.  Here I follow 
Armstrong in taking a functional law to be “a determinable law that governs a class of 
determinate laws.” (1997, p. 245) There are various ways of conceptualising the 
determinable-determinate relationship. For instance, determinables are often viewed as 
sets of determinates. Alternatively, determinables may be seen to differ from 
determinates in terms of specificity.  Determinates are more specific than 
determinables. Either way we can get a sense of determinables and determinates by 
example. Red is a determinate of colour, however it is also a determinable of scarlet and 
crimson. Similarly, quadrangle is a determinate of shape, however it is a determinable 
of square and rectangle. As a result, a determinable law will be one that holds at the 
determinable level (for instance a law that is true of colour) and a determinate law will 
hold at the determinate level (in this case red, blue or yellow). If functional laws are 
determinable laws which govern determinate laws, they will be laws about 
determinables like colour, charge, or mass assuming these govern laws about 




Functional laws are a problem for popular expositions of Dispositional Essentialism on 
the basis that these take determinate properties to ground laws. However, determinate 
properties seem like candidates for grounding determinate (as opposed to determinable) 
laws. Dispositional essentialists tend to favour determinate properties despite 
recognizing that the laws of science are functional (determinable). Chris Swoyer does 
this on the basis that there is reason to doubt that determinable properties exist, yet he 
accepts that this leaves unanswered questions. “If determinables are not genuine 
properties, the truth of a general principle must be explained by facts about 
determinates, rather than conversely. Moreover, we need to explain what it means to 
say that determinates fall under the same determinable.” (1982, p. 219) Dispositional 
essentialists have yet to account for this, with the issue going unnoticed. 
The difficulty Dispositional Essentialism faces accounting for functional laws stems 
from the fact that the properties that they say ground modality are determinate. The 
problem comes across clearly in Bird’s popular exposition of Dispositional Essentialism 
(2007). Bird claims that there is no room for multi-track dispositions in our fundamental 
ontology. Multi-track dispositions are dispositions with multiple stimulus-manifestation 
conditions. On his view all fundamental properties are single-track meaning that they 
only have a single stimulus-manifestation condition.  
The idea that only single-track dispositions are fundamental is based on the idea that 
multi-track dispositions can be reduced to a multitude of single-track ones. Bird argues 
that if a property has multiple stimuli and/or manifestations then it is not a 
fundamental one. Rather, it is a conjunction of multiple fundamental properties which 
are single-track. For instance, if property S has the following stimulus-manifestation 
conditions S12-M134 and S18-M134, then S is actually two properties: the property to 
manifest M134 when presented with stimulus S12 and the property to manifest M134 
when presented with stimulus S18. These two properties have different stimuli3. 
Bird illustrates the relations between fundamental properties using graph theory. On 
his view, each fundamental dispositional property will have a single stimulus and 
manifestation condition. These stimuli and manifestations will be further properties. In 
the graph properties are represented by nodes or vertices. The relations they hold to 
 
3 It is worth noting that Bird allows for single-track dispositions with a complex stimulus 
condition, i.e. where various conditions must hold together to meet the stimulus condition (2007, 




other properties (their stimuli and manifestations) are represented by lines between the 
nodes or vertices (see figure 1 below). This also has the advantage of showing how we 
differentiate properties from each other given the interrelations between them. Each 
property will be differentiated by its unique set of relations to other properties. “The 
identity and distinctness of the vertices of a graph can supervene on the structure of 
that graph.” (Bird, 2007, p. 139) The lines between the properties are supposed to give 
us the modality of the world i.e. to explain the lawfulness we witness in nature. But let’s 
consider what laws these graphs can really give us. 
 
Figure 1 (Bird, 2007, p. 146) 
According to Bird, laws within Dispositional Essentialism are of the type ∀x((Px 
∧Sx)→Mx) where P stands for a property, S the stimulus and M the manifestation (2007, 
p. 46). The idea is that given a property P and its stimulus S, manifestation M follows. 
However, as we saw, for Bird the fundamental or natural properties are single-track. So, 
that basically means that laws formalise a relation between a single-track property, its 
maximally determinate stimulus and manifestation.4 I say that the stimulus and 
manifestations are maximally determinate because, if they were not, they would allow 
various determinate stimuli and manifestations. However, this would make them multi-
track. Therefore, the stimulus and manifestations will be maximally determinate. The 
problem is that these properties only seem able to ground maximally determinate laws. 
If laws of nature are of the type ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) where a determinate property, taken 
with a determinate stimulus gives rise to a determinate manifestation, only determinate 
laws are fundamental. The problem for Dispositional Essentialism is that the basic 
properties in science (e.g. mass, charge, etc.) thus far have not been single-track. They 
have various stimulus and manifestation conditions.  They are multi-track in Bird’s 
 
4 Later in this chapter I will look at whether maximally determinate properties can be multi-
track (Vetter, 2015). I set this issue aside for now as it distracts from the discussion regarding 




terminology. As a result, these properties cannot be fundamental for Bird, nor can the 
laws in which they enter. Since these laws range over many determinate laws they are 
determinable or functional laws (e.g. Coulomb’s law, the law of gravitation). So 
determinable laws cannot be fundamental and are mere conjunctions of determinate 
laws. This leaves the determinable or functional laws of current science unexplained, as 
brute regularities of determinate laws – a situation which Dispositional Essentialism 
was set up to avoid (Vetter, 2012, section 3).  
I will use Coulomb’s law to illustrate Dispositional Essentialism’s difficulty in 
accounting for functional, or determinable laws. Coulomb’s law is a functional or 
determinable law since it outlines how any two charged objects interact (covering all 
combinations of determinate charges). In the dispositional essentialist’s lingo it tells us 
how any charge (C) will manifest (M) when presented with stimulus (S). However, for 
Bird, these variables C, M and S are mere disjunctions of determinate Cs, Ms and Ss. As 
a result, the only laws which we can truly account for (assuming that the determinates 
here are not disjunctions too) are the determinate laws which outline how determinate 
charged objects interact. So Dispositional Essentialism can explain, for instance, why 
determinate charges {C1, C2, and C3} have determinate manifestations {M1, M2, M3} 
given a determinate stimulus {S1, S2, S3}. Since laws do not add new information, but 
trivially supervene on properties, this allows for the following laws within Dispositional 
Essentialism: ‘When C1 is presented with S1 it manifests as M1’, ‘When C2 is presented 
with S2 it manifests as M2’, ‘When C3 is presented with S3 it manifests as M3’, and so 
on. However, these determinate laws do not explain Coulomb’s law, which states that S, 
C, and M (qua determinables) stand in a functional relationship. No explanation has 
been given for the regularity among the determinate charges and, thus, for Coulomb’s 
law itself. Given how critical dispositional essentialists are of regularity views, they 
need to be able to account for functional laws without running into a regularity view 
themselves. 
The difficulty Dispositional Essentialism faces accounting for regularities among 
determinates may be made worse by the threat of “vacuous laws”. A vacuous law is a 
law which, for one reason or another, is never instantiated. This can happen either 
because a property is not instantiated – missing property - or because two properties 
never cross paths so that the relation is not instantiated - missing relation 
(Chakravartty, 2007, p. 141). As mentioned earlier, objects can have dispositions 




it ever breaks. Being fragile entails certain possibilities about the object that is fragile 
which need not materialise. Thus, I focus on the missing properties problem for 
Dispositional Essentialism. Let’s disambiguate between two kinds of missing properties. 
There may be determinates (e.g. charge C235) which are not instantiated. Alternatively, 
there could be determinables which are not instantiated. I will call these alien 
properties following Lewis (2009) and Tugby (2013). 
The issue of uninstantiated determinates is that we believe that there are facts about 
what laws those determinates would follow. In the case of an uninstantiated magnitude 
of charge we believe it will follow a determinate of Coulomb’s law. Similarly, an 
uninstantiated mass would follow a determinate of the law of gravitation. However, it is 
not clear what makes these beliefs true in the dispositional essentialist’s worldview. If 
we are only realists about determinate instantiated properties it seems that there are no 
truthmakers for uninstantiated ones. Rather, we make guesses about the behaviour of 
possible determinates from the pattern of regularities we witness, but nothing 
guarantees that our guesses are correct.  
Chakravartty proposes various ways of circumventing this worry (2007, chapter 5). The 
first is inspired by Armstrong, who has an Aristotelian view of universals whereby only 
instantiated universals are real. On his view, statements about uninstantiated 
determinates have truthmakers in the determinable laws they instantiate. On his view, 
“The existence of the determinable universal is entailed by, and so supervenes upon, the 
existence of each and every determinate universal falling under it.” (Armstrong, 1997, p. 
247) So any one determinate mass or charge (for example) brings the determinable mass 
or charge into existence. The determinate law regarding that particular mass or charge, 
brings the determinable law into existence too. Determinable properties and laws then 
are necessary for us to know anything about uninstantiated determinates. 
A second suggestion stems from the holistic nature of Dispositional Essentialism. The 
idea is that all properties are connected within Dispositional Essentialism. As properties 
get their identity from other properties, the existence of any property will eventually 
loop round, grounding truths about uninstantiated determinates.  
“The role of truthmaker can be served, not only by any one of the properties 




that it is a consequence of DIT [Dispositional Identity Thesis] that networks of 
causal properties have a holistic nature.” (Chakravartty, 2007, p. 146) 
Picture Bird’s graphs. Every property will eventually (even if with some degrees of 
separation) connect to every other property. So, every property fixes the facts about 
every other property. 
The issue of uninstantiated determinables is more or less troublesome, depending on 
your point of view. It is less troublesome if you do not accept the possibility of alien 
properties. However, this is very hard to justify a priori. At best we have an argument 
from Ockham’s razor to their non-existence but this is hardly decisive (Lewis, 2009). 
Again, Bird’s graphs creeps in. As Tugby put it, “unless we take our world to be 
metaphysically privileged in some way, we would have to be lucky to belong to a world 
which spatiotemporally instantiates all the properties in the transcendent graph.” 
(2013, p. 477)  
Armstrong’s strategy cannot help with truthmaking with regards to statements about 
uninstantiated determinable properties and laws. After all, being uninstantiated these 
will not have a corresponding truthmaking universal. If we are concerned about alien 
determinables we can endorse a Platonic view in which all universals exist, not just the 
instantiated ones. It is worth noting that some dispositional essentialists are open to 
Platonism like Bird (2007) and Matthew Tugby, who gives a full exposition of Platonic 
Dispositionalism in his 2013 paper of that name. How does Chakravartty’s suggestion 
fair?  
Recall that Chakravartty suggested that, within Dispositional Essentialism, every 
property could serve as a truthmaker for facts about every other property and the laws 
it follows. The relations between properties (the laws) go all the way round the holistic 
structure, so they are fixed by the properties which exist.  The issue is that, within a 
Bird-like framework, it will be the case that any instantiated determinate property is 
linked to every other possible or actual determinate property. However, this would still 
leave us with a bunch of determinate laws. The determinable level is left unexplained.  
Alien properties aside, in my view Chakravartty’s solution still requires realism about 
determinable properties. Without determinables we risk a regularity view. This would 




Given the commitment to properties having dispositional essences that would not be 
possible. Nonetheless, the existence of unifying determinable laws would go 
unexplained. The fact that so many determinates obey a single law would be an 
unexplained regularity, a seemingly miraculous accident. This goes against 
Dispositional Essentialism’s aim of accounting for all modality, rather than leaving it 
brute. 
In my view, realism about determinables neatly solves the problem of uninstantiated 
determinates. If the determinable property and law exist, they explain why 
uninstantiated determinates are bound to follow certain laws. I will not take sides on 
the issue of uninstantiated determinables. If you take an Aristotelian stance, and do not 
believe in uninstantiated universals, this may not be a problem for you. If you do believe 
in alien properties, you have the options of pairing your realism about determinables 
with either a) a platonic view whereby all determinables exist (see Tugby, 2013) or b) 
Chakravartty’s holism. However, the most persuasive reason for my proposed solution is 
that realism about determinables would help solve the larger problem of accounting for 
functional or determinable laws within Dispositional Essentialism. The fact that it helps 
account for vacuous laws is a bonus. Thus, in my view, the way forward is to reject 
Bird’s dogma of maximally determinate properties which causes more trouble than it is 
worth. I do the argument for determinables justice in the next chapter, for now I will 
look at some other problems for Dispositional Essentialism’s account of laws. 
2.3.2 Laws are complex 
The second problem for Dispositional Essentialism’s account of laws stems from the idea 
that laws are of the type ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) where P stands for any property, S for its 
stimulus and M its manifestation.  
We saw that Bird articulates properties and laws in terms of stimulus-manifestation 
conditions. For instance, he says that “The manifestation of charge is a force on some 
other charge, its stimulus is the magnitude of that other charge.” (Bird, 2007, p. 21) 
Presumably, a formalisation of this would give us Coulomb’s law. The problem is that, 
this is not what scientific laws look like. Barbara Vetter is quick to point out that the 
laws in question do not even mention stimuli or manifestations (2012; 2015). Scientific 




Coulomb’s law (see the table below) determines the electrical force (F) by multiplying 
the charges of the objects (Q1 and Q2), dividing their sum by the square of the distance 
between them (r2), and multiplying the result by Coulomb’s constant (K). So, the 
electrical force is proportional to the charge of the objects and inversely proportional to 
the distance between them. Newton’s law of gravitation determines the gravitation 
forces (F) in function of the mass of two objects (M1 and M2) and the square of the 
distance between them (r2), all of which are variable quantities. In particular, it tells us 
that gravitational force is proportional to the mass of the objects but inversely 
proportional to the distance between them. And Einstein’s mass energy equivalence 
determines the quantity of energy (E) in function of the quantity of mass (M) which is 
multiplied by the square of the speed of light (C2). 





Newton’s law of 
gravitation 






E = MC2 
Bird’s model of laws within Dispositional Essentialism - ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) – 
oversimplifies things. Dispositions are not absolutes which either hold or do not hold. 
They come in degrees or quantities. Laws do not speak of stimuli and manifestations but 
relate quantities. Further, they may relate more than three entities (whereas Bird can 
only allow for laws which relate 3 properties – they relate the property in question to its 
stimulus and manifestation). For instance, Coulomb’s law allows for the input of two 
charges, a distance and that gives us the force between the two objects. Here I will not 
take sides on whether all these properties are legitimate, intrinsic or extrinsic, 
fundamental or not. The point is that scientific laws are varied and take on a plethora of 
different forms. They are not reducible to a simple formula. Dispositional Essentialism 
is faced with two options. It can cling to Bird-like views that laws are of a certain type 
and claim that any laws which do not fit the mould are not fundamental. Alternatively, 
it can allow properties to relate to each other in more flexible ways. I choose the second 




First, Bird has not actually succeeded at persuading other dispositional essentialists 
that properties and laws must fit the narrow confines he places upon them. There is 
precedent within Dispositional Essentialism for properties with multiple powers 
(Mumford, 2014 - see next chapter). Additionally, Vetter argues that dispositions are 
multi-track, that conditional analyses fail to capture how properties and laws work, and 
that dispositions need to be flexible to account for laws such as the above (2013; 2015). 
This leads Vetter to say that we are better off leaving stimulus out of the picture and 
characterising dispositions by their manifestations only (2015, p. 65). Further, 
Marmodoro argues that stimulus-manifestation models miss the point of the reciprocal 
exchange between powers (2017). 
Second, it takes a very powerful case to establish each of the a priori constraints Bird’s 
places on properties and laws individually. It takes a strong case to show that a) 
properties (and/or laws) must be maximally determinate, b) properties are single-track, 
c) laws relate exactly three things (stimulus, property they are about and their 
manifestation) and d) all laws will conform to the simple formula he suggests. Each of 
these constraints is contentious, especially given that science (and philosophy according 
to my argument) is leading us away from his conclusions. It seems too quick to dismiss 
current successful physical laws on the basis that they are functional, do not conform to 
a bog-stand formulation of laws, or relate more than three things (stimulus, property, 
and manifestation). 
2.3.2.1 Functional laws re-visited 
In light of Vetter’s critique, I must rephrase the first problem for Dispositional 
Essentialism – the problem of accounting for functional laws. I argued that it is was 
hard for dispositional essentialists to account for Coulomb’s law given that it is a 
functional law which ranged over many charges, stimuli, and manifestations. However, 
as Vetter shows, things are more complex. Coulomb’s law does not mention stimulus or 
manifestations. What Coulomb’s law tells us is that the electrostatic force of attraction 
between two charged objects is directly proportional to the product of the charges and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.  
Maximally specific solutions to Coulomb’s law, as given by Bird’s properties, would give 
us maximally determinate versions of this law such as “(CL∗) For all x, if x has charge e 




8×10–8 N.” (Vetter, 2015, p. 57) The problem is that these are utterly uninteresting and 
uninformative when compared to the general law.  
Laws which only outline how a property manifests in a maximally determinate 
circumstance are useless – they do not allow us to predict what will happen in other 
circumstances. Further, they do not give us interesting information about the world in 
the way that the general law does. (CL*) does not reveal to us the fact that the force 
between two charges is directly proportional to the product of those charges, and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. That information 
cuts to the heart of charge, giving us interesting information about its very nature. 
In addition to being uninformative, without an explanation for the relation between 
these determinables we are left with a regularity view of laws where the similarities 
between (CL*) and other determinate laws are left brute. The fact that so many things 
follow the general law is left unexplained which goes against the explanatory aims and 
promises of Dispositional Essentialism. 
The dispositional essentialist is left in an awkward position. The fact that all 
determinate charges behave in similar ways, so similar that their behaviour to be 
predicted by a single equation, calls out for an explanation. The regularities cannot be 
left brute, with functional laws inferred from them. That is tantamount to taking a 
Humean regularity view of laws (or at least determinable laws). Yet one of Dispositional 
Essentialism’s major selling points is its anti-Humean attitude – taking laws to be 
written into properties rather than mere regularities. Worse, Dispositional 
Essentialism’s inability to account for higher-level determinable laws undermines the 
power of the theory to explain the lawfulness of nature – one of its main selling points. If 
laws are made on a case by case, determinate, basis they seem ad hoc and lose their 
explanatory power. Little or no information is given by showing that a determinate 
property manifests a determinate way in a determinate situation. Impressive advances 
in science occur when high-level determinable laws are formulated which explain and 
predict the behaviour of many determinates.  
2.3.3 Global Principles 
Even after solving the previously mentioned problems for Dispositional Essentialism a 




Dispositional Essentialism has little or nothing to offer by way of an account of global 
principles. Roughly, global principles are higher-level laws than regular laws like 
Coulomb’s law. They do not hold of individual objects and their properties, so they 
cannot tell us information like what force a massy object is exerting or what dispositions 
a charged object has. Rather, they hold of the whole universe. These high-level laws 
appear to explain what happens at the local level rather than the reverse. So, if the 
universe conserves mass-energy that explains why any local loss of mass or energy will 
be paired with a gain somewhere else.  
Global principles are quite diverse. The best-established global principles include 
symmetry laws, conservation laws and the principle of least action. The principle of 
least action tells us that, when in doubt about how a system evolved, the option which 
required the least action is correct. We can visualise least action as the shortest 
trajectory between two points, however this is not technically correct. Action is a 
technical term for the difference between kinetic and potential energy over time. When 
we want to decide how a system evolved, the principle of least action tells us that the 
trajectory which involved the least action occurred (Katzav, 2004). Symmetry laws are 
closely tied to the concept of invariance. Symmetry laws outline what sort of 
transformations things can undergo without changing in other ways e.g. translation in 
space-time, spatial rotation. For instance, the speed of a train could change without 
affecting the laws of physics inside the train. Symmetry principles constrain which 
particles are able to exist leading to the famous prediction and discovery of the Higgs 
boson (French, 2014, p. 271). Conservation laws are laws regarding certain physical 
quantities which remain constant in the universe e.g. mass-energy, angular momentum, 
momentum, number of leptons. 
Bird recognises the problem of global principles in a small section of his concluding 
chapter in which he quickly dismisses these laws as “pseudo laws” to be explained away 
by future science (2007, p. 214). His dismissal is not convincing for two reasons. First, 
because contemporary physicists take global principles so seriously that they posit 
symmetries as fundamental in nature (McKenzie, 2012). Not only do these global 
principles appear to govern all interactions but they have proved incredibly fruitful. 
They constrain which particles are able to exist, allowing the prediction and discovery of 
the Higgs’ boson (Ibid). The second reason Bird’s treatment of global principles as 
pseudo-laws is unconvincing is that he never gives an independent argument for it. He 




Essentialism. Within Dispositional Essentialism laws stem from the dispositional 
essences of properties so there is “no room for further constraints.” (2007, p. 214) Given 
how well established and fruitful global principles are to contemporary science their 
dismissal warrants a strong argument.  
This is all very brief. These laws deserve a much greater exposition and so they will be 
the subject of two chapters. In chapter 4, I will look at global principles. I look at what 
they are, how they have been accounted for and why those accounts are unpopular. I 
also forward my own novel strategy for accounting for global principles within 
Dispositional Essentialism. Then, in chapter 5, “Case studies in accounting for Global 
Principles: Conservation laws and the Principle of Least Action”, I do a deep dive into a 
couple of examples of global principles, so that we can see these explanations applied to 
real cases.  
For now, suffice to say that these principles present a great, and often ignored, problem 
for Dispositional Essentialism. This is because it is hard to see how they can be the 
manifestations of ordinary properties’ dispositions. Again, a Humean view of these 
global principles as regularities is not open to Dispositional Essentialism. Leaving 
highly explanatory scientific laws brute or unexplained is exactly the sort of thing 
Dispositional Essentialism is supposed to avoid. 
 
Conclusion: 
Dispositional Essentialism arose in opposition to Categoricalism. Dispositional 
essentialists believe that what properties do – their nomic roles – reflect what they are – 
their essential nature. On the standard view, the dispositions of properties give rise to 
laws. This allows for necessary laws, avoiding regularity views or contingent laws. 
However, as we have seen, there are problems with the standard view. The most 
pressing and first to address is that it is hard to see how we get from properties to laws. 
This is because, the properties in question are often assumed to be maximally 
determinate or single-track (Swoyer, 1982; Bird, 2007) yet the laws are functional or 
determinable. In the next chapter I will argue for what I take to be the solution: realism 
about determinables. I will do this by showing the motivation for realism about 




Dispositional Essentialism (Mumford, 2004; Vetter 2012, 2015) and that realism about 
determinables neatly solves the issue at hand. After I have shown how dispositional 
essentialists can account for laws in general in chapter 3, I will look at ways in which 





3. Realism about Determinables 
In the previous chapter we saw that the main difficulty Dispositional Essentialism faces 
in accounting for laws is the fact that the laws of physics are functional or determinable. 
In this chapter, I articulate my proposed solution to the problem. I argue that if 
dispositional essentialists are realists about determinable properties the problem goes 
away. I argue this by showing the motivation for realism about determinables and 
showing that there is some precedent for this view within Dispositional Essentialism. 
After arguing for realism about determinables within dispositionalism, I will go on to 
explain the relationship between determinables and determinates on my view. 
 
3.1 Determinables and determinates 
In the previous chapter we saw that determinables are more general than determinates. 
Determinates like “crimson”, “maroon” and “scarlet” fall under the determinable “red”. 
Yet what exactly red is is up for debate. Is red real? Is it an abstraction or set of 
determinate reds? To answer these questions, let us look at what can be said about 
determinates and determinables generally.  
There are many determinates in existence, and many more could be instantiated. In 
addition to every shade of red (or every shade of colour at all), there are all the 
determinate shapes, charges, masses, pains, pleasures, angles, sounds, etc. That said, 
you can’t just make a set of a few determinate sounds, crimson and half a dozen charges 
and plausibly claim to have a determinable. Even if you thought that determinables 
were mere sets of determinates, those sets are not random. Determinates which fall 
under the same determinable have a special relation to each other (Johansson, 2000; 
Funkhouser, 2006; Wilson, 2012). In particular: 
a) Determinates under the same determinable resemble each other in a way 
that they do not resemble determinates of different determinables (e.g. yellow 
resembles blue in a way that it cannot resemble circular or square) 
b) Determinates of the same determinable are mutually exclusive 





d) Determinables do not fix determinates 
e) Determinates fix determinables 
Regarding a) determinates which fall under the same determinable are both similar and 
different in particular ways. Determinates of a determinable are like each other in a 
way that they are not like determinates of other determinables. Further, this similarity 
admits of degrees. So “blue” and “green” are similar in a way that “blue” and “square” 
can never be. Further, “blue” and “green” are more like each other than “blue” and 
“orange”. That said, “blue” and “yellow” may be equally similar to “green”. However, 
“blue” is no more similar to “circular” than to “square”. In fact, there is a sense in which 
these are utterly dissimilar and cannot be compared at all. 
In addition to sharing similarities, determinates importantly differ. As outlined in b). 
Determinates of the same determinable are mutually exclusive. Something cannot be 
“blue” and “red” at the same time (more on this below). Nor can something be both a 
“square” and a “circle”. In fact, square-circles are the archetype of logical impossibility, 
frequently brought up alongside 2 plus 2 being 5. On the other hand, determinates of 
different determinables do not usually exclude each other.5 Objects (even simple objects 
like particles) have determinates of various determinables. Electrons, for instance, have 
size, mass and charge. Back to our example, a thing may be blue and square, blue and 
circular, red and square or red and circular. We would not expect the blueness of a thing 
to dictate its shape or vice-versa. 
It is worth noting that at least one prominent writer about this topic allows for some 
determinables (or some determinates which fall under different determinables) to 
resemble each other in certain ways. Nonetheless, they will retain important 
differences. Eric Funkhouser (2006, 2014) paints a detailed picture of determinates and 
determinables based on the idea of determination dimensions. In his view, properties 
feature certain determination dimensions. For instance, the determination dimensions 
of colour are hue, brightness and saturation; those of sound are pitch, timbre and 
loudness.  
 
5 Determinates of different determinables can mutually exclude each other in special 
circumstances. Size and colour provide an example. The determinate “being particle sized” might 
exclude all determinate colours. However, that is not to say that size determinates and colour 





On Funkhouser’s view, maximally determinate properties – known as super-
determinates – have maximally specific values of their determination dimensions. For 
instance, a maximally specific shade of red has a precise hue, brightness and saturation. 
In contrast, determinables range over certain values of the determination dimensions. 
Red will range over all the values of hue, brightness and saturation which, if 
instantiated, would produce determinate reds. Colour, on the other hand, is a super-
determinable. It ranges over the entire determination dimensions i.e. over all 
combinations of hue, brightness and saturation. It is a super-determinable because it is 
maximally unspecific with regards to the determination dimensions. 
Determinates under the same determinable resemble in certain ways. They all share the 
same determination dimensions. As a result, determinates under the same determinable 
can be compared along those dimensions. They differ from determinates of other super-
determinables according to which values of determination dimensions they have. So, all 
colours have hue, brightness and saturation. They may be more or less similar on one or 
all of these dimensions. If three colours differ only with respect to hue, the two with the 
closest values of hue will be more like each other than the third. However, if they differ 
on various dimensions then perhaps it will be impossible to decide which are most 
dissimilar. 
Funkhouser leaves room for determinates under different determinables to partially 
resemble or be compared on specific determination dimensions. This is because he 
allows for the possibility that determinables can share some of their dimensions. Say 
determinable X and Y have the determination dimensions {A, B, C} and {B, D, E}. If this 
is possible, then determinates of X and Y would share a determination dimension - B. As 
a result, we may be able to compare them along this dimension and they are not utterly 
incommensurable.  
Jessica Wilson criticised Funkhouser’s use of determination dimensions. She pointed out 
that his favourite example – colour – might have different determination dimensions 
according to the discipline studying it. While he claims that the determination 
dimensions of colour are hue, brightness and saturation, a scientist might say that they 
are spectral power distributions (Wilson, 2006). Funkhouser has various responses to 
this, remaining neutral on what exactly the dimensions are.  He says “I am not 
concerned with defending any substantive thesis about the nature of colour, pain, etc. So 




from the three—hue, brightness, and saturation” (2014, p. 58) Funkhouser leaves this to 
science and retreats to neutrality as metaphysicians often do. He aims to give an 
abstract recipe for understanding determinates and determinables along determination 
dimensions. This abstract recipe, if true, holds independently of what those turn out to 
be. 
For my part I remain neutral on whether determinates and determinables can be 
mapped out on determination dimensions. I accept the traditional differentiators of 
determinates and determinables outlines in a) – e), leaving open how we flesh that out. 
What I take from Wilson and Funkhouser’s exchange is that, if Funkhouser’s picture is 
right the question of which determination dimensions properties have is very much 
open. Additionally, there is the issue of whether determinables can share dimensions. 
However, even if determinables may share determination dimensions, determinates 
under different determinables will still share significant differences. They will still 
importantly differ in virtue of having different determination dimensions. So, under all 
these popular expositions of determinates and determinables b) stands i.e. determinates 
of the same determinable are mutually exclusive 
In addition to having certain similarities and dissimilarities, determinates and 
determinables have special entailment relations. As mentioned in c) it is commonly 
assumed that for an object to have a determinable property it must have a relevant 
determinate property. So, for an object to be coloured it must be a particular shade. 
Similarly, for an object to have a shape it must have a particular shape. This has only 
recently been challenged by Wilson who argues for indeterminate properties (2016). I 
will not challenge the received view that instantiated properties fall under one 
determinate or other e.g. that every instantiation of colour is a particular shade. This 
issue is tangential to my case for realism about determinables. 
An object having a determinable means that it has a determinate. The determinable 
implies some determinate. Yet, it is worth nothing that the determinable does not fix the 
determinate (d). Saying that an object is coloured does not tell us anything about which 
determinate shade the object is.  
While determinables do not fix determinates, the reverse is not true. As per e), 
determinates do fix determinables. Any object with a determinate property has all the 




is crimson, it is necessarily red and coloured; if an object is round, it is necessarily 
shaped, etc. This asymmetry of entailment between determinates and determinables 
will be of importance in the next section which looks at anti-realism about 
determinables. 
 
3.2 Determinables as second-class properties 
Philosophers have been realists about determinates but often apathetic, deflationary or 
anti-realists about determinables. The emphasis on determinates is seen when Lewis 
says that fundamental properties “are not at all disjunctive, or determinable, or 
negative” (2009, p. 204). As we saw, Bird follows this tradition in saying that 
fundamental properties are single-track. Single-track properties will be maximally 
determinate because they have one maximally determinate stimulus and one maximally 
determinate manifestation, leaving no room for variation. Further, the prevalence of 
this assumption in the dispositional essentialist literature can be traced back to at least 
1982 when Swoyer noted the difficulty accounting for determinable dispositions and 
laws (p. 219). The idea of invoking determinables did not seem to even occur to him. 
The emphasis on determinate properties is somewhat inspired by the notion of 
abundant properties and the pressure that puts on philosophers to slim down their 
ontology. Abundant properties, as a category, includes every possible property. As a 
result, this group includes regular properties (e.g. the property of being red), negative 
properties (e.g. the property of being not-red) and conjunctive properties (e.g. the 
property of being Obama, the Eiffel tower or number 2). In order to avoid a situation 
where we have endless gerrymandered properties, and to emphasise the properties that 
are important, Lewis forwards the notion of “natural properties” (1983, p. 346) which he 
elsewhere calls fundamental (2009, p. 204). On his view these are the only properties we 
need in our fundamental ontology. Bird uses this notion in his book, making it clear that 
his concern is with fundamental natural properties (2007, p. 243).  
According to Bird “The fundamental natural properties are those with non-redundant 
causal powers.” (2007, p. 13) What does this have to do with determinates? There seems 
to be an implicit assumption that the fundamental natural properties are maximally 




that properties are determinate despite acknowledging the problem of accounting for 
determinable laws with them. Similarly, Bird claims that only single-track dispositions 
– dispositions with a single determinate stimulus and manifestation condition – are 
fundamental (see previous chapter). 
There are at least two broad components to the trend of taking determinates, as opposed 
to determinables, to be fundamental. The first is the belief that all instantiated 
properties are determinate. So, any object with mass will have a particular mass, any 
object with charge will have a particular charge. This intuition is widespread to the 
point that it is assumed by those who are not interested in the 
determinate/determinable debate.  
The expectation is that instantiated properties are determinate, and there may or may 
not be room for determinable properties. For an object to have a property X, it must 
have a maximally determinate property. If X is a superdeterminate that will be X, if not 
it will be a determinate of X. We saw this above when we looked at criterion c) “If 
something has a determinable property it must have a determinate property”. So, we 
know that objects possess determinates, the question is whether they possess, in 
addition, determinables. Determinables are thus forced to earn their keep. 
The less than realist attitude towards determinables comes, first, from the assumption 
that all property instances involve a specific – superdeterminate - property. Second, and 
more importantly, many philosophers do not think determinables earn their keep. This 
paired with parsimony concerns (we will look at these soon) led philosophers to exclude 
determinables from their fundamental ontology.  
The main driving force behind the scepticism about determinables is that determinables 
do not appear to contribute anything new to our ontology. The idea is that determinates 
have all the causal powers necessary to account for events. Determinables have no new 
causal powers, at most they possess a subset of the powers of the determinates. This is 
supposed to hold whether we take properties to have their powers contingently or 
essentially (Gillett and Rives, 2005). That said, I will assume that they have causal 
powers essentially as my focus is on how Dispositional Essentialism accounts for laws. I 
will be arguing that realism about determinables allows Dispositional Essentialism to 
account for functional or determinable laws. However, for now I will return to the 




Stephen Yablo’s work is often invoked to argue for the fundamentality of determinates 
and the idea that determinables are unnecessary for the causal story. Further, it shows 
why some philosophers say that determinables only have a subset of the powers of 
determinates. Yablo’s famous example invokes a smart pigeon called Sophie (1992). Say 
Sophie has been taught to peck at red objects. She is pecking at a red object. This could 
be explained by the fact that the object is red. It could equally be explained by the fact 
that the object is crimson. The determinate and determinable explanation seem 
interchangeable. Now consider the case where Sophie has been trained to peck at 
crimson objects only. 
Sophie is pecking at a crimson triangle. She has been trained to peck at crimson objects. 
The fact that the triangle is crimson already determines that Sophie will peck on it. 
There is no need to explain her behaviour also by the fact that the triangle is red. 
Further, explaining her pecking by the fact that the triangle is red leaves something out. 
After all, there are many red objects that she will not peck at (scarlet objects for 
instance). However, this leads to the odd conclusion that the triangle being red is 
irrelevant to the pecking incident. 
Perhaps the best known view of determinables is the subset view. While I do not endorse 
this view and will argue for my strongly realist view soon, it highlights interesting 
facets of the determinate-determinable relation. The subset view dates back at least to 
Fales (1990). On this view, determinables have a subset of the causal powers of 
determinates.  This is seen in Yablo’s example. Red will have a certain causal profile. All 
the determinate reds will have to abide by that profile. However, those determinates 
also have additional powers. In the example, crimson has the power to make Sophie 
peck. Let us say that maroon has the power to make me buy clothes and that I will buy 
anything maroon that crosses my path. Then maroon has an additional power to red. We 
could give many more examples because determinates have a more detailed causal 
profile in virtue of their more specific nature. Determinables have more watered down 
causal profiles so as to be flexible enough to apply to all their determinates. 
The subset view is often discussed in the context of philosophy of mind and multiple 
realisation. Pain is often given as an example of a mental property that is functional and 
multiply realisable. There are many physical brain states which can realise the mental 
state of pain. Just as pain is multiply realisable, some claim that determinables are 




by crimson, maroon, burgundy, scarlet, etc. Any determinable can be realised by all the 
determinates under it. 
The subset view contrasts determinates and determinables by the scope of their powers. 
It was mostly discussed in the context of views of properties as essentially causal or 
dispositional despite these views being in a minority at the time (Wilson, 1999; 
Shoemaker, 2001). According to the subset view, determinables have a subset of the 
powers of determinates. This view is not meant to eliminate determinables. 
Nonetheless, it gives the impression that determinables do not exist over and above 
their determinates. As a result, it is often used to argue that determinables are 
superfluous and ought to be done away with.  
The subset view is the view that determinables have a subset of the powers of 
determinates, and no novel powers of their own. Gillett and Rives (2005) point out that 
if we pair this view with other concerns, we have a strong case for rejecting 
determinables altogether. The following points are brought up as damning for 
determinables: 
(i) Overdetermination 
(ii) Determinates explain determinables but not vice versa 
(iii) Ockham’s razor 
The previous concerns are all interrelated. They all point to the idea that determinables 
are unnecessary, determinates do all the work already. As a result, I believe these 
concerns can be jointly tackled by showing that determinables earn their keep. However, 
for now I will explain each concern in turn. 
The first concern is known as the overdetermination or double-counting concern. This 
concern invokes the commonly held belief that overdetermination is undesirable, so a 
theory which overdetermines ought to be replaced by one which does not where possible. 
If event X is overdetermined that means that there are two or more causes for X. The 
issue is that each cause is individually sufficient to cause i.e. to determine X. For 
instance, imagine that I ask why daffodils are yellow and you give both a scientific 
explanation and also say that there is a fairy which paints each daffodil every morning. 
There is a sense in which these answers are competing. Which one is it? Are daffodils 




sufficient to account for the yellowness of the daffodils, we need not invoke fairies. If we 
need fairies to paint daffodils yellow, their properties are not sufficient causes of their 
yellowness. 
The overdetermination concern creeps into the debate on properties. Say Sophie the 
pigeon pecks at all red objects. In that case, we can explain Sophie’s pecking an object 
both in terms of the fact that it is red and crimson. I could say “Sophie is pecking that 
object because it is red” but I could also say “Sophie is pecking that object because it is 
crimson”. What Gillett and Rives point out is that here we risk double counting. In other 
words, we risk positing two separate properties as causes – crimson and red – where 
only one is needed. 
One straightforward response to the overdetermination concern is Shoemaker’s (2007). 
He believes that the subset view actually saves determinables here. This is because, on 
his view, determinates and determinables are not competing causes. They do not 
compete in the way the daffodil’s properties and the painting fairies competed with each 
other. Rather, they are contributing the same causal power to the story. Thus, we are 
not counting two causes where there is one. As Wilson put it, “a higher-level property is 
not in causal competition with its lower-level realizer base property, since the 
conditional causal powers of the former are a subset of those of the latter. (Wilson, 1999, 
p. 51) I think there is something to this answer. Determinates and determinables have a 
special and close kind of relationship. However we flesh this relationship out, it seems 
clear that a determinable is not contributing a completely unrelated causal power to the 
story. I will say more on what role I take the dispositions of determinables to play later 
in this chapter. 
The second concern stems from the fact that determinables are explained by 
determinates but not vice-versa. We saw this earlier in 3.1. In particular, we saw that:  
c) If something has a determinable property it must have a determinate property 
d) Determinables do not fix determinates 
e) Determinates fix determinables  
This is potentially problematic for determinables because they appear superfluous. 
Recall that determinables are multiply realizable properties with only a subset of the 




Determinables cannot account for which determinates are instantiated. The issue is that 
those hostile to determinables can argue that determinates can give us that full story. 
We do not need “red” to explain why Sophie pecks, “crimson” will do.  
The third and related concern regards parsimony. Ockham’s razor famously mandates 
that we must not multiply entities beyond necessity. The “beyond necessity” part is 
vital. It tells us that, all else equal, we ought to favour more parsimonious views. 
However, if a less parsimonious view is vastly explanatorily superior we can claim 
necessity. We can say that the parsimony cost associated with that view is outweighed 
by its explanatory benefits.  
The key issue for determinables, which runs through all their criticisms, is that they do 
not seem necessary for explanation. We do not appear to need them in our ontology. 
Determinates seem perfectly able to do all the work. If determinables do not have a vital 
explanatory role, i.e. if determinates explain the determinables, then we ought not 
postulate them. The best response to these issues is to show that determinables earn 
their keep. In other words, determinables are necessary and bring explanatory benefit 
beyond what determinates can do. If determinables can earn their keep – and next I will 
argue that they do – then we have reason to be realists about them after all. 
 
3.3 Realism about determinables 
In the previous section we saw that realism about determinables is often met with 
scepticism. Determinables are often seen as unnecessary so that positing them 
overdetermines events and violates Ockham’s razor. Those sceptical of determinables 
assume that determinables do not give us any additional information over what 
determinates do. They are unnecessary theoretical postulates. They do not enrich our 
explanation of the world. If anything, they confuse it. Determinables add unnecessary 
junk to an otherwise elegant ontology. I will show that this is not the case. There is 
important work for determinables to do. They give a unified explanation for modality. 
Determinables fill the explanatory gap that determinates leave, the gap between specific 
properties and general laws. Thus, I argue that if we want an elegant ontology, we ought 




The debate concerning determination has mostly assumed that determinates are 
fundamental and determinables are secondary, if real at all. However, recently there 
has been some work advocating for realism about determinables by showing that 
determinates don’t do all the work after all. Determinables have an important 
explanatory role to play in our ontology. Recall the difficulty Dispositional Essentialism 
faces accounting for laws of nature. There is little to no interest in discovering how each 
determinate behaves and formalising that into a law that only applies to that 
determinate. The interest lies in determinable laws which allow us to predict the 
behaviour of their many determinates. Further, the fact that so many determinates fall 
under the same determinable laws calls out for explanation (Wilson, 2012; French, 
2014). As we saw, functional laws have a kind of unity to them. They relate 
determinable properties, applying to all determinate instances of those properties. 
As we saw, on the powers view determinates (e.g. determinate charges C1, C2 or C3) will 
have determinate powers. However, all these determinates follow the same law – 
Coulomb’s law. The fact that a single equation can predict how every determinate 
charge will manifest needs explaining. Without explanation the regularity is left brute. 
Of course, a Humean regularity theorist could bite the bullet and say that these 
regularities are brute and unexplained. However, the idea that they all randomly 
happen to behave in this way will not be satisfactory for the dispositional essentialist or 
any philosopher who aims to explain laws and ground modality. And, of course, my 
interest here is exactly in formulating an explanation of laws which works for 
Dispositional Essentialism. Further, there is the problem of vacuous laws. Perhaps 
certain charges are not instantiated in this world.  Yet, we believe that if those charges 
were instantiated they would obey Coulomb’s law – the determinable charge law. Other 
determinates cannot account for this. After all, it is hard to see how the causal profile of 
one determinate could influence the causal profile of any other determinate.  
Wilson (2012) is a vocal advocate of determinables. She argues that it is a mistake to 
think that determinates suffice or, to use the popular metaphor, are “all god needs” in 
order to create our world. On her view, those who believe this assume that all that needs 
grounding are non-modal facts. This can be traced back to Ellis who said that the 
assumption is that “everything that is the case about the world is the sum over all times 
of everything that is the case at any one time.” (1999, p. 65) This assumption is easily 




by the fundamental base. Given that determinates cannot do this, we must include 
determinables in our fundamental ontology.  
Wilson uses the fact that laws of nature are going unexplained to argue that 
determinates do not fix determinables at all. In the interest of grounding both modal 
and non-modal facts, Wilson claims that determinables are just as fundamental as 
determinates. The two belong in our fundamental base. Determinables are required in 
our fundamental base to give us facts about the natural modality expressed in 
functional laws. However, once the modal facts are fixed, we still need determinates to 
tell us what is actually instantiated in our world. “more specific facts — concerning 
determinate properties, in particular — require existential witnesses, so to speak; and 
the facts about determinable properties cannot, it seems, do the job.” (Wilson, 2012, p. 9) 
So, we need determinates. 
One issue for Wilson’s view is that determinates can still be argued to be modal. I 
discuss this more in chapter 7 (section 7.4.4). However, briefly, if the determinates are 
dispositions then, by definition, they are modal. Their very essence is given by their 
dispositions i.e. by their modal relations to other properties or to their potential 
manifestation. This is further seen by the fact that a disposition need not manifest to be 
there, it contains the modality whether or not it has an opportunity to manifest that. I 
don’t think we can say that determinates are non-modal qua Wilson. However, Wilson is 
definitely onto something here.  
Determinates can only ground narrow modal facts about how determinates interact. Yet, 
determinates under the same determinable obey incredibly succinct laws to the letter. 
This needs explanation. Here is where determinables come in. Wilson’s idea is that we 
need determinables to ground the modal facts about why determinates obey the same 
determinable laws and are perfectly synchronized to this larger modal picture. The fact 
that we need determinables for these modal facts and determinates to provide 
‘existential witnesses’ for what is actually instantiated in our world is echoed in 
French’s work (2014) which we will look at when we discuss Ontic Structural Realism in 
later chapters. (More on the relationship between determinates and determinables in 
chapter 7.) 
While Wilson suggests that determinables and determinates are on par, Barbara Vetter 




fundamental as the specific ones, they are more fundamental”. (2015, footnote p. 57) She 
argues this on the basis that particular instances of dispositions or laws like Coulomb’s 
law are so explanatorily poor they appear less fundamental than the general versions. 
Recall the particular instance of Coulomb’s law “(CL∗) For all x, if x has charge e and is 
5.3×10–11 m from a charge of 1.6×10–19 C, then x exerts a repulsive force of 8×10–8 N” 
(Ibid, p. 57). (CL*) lacks the insight of the general law. It does not give us the 
information that the general law – Coulomb’s law – does. It does not tell us that the 
electrostatic force of attraction between two charged objects is directly proportional to 
the product of the charges and inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between them. Yet this seems essential to the nature of charge. The general law gives us 
more interesting insight and information into the nature of reality i.e. like charges repel 
each other, opposite charges attract each other.  
In my view, we need both determinables and determinates in our fundamental base. 
Without determinables we cannot get the high-level modal facts. For now, I hope to have 
shown that there is an important role for determinables in our ontology. While Wilson 
and Vetter have pointed us towards determinables for this reason, many questions 
remain. What determinables should we be realists about? How do determinables 
generate facts about modality? How does this fit the dispositional essentialist 
framework? Finally, after making room for determinables within Dispositional 
Essentialism, we are left with the question of what their role is and what the 
relationship between determinates and determinables is on this view. I will address 
these issues in the remainder of this chapter in order to give the most comprehensive 
account of the interplay between determinates and determinables within a Dispositional 
Essentialism which can truly account for laws. 
 
3.4 Which determinables? 
By endorsing realism about determinable properties, Dispositional Essentialism can 
account for determinable laws as supervening on determinable properties. Recall the 
core of Dispositional Essentialism is that dispositional properties give rise to laws. In 
other words, at least some, if not all, properties have dispositional essences. This means 
that they are the property they are in virtue of their disposition or propensity towards a 




modality. They have internal modal relations to further properties. These relations 
make for laws of nature. 
My proposal is that we accept determinable properties and allow these to account for 
determinable laws in the way dispositional properties account for laws within 
Dispositional Essentialism. This requires little departure from Bird’s type of framework. 
After all, all this requires is the move he was already making – for laws to supervene on 
properties. The only difference is the shift in generality from determinate laws and 
properties to determinable laws and properties. It is even compatible with traditional 
dispositional essentialist readings where properties are universals that get their essence 
via their relations to further universals. It is entirely in keeping with Dispositional 
Essentialism that if determinable properties existed, they would have modal relations to 
further determinable properties. These relations are laws of nature. Further, these laws 
would have to be determinable since they relate determinables. If we accept ontological 
determinable properties there is no more mystery to determinable laws supervening on 
them than there is to determinate laws supervening on determinate properties. 
I have made my view of the role of determinables clear. In the rest of this chapter I will 
look at issues for this view and how to flesh out the relationship between determinates 
and determinables. For now, in this section, I look at what determinables we should be 
realists about so we can move on to tougher questions. 
One issue that may strike the reader is that what counts as a determinable or a 
determinate differs contextually. While “colour” is the determinable of “red” the 
determinate; “red” is the determinable of the determinate “crimson”. So, it can be 
confusing which determinables we ought to be realists about. On the other hand, we do 
have reason to think that determinables “bottom out” and “top out”. By this I mean that 
there may be super-determinates which are maximally specific and so are not 
determinables of anything. At the same time, there may be superdeterminables which 
do not fall under any other determinables.6 
In his paper Determinables as Universals Ingvar Johansson (2000) argues that we 
should accept certain determinables into our ontology – superdeterminables (although 
he did not call them that). He claimed that such a determinable was identified by the 
 
6 Here I set aside the issue of whether they can be grouped under the determinable 




fact that all other properties are either (a) its determinates or (b) separated from it by a 
“gap”. A gap is a total lack of resemblance between determinates, as is the case with 
colour, shape and volume. Particular colours, shapes or volumes can always be linked by 
a chain of intermediate colours, shapes or volumes. However, colour (whether generally 
or a particular shade) does not more closely resemble shape or volume (whether 
generally or any particular shape or volume) (Ibid, p. 108).  
Another way of conceptualising the gap between superdeterminables comes from 
Funkhouser. Again, for Funkhouser, determinates and determinables are fleshed out in 
terms of determination dimensions. The determinable red, for instance, combines a 
particular region of the determination dimensions of brightness, hue and saturation. 
Thus, for Funkhouser, a superdeterminate will be a maximally determinate point in 
these determination dimensions. So, for instance, a specific shade of red with a precise 
brightness, hue and saturation. The superdeterminable would be the most general 
possible combination of determination dimensions. In this case, colour would be a 
superdeterminable as it is maximally unspecific regarding hue, saturation and 
brightness. 
It does seem inevitable that there will be certain superdeterminates. However, I doubt 
that the answer to what determinables we should be realists about is 
‘superdeterminables like shape, volume and colour’. Even their superdeterminates (like 
crimson or perfectly round) are prime candidates for reduction to other properties. 
Colour, for instance, may be reducible to the wavelength of light or the reflective 
properties of surfaces (and their interaction with our optical system). I think we should 
base what determinables we are realists about on other considerations like explanatory 
value. These considerations may turn out to only favour superdeterminables, however 
we should allow for the possibility that they give an important role to some 
“intermediate” determinables (determinables which are determinates of something else).  
In my view, being realists about the minimum sufficient determinables needed to 
account for the laws of nature is the way to go.7  This strategy is reminiscent of David 
Lewis’s strategy of using science as a guide to find the sparse or fundamental properties 
on which all else supervenes (2006). This keeps our ontology as austere as a realist 
ontology can be while allowing us to account for functional or determinable laws – the 
 
7 Here I am assuming that there is only one answer to ontological questions, setting arguments 




most important kind in physics and in our navigation of everyday life. Given that which 
laws of nature exist is an empirical matter, “what determinables should I accept into my 
ontology?” will be an empirical question too. 
A caveat: of course there are always competing explanations. Indeed, there will still be 
competing explanations of laws which do not involve determinables at all. However, for 
the reasons given above, these seem unsatisfactory. They may be more parsimonious, 
but they don’t give a unified explanation of determinable laws. By making what 
determinables exist an empirical matter, I leave the issue of which combinations are 
most explanatorily satisfactory open. A minimal ontology must be balanced with 
explanatory success. Addressing exactly how this balancing act works out - comparing 
different groups of determinables and how they account for all laws of nature - is most 
definitely beyond the scope of this work.  
 
3.5 Complex properties and Dispositional Essentialism 
Like many views in philosophy, there may be as many kinds of Dispositional 
Essentialism as there are dispositional essentialists. Some ideas are core to the view. To 
be a dispositional essentialist you must believe in dispositional properties. Further, 
dispositional properties are responsible for the lawfulness of nature. However, there are 
many ways of fleshing this out. In particular, we will be concerned with questions like 
whether those properties are single-track, multi-track, determinate or determinable. 
While the Bird-type view that only single-track properties are fundamental may be the 
best known, it is not the only contender - other dispositional essentialists allow for more 
complex dispositions. 
Earlier we saw that Bird argues that fundamental dispositional properties are single-
track. Here a single-track property is a property with a single stimulus-manifestation 
condition. Single-track properties are opposed to multi-track properties which have 
more than one stimulus-manifestation condition. His reasoning for this is that multi-
track properties seem like conflations of multiple single-track properties. However, 
other dispositional essentialists have conceptualised dispositions differently. For 
instance, Brian Ellis (2001) speaks of dispositional properties supervening on other 




Stephen Mumford describes properties as power-clusters, allowing for the possibility of 
multiple-powered dispositions (2004). Vetter goes further to argue that all dispositions 
are fundamentally multi-track (2015). 
Mumford says that: “The view of properties I [he] find most attractive is one in which 
they are natural clusters of, and exhausted by, powers” (2004, p. 170). He does not go on 
to explain exactly how that cluster works but he makes it clear that there is no 
ontological distance between properties and powers. It is not that properties have 
powers; properties are clusters of powers. If a property only had one power, it would 
presumably be identical with that power. Mumford addresses the issue of whether a 
property can have more than one power. He says the following: 
“Do the clusters that constitute properties always contain many powers? Could 
there be a property that had its identity fixed by a single power? Either option is 
consistent with the general realist lawless metaphysic being developed [in his 
book] and there could be a mixture in which some clusters of powers are complex 
and some simple.” (2004, p. 172) 
Mumford claims that properties having multiple powers, which would require them to 
be multi-track, is consistent with Dispositional Essentialism. However, he does not go as 
far as to advocate them. I have been arguing for incorporating determinable properties 
into our ontology as it goes a long way to solving the problems Dispositional 
Essentialism faces accounting for functional laws. I must consider how the notion of 
single-track and multi-track properties, single power and many-power properties, and 
determinate and determinable properties relate. 
On the face of it, Mumford’s single power properties map onto Bird’s single-track 
properties, Mumford’s many-power properties map onto Bird’s multi-track properties. 
Further, single power properties (Mumford) or single-track properties (Bird) will be 
maximally determinate properties. Many-power properties (Mumford) and multi-track 
properties (Bird) will be determinable in the sense that they are multiply realisable. 
This is too quick. 
Let’s say we have a property S which has one power T. The fact that S only has one 
power – T – does not imply that S is a single-track property. T could be multi-track 




is if we assume that each power will be single-track i.e. will have a single stimulus-
manifestation condition. However, this has not been shown. To see this, Mumford 
believes that properties like spin, mass and charge are good examples of single power, 
fundamental properties (2004, p. 172). At the same time, Bird argues that mass is not 
single-track (and hence may not be fundamental) see below: 
“In classical physics mass is (i) a fundamental property, and (ii) associated with 
two dispositions, one inertial and one gravitational. The latter makes classical 
mass a multi-track disposition, i.e., a disposition that relates multiplicity of 
stimuli and manifestations. Indeed… it is an impure disposition, one which does 
not fit the schema: D is the disposition to manifest (M1 ∨ M2 ∨ M3 ∨ …) in 
response to stimulus (S1 ∨ S2 ∨ S3 ∨ …). There I argued that impure dispositions 
cannot be fundamental. It seems odd that a fundamental property should both 
yield manifestation M1 in response to stimulus S1 and also manifestation M2 in 
response to stimulus S2. That looks like a conjunction of propositions, which does 
not conform to the schema, and does not seem fundamental at all. It would 
appear that such a property, if genuinely a single property, would be a non-
fundamental property” (Bird, 2007, p. 215) 
I will not take sides on the fundamentality of mass. I leave that to science and indeed 
propose that we let empirical data shed light on which properties are fundamental. I do 
not share Bird’s view that all fundamental properties must be single-track. As a result, 
the idea that mass is multi-track is not of much concern to me. I simply use this to 
illustrate the strength of Bird’s conviction. However, on my view, it is too strong a claim 
to say a priori that all fundamental dispositions must have a single stimulus-
manifestation condition. Especially given that science is not corroborating that story. 
The properties science is built on and, indeed, the ones that are of interest to it (e.g. 
mass or charge) are richer and more complex than that. 
Bird insists that fundamental dispositions are single-track. Mumford allows for the 
possibility of dispositions with multiple powers however, he does not actively advocate 
them. However, Vetter actively advocates the complexity of dispositions. According to 
her, dispositions are inevitably multi-track. She rejects the conditional analysis of 
dispositions on the basis that it relies on an over-simplified view of dispositions 




Vetter (2015, p. 53) disambiguates between two ways or levels at which properties are 
complex or multi-track. This provides a much needed layer of nuance to the discussion. 
First, as we saw, determinables are complex or multi-track in the sense that they range 
over many possible determinate instantiations. Charge is determinable in the sense that 
it has many determinate charges (all magnitudes of charge). Further, any charged object 
will have a determinate charge.  
However, Vetter points out that there is a more basic sense in which dispositions are 
multi-track. She argues that each determinate property is irreducibly multi-track. Each 
determinate instantiation encodes a myriad of single-track dispositions to slightly 
different manifestations, depending on what situation leads to their manifestation. 
Again, in the example of charge, even a maximally specific charge has a variety of 
stimuli (for every other possible charge it could encounter it will manifest slightly 
differently). 
While determinates may be maximally specific and multi-track, this does not make them 
determinables which range over their single-track dispositions. This is because the 
maximally specific determinate has all the corresponding single-track dispositions at 
once. In Vetter’s words “Having a determinable property entails having one of its 
determinates, to the exclusion of all others. Having the multi-track disposition electric 
charge, on the contrary, entails having all the corresponding single-track dispositions.” 
(2015, p. 53) These single-track dispositions are not determinates because they are not 
mutually exclusive. It is not that charge X has only one disposition at a time to the 
exclusion of all others. Rather it has all those dispositions at once despite being 
maximally determinate. 
Mumford and Vetter provide various avenues for properties to be complex. We saw that 
Mumford allows for properties which are clusters of more than one power. And Vetter 
allows for determinable properties like charge to have many determinate instantiations 
and for determinate properties to be infinitely multi-track. Vetter’s work may make us 
question what Mumford means, pressing him for more detail. It leaves room for a 
property with one power to still have a multitude of dispositions, being irremediably 
multi-track in this way. This holds whether Mumford sees powers as determinates or 
determinables. After all, if Vetter is right, both determinate and determinable 
properties have many possible manifestations. The concept of power also seems flexible 




too flexible and ambiguous, confusing the debate. As a result, I set the term power aside 
for the sake of clarity. 
I have shown that there are alternatives to Bird’s neat picture where all modality is 
broken down to a fundamental level of maximally specific single-track dispositions. 
There is precedent for complexity in the dispositional world. Some even argue that this 
complexity is inevitable. I am happy to allow that maximally determinate properties 
have this complexity. However, this is a side note. My focus is on developing 
Dispositional Essentialism so that it can account for laws of nature. In the interest of 
accounting for functional laws I have proposed realism about determinables. This means 
allowing complexity at the higher-level Vetter talks about, allowing fundamental 
determinables into our ontology. 
 
3.6 The relation between determinables and determinates 
When I first introduced Dispositional Essentialism, I started with what many see as the 
status quo of the view: Bird’s work. He believes that the fundamental level will be 
populated with single-track dispositions i.e. dispositions with a single stimulus-
manifestation condition. We saw that there is tension between this view and the 
explanatory aims of Dispositional Essentialism to avoid views on which laws are mere 
regularities or brute facts about the universe. Dispositional essentialists aim to explain 
all modality from the bottom (properties) up. In my view, it is the assumption that they 
are explaining modality from determinate properties up that fuels the criticisms that 
Dispositional Essentialism cannot account for laws of nature. 
In the previous section, we saw that some prominent dispositional essentialists allow 
room for complex properties. Mumford sees properties as power-clusters, allowing for 
properties to have various powers. Vetter argues that even maximally determinate 
properties have a multitude of dispositions, and so are irreducibly multi-track. Further, 
we saw in 3.3 that complex properties – determinables – can close the explanatory gap 
between modal properties and functional laws (Wilson, 1992). Determinables earn their 





If the only properties which exist are maximally determinate it is hard to explain why 
these determinates follow determinable or functional laws. Even if we see determinates 
through the power lens or the multi-track lens, they at most codify determinate laws. In 
other words, they only contain the modal information about that determinate, not about 
all other determinates of the determinable they belong to. Bottom-up explanations from 
determinate properties to determinables can’t give a unified explanation of why they 
cohere in this way. Explaining Coulomb’s law from the collection of determinate charges 
is unsatisfactory. It does not explain why the determinates resemble so closely, much 
less fall under a single equation. Determinables provide a much more satisfactory, or 
unifying, explanation. Rather than leaving the elegance of Coulomb’s law as a regularity 
among many determinates, the behaviour of all the charges is explained by reference to 
the determinable charge. The law is explained by the very nature of charge.  
I have argued for realism about determinables as a way out of Dispositional 
Essentialism’s difficulty accounting for functional laws. If determinable properties are 
dispositional, they will give rise to laws of nature. These laws are determinable or 
functional as they relate determinable properties. This leaves open the question of how 
determinates fit into the picture. First, do we need them? Second, what is their 
ontological status compared to determinables? Third, what is the relationship between 
determinates and determinables on this modified Dispositional Essentialism? 
Regarding the first concern, we definitely need determinates in our ontology. 
Determinables cannot ground all the facts or give us all the information about our 
world. As per d) determinables do not fix determinates. We cannot derive facts about 
which determinates exist from facts about determinables. For instance, knowing that a 
thing is coloured does not tell us what determinate colour that thing is. Rather, the 
reverse is true, if we know that a thing is scarlet we know that it has the determinable 
red and the determinable colour. 
Wilson argued that those who assume determinates can explain all the facts about the 
world are assuming that all the facts to account for are non-modal (2012). As we saw, 
this is arguable as determinates are themselves modal in dispositional essentialism. 
Their essence is dispositional or modal. However, they only contain narrow, 
determinate, modality. They don’t account for the wider laws of nature. In that sense, 
we need determinables to account for modality with a big M – the functional laws of 




flipside is that determinables cannot account for everything. Determinables give us the 
broad modal facts about reality but there is more to the story. In particular, there are 
still the facts about which determinates are instantiated to account for. 
The second question regarded the ontological status of determinates compared to the 
fundamental determinables. There are at least two options in the literature. Wilson sees 
determinates and determinables as ontologically on par (2012) and Vetter argues that 
determinables may be more basic than determinables (2015). 
I see determinates and determinables as ontologically on par. To use the God metaphor, 
she would have to create both determinates and determinables to create the world. 
Especially since, as we saw, they cannot explain or be reduced to each other. Both have 
important and unique roles to play. In my view, putting determinables first as Vetter 
does is an overcorrection. It seems to assume that determinables and determinates are 
competing for the same kind of explanation – modal explanation. But this is not what I 
see determinates as doing. These two have different roles. The determinates act as 
‘existential witnesses’ to our world. They differentiate our universe from others with the 
same laws by saying what determinates are actually instantiated in our world. And, yes, 
if you are a dispositionalist they have some disposition and modality to them. However, 
we need the determinables to explain the determinable laws that the determinate laws 
follow.8 This brings us to the third question about the relationship between 
determinates and determinables. 
Finally, what is the relationship between determinates and determinables on my view? I 
will start by looking at common explanations of the relationship between determinates 
and determinables and why they fail. To begin with, we have seen a few already: the 
subset view and the view that determinables are sets of determinates. These are not 
appropriate for my view because I take determinables to have their own separate and 
vital explanatory role.  
Another possibility is that determinables govern determinates. However, on such a view, 
determinates lose their causal oomph. They would act as mandated by determinables 
according to some sort of governance relation. This to me places too great a distance 
 
8 In chapter 7 I will also consider whether they have some explanatory connection to each other, 
on the basis that they are clearly not entirely independent of each other. The dispositions of 




between determinates and determinables. Further, it pushes the problem a step back as 
now we need to account for why these determinates obey the same determinable. 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1988) suggested determinables were second-order properties. So, 
for instance, red is a second-order property which a crimson thing has. Objects have 
first-order properties like crimson and scarlet and second-order ones like red. These 
second-order properties are conceptualised as functional roles. The mention of functional 
roles invokes the ideas of multiple realizability which are amply discussed in the 
literature. The idea being that various determinates can instantiate the functional 
property i.e. the determinable. 
My view is somewhat different from the available options. It takes inspiration from 
Wilson (2012) and French’s (2014) views that determinables are modal and 
determinates give us non-modal facts. Determinates are referred to as giving initial 
conditions and/or providing ‘existential witness’. In other words, they say what 
magnitudes of the determinables are actually instantiated, allowing us to differentiate 
our world from others with the same laws. Determinables are modal properties and 
determinates are instantiations. Thus, for me relationship between determinables and 
determinates is not one of governance but of instantiation. Determinables do not govern 
determinates. Determinates instantiate determinables.  
Determinates and determinables are not independent of each other, both are 
dispositional. On my view, determinate properties are the sort of properties which are 
actualised and which actualise determinables. They give us non-modal, concrete, 
information about our world. We need to pair non-modal facts with modal information to 
explain the trajectory of the world. A full explanation of the world and its modality must 
cover its lawfulness. Functional or determinable laws need accounting for or something 
is missing from the picture. This is where determinables come in. Determinable 
properties, as dispositions, have modal relations to further determinables. Those 
relations are high-level functional laws.  This view has the benefit of explaining why 
different determinates follow the same determinables – they are instantiations of those 
abstract properties.  
Another benefit of this view is that it helps avoid the overdetermination concern. In a 
sense, determinates are instantiations of limiting conditions of determinables. This 




Shoemaker’s given above - that determinates and determinables are not in causal 
competition. However, this is not simply because they contribute the same power to the 
causal story. In addition, there is a sense in which determinates and determinables have 
different roles which do not compete. We need both the high-level modal facts and non-
modal facts to explain causation. The modal and non-modal facts do not compete. They 
complement each other. (For a more detailed response to the overdetermination concern 
see 7.4.1-7.4.3.) 
 
3.7 The next move for Dispositional Essentialism 
By showing that determinables are a necessary part of our fundamental ontology, that 
determinables ground facts that determinates do not, and that determinables are not 
reducible to their instances, we have a solid case for realism about determinables. This 
helps the dispositional essentialist respond to the first objection – that the laws of 
physics are functional or determinable. This problem disappears for Dispositional 
Essentialism if it allows laws to relate determinable properties. After all, if laws relate 
determinable properties, they will of course be determinable or functional themselves. 
The second problem we saw for Dispositional Essentialism’s account of laws is that the 
laws of physics do not fit the formalism Bird forwards. In particular, laws of physics are 
not of the type ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) where P stands for any property, S for its stimulus and 
M its manifestation. Laws of physics are more complex than this. I do not fight Vetter 
(2012) on this point. In my view the dispositional essentialist would do well to distance 
themselves from Bird’s position here – as I have tried to do. Dispositional Essentialism 
can benefit from being more flexible in terms of properties’ dispositions, not mandating 
that properties only have a single stimulus and manifestation condition. Further, and as 
a result, dispositional essentialists ought to be flexible on what exactly the laws of 
nature will look like.  
I do not think that we can a priori establish, as Bird hopes, that every property has a 
single stimulus-manifestation condition. Further, the a posteriori evidence (the laws of 
physics we have) does not favour this kind of neat view. In my view dispositional 




may have multiple powers (Mumford, 2004), they may be infinitely multi-track (Vetter, 
2015) and they may relate to each other in a myriad of complex ways. 
One final and dare I say bigger hurdle awaits the dispositional essentialist account of 
laws: the problem of global principles. In the next chapter, I will explain what global 
principles are, why they matter so much, why they are so problematic for Dispositional 






4. Accounting for Global Principles within Dispositional 
Essentialism 
Dispositional Essentialism has difficulties accounting for laws. I have argued that a lot 
of the criticisms of Dispositional Essentialism stem from the assumption that it explains 
functional or determinable laws via determinate properties. I argued that if we accept 
determinable properties into our ontology this problem goes away. Functional or 
determinable laws relate determinable properties. However, the problems for 
Dispositional Essentialism are not over. A class of laws remains which dispositional 
essentialists really struggle to account for. I will call these global principles. Global 
principles are high-level laws like symmetry principles, conservation laws and the 
principle of least action. They are high-level because they apply to a wide range of 
properties, if not the whole world. As a result, it is hard to see how global principles can 
be accounted for via the dispositional essences of individual properties. 
I start this chapter by explaining the difficulty global principles pose for Dispositional 
Essentialism. After, I will lay out various strategies Dispositional Essentialism can 
employ to account for global principles. I begin with the strategies in the existing 
literature. These have been criticised as ad hoc and explanatorily poor (Livanios, 2010). 
Then, I proceed to advance some novel strategies. I argue for my novel take on the basis 
that it has the explanatory advantages of the old strategies while avoiding the criticisms 
levelled against them. Showing that Dispositional Essentialism has a strong account of 
global principles sets the scene for the next chapters. In the next chapter, I bring the 
discussion of global principles out of the abstract by looking at case studies from physics. 
I look at how Dispositional Essentialism can account for conservation laws and the 
principle of least action. Afterwards, in chapter 6, I look at another theory which claims 
to have the same motivations as Dispositional Essentialism while doing a better job at 
accounting for laws (Ontic Structural Realism). Having a strong account of even the 
most elusive laws will help the dispositional essentialist position here. 
 
4.1 The problem of global principles for Dispositional Essentialism 
Thus far the laws we have been considering have been relatively simple. Laws like 




particular properties, in this case charge and mass. And, within the dispositional 
worldview, they are explicable in terms of the nature of those properties. That is, of 
course, not to say that those properties are simple in Bird’s stronger sense. Recall that 
Bird argues that the fundamental properties would all be single-track dispositions with 
a single stimulus and manifestation. I have argued that this kind of simplicity is not 
realistic within Dispositional Essentialism as these properties are unable to ground 
functional laws which are determinable. 
I have shown that there is precedent and thus room for complex properties within 
Dispositional Essentialism. Properties may have multiple powers, be determinable, or 
infinitely multi-track at the smallest level. I have argued that in addition to there being 
room for complex properties there is need for complex properties within Dispositional 
Essentialism. We must make room for determinable properties in our ontology to 
account for even the simplest laws of physics as these are functional or determinable. 
Determinable properties allow us to account for determinable laws. This is because the 
laws will follow from the dispositions of the properties. However, not all laws are so 
simple.  
Accounting for regular laws, like Coulomb’s law, via the dispositions of properties is 
relatively simple. This is because there are particular properties these laws are about 
(in this case charge). Thus, we can say that the dispositions of said properties give rise 
to the laws. However, not all laws are like this. There is a class of laws which resists 
this kind of explanation. These are the problem laws I refer to as global principles. 
Roughly, global principles are higher-level laws rather than regular laws like Coulomb’s 
law. They do not hold of individual objects and their properties, so they cannot tell us 
information like what force a massy object is exerting or what dispositions a charged 
object has. Rather, they hold of the whole universe. They appear to be laws the system 
follows which explain what happens at the local level rather than the reverse. So, if the 
universe conserves mass-energy that explains why any local loss of mass or energy will 
be paired with a gain somewhere else. The best-established global principles include 
symmetry laws, conservation laws and the principle of least action. 
The generality of global principles makes them very difficult to explain from a 
dispositional essentialist standpoint. Dispositional essentialists want to explain laws by 




properties – up. Given that these laws operate at this higher-level they resist this kind 
of explanation. They are not easily tethered and grounded by a simple property.  
Global principles are quite a diverse group of laws. For instance, the principle of least 
action states that, when in doubt about how a system evolved, the option which required 
the least action is the correct one. We can visualise least action as the shortest trajectory 
between two points, however this is not technically correct. Action is a technical term for 
the difference between kinetic and potential energy over time. When we want to decide 
how a system evolved, the principle of least action tells us that the trajectory which 
involved the least action occurred (Katzav, 2004; Smart & Thébault, 2015). Symmetry 
laws are closely tied to the concept of invariance. Symmetry laws outline what sort of 
transformations things can undergo without changing in other ways e.g. translation in 
space-time, spatial rotation. For instance, the speed of a train could change without 
affecting the laws of physics inside the train. Symmetry principles constrain which 
particles are able to exist leading to the prediction and discovery of the Higgs boson 
(French, 2014, p. 271). (I will not be focusing on symmetry principles except for where 
they reappear in connection to conservation laws in the following chapter). Finally, 
conservation laws regard the fact that certain physical quantities – e.g. mass-energy, 
angular momentum, momentum, number of leptons – remain the same over time. I will 
give a much more detailed analysis of these in the next chapter “Case studies in 
accounting for Global Principles: Conservation laws and the Principle of Least Action”.  
Global principles are quite different from each other. What unifies or distinguishes this 
group of laws is how high-level the laws are. They apply to many physical properties 
rather than being predicated of a single one. As they relate so many properties, they 
resist the kind of bottom-up explanation Dispositional Essentialism promises. A good 
solution to the global principles problem should be abstract enough to account for all 
global principles, remaining neutral on which of these principles are legitimate. 
Dispositional essentialists have not done much work on accounting for global principles. 
When they have, their attempts have been ignored or criticised for being ad hoc and 
explanatorily poor (Livanios, 2010). I begin with the existing options, like the world-kind 
approach, before moving onto novel strategies. I will show that there are alternative 





4.2 Accounting for global principles within Dispositional Essentialism 
As we have seen, Dispositional Essentialism has difficulty accounting for global 
principles. This difficulty is rooted in the fact that these principles are general, applying 
to many properties if not the whole world. This makes it difficult to give bottom-up 
explanations of them in terms of the dispositional essences of individual properties. 
Dispositional essentialists can and have employed different strategies to account for 
global principles. These strategies are meant to be abstract enough to account for all 
global principles. As such, they are not tied to any particular global principle, rather 
they are proposals for dealing with global principles generally. Broadly these strategies 
are: 
(S1) Dismiss global principles as pseudo laws (Bird, 2007) 
(S2) Find a core feature of the properties governed by global principles to ground 
the laws 
(S3) Posit high-level entities whose high-level properties give rise to global 
principles 
(S3A) Natural-kinds, in particular the world-kind (Bigelow, Lierse, & 
Ellis, 1992)  
(S3B) Systems (Chakravartty, 2019) 
(S4) Posit high-level properties which ground global principles, rejecting the 
existence of high-level entities which bear them  
(S5) Posit high-level properties which ground global principles, whilst remaining 
agnostic about the existence of high-level entities which bear them 
The first strategy (S1) is reductive or eliminative of global principles. In a small section 
of the concluding chapter Nature’s Metaphysics (2007) Bird recognizes the fact that it is 
hard to explain conservation laws by reference to dispositions. In the absence of an 
explanation he suggests that global principles are not genuine laws. They are either 
meta-statements about laws or they are part of the background structure which science 
aims to eliminate (ibid, p. 214). So, for Bird, global principles are either dismissed or are 
to be explained away by future science. He says this because of his commitment to 
Dispositional Essentialism. Within Dispositional Essentialism laws stem from the 
dispositional essences of properties so there is “no room for further constraints” (Ibid). If 
global principles were genuine laws, they would present ‘further constraints’. Thus, Bird 




As he is committed to Dispositional Essentialism, he concludes that these principles 
must not be genuine laws. If anything, he would say that they are meta-statements 
about the limits of regular laws. 
Bird’s dismissal of global principles is unconvincing. Global principles are crucial to 
current physics to the point that physicists take symmetry laws as fundamental in 
nature. Not only do these global principles have far ranging applications but they have 
proved incredibly fruitful. They constrain which particles are able to exist, famously 
allowing the prediction and discovery of the Higgs boson, mentioned above. In Cei and 
French’s words “Given the significance of symmetries and conservation laws in modern 
physics, some might take the conclusion to this argument as a form of reductio of the 
whole dispositional essentialist enterprise.” (2010, p. 6) 
Bird’s treatment of global principles as pseudo-laws is also unconvincing because he 
never gives an independent argument for it. He simply states that we should endorse 
this view because it fits better with Dispositional Essentialism. Given how well 
established and fruitful global principles are to contemporary science their dismissal 
warrants a strong argument. As a result, I focus on accounts which are not eliminative 
regarding global principles. 
The non-reductive strategies for accounting for global principles within Dispositional 
Essentialism attempt to pin-point properties which could give rise to such high-level 
laws. The first (S2) is to single out an aspect of the many things affected by global 
principles which could explain them. For instance, we might suggest that physical 
quantities are conserved, so the property of “being a physical quantity” explains 
conservation. This suggestion fails because not all physical quantities are conserved. 
Quantities like velocity are not conserved while others like entropy increase. I set this 
strategy aside as we are unlikely to find a property which fits the bill. Global principles 
hold for a large group of heterogeneous things which seem to only have obedience to the 
principles in common.  
The second non-reductive strategy (S3) is the most popular and polemic. This approach 
involves positing high-level entities whose high-level properties could give rise to global 
principles. The most famous example of this is given by John Bigelow, Brian Ellis and 
Caroline Lierse (1992). In their view, laws of nature are explained via natural kinds 




argue that global principles like symmetry principles and conservation laws cannot be 
explained via natural kinds which are mere parts of the world. The difficulty can be seen 
in the case of conservation. Conservation only fully holds in physically closed systems 
and the world itself, in its entirety, is the only physically closed system in existence. So, 
conservation appears to hold of the whole world in its entirely. As a result, Bigelow, 
Ellis and Lierse postulated the world-kind hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the 
world is a member of the world-kind. As a natural kind, the world-kind has essential 
properties which give rise to global principles like conservation laws.  
Before I explain this view, a caveat. One could argue that all laws only hold in the world 
as a whole i.e. as a physically closed system. Take the law of gravity - there are never 
only two masses to consider. There is an infinite series of endless masses to consider if 
we want to calculate the true value of any force in existence. This could lead a reader to 
think that there is not really a difference between regular laws and global principles. 
However, global principles are different. We can calculate with certainty the force that 
two objects exert on each other. The value of this force is independent of the fact that 
these objects are subject to further forces (which can all be calculated with precision). It 
is only if we want to calculate the net force that we need to worry about all the forces in 
the universe. Even then, the net force is no more than the sum of the individual forces. 
Global principles cannot be explained so easily. In the case of conservation, we can see 
conservation by summing up all the e.g. mass-energy of the universe. However, the fact 
that that number never changes, that every loss of mass and/or energy will co-occur with 
a gain of mass and/or energy elsewhere needs explaining. If anything, these high-level 
principles seem to be explaining the local occurrences which only make sense within the 
wider picture. This is what makes global principles so interesting and challenging from 
a metaphysical point of view.  
Back to Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse’s world-kind hypothesis. They take the world-kind to 
bear the high-level dispositional properties needed to account for global principles. They 
are careful to say that their theory is an ontological one and not an epistemic one. They 
are laying out what they see as the metaphysical conditions necessary for global 
principles. “We do not claim to know for sure what the conservation laws are. But we do 
say that when we get them right, they will describe essential properties of the kind of 
world we live in.” (1992, pp. 385-6) This view has the benefit of avoiding regularity views 
of global principles. This is because these principles are explained via one high-level 




conservation of mass-energy via the nature of the world rather than via the nature of 
mass and energy. Further, this would help explain why the conservation of mass-energy 
only truly holds in the world as a whole. That said, this view is quite unpopular and 
widely criticised as we shall see soon. 
Recently, Chakravartty has come up with another variant of this account (S3B). On his 
view systems have properties, those properties give rise to global principles (2019). 
Sticking to our previous example, the conservation of mass-energy can be explained via 
properties of physically closed systems. This explains why the conservation of mass-
energy only truly holds within the physically closed system that is the universe, holding 
only approximately in experimental setups which approximate this closure. In my view, 
this rendition of (S3) is more successful than the natural-kinds one. This is because it is 
more ontologically neutral and less ad hoc than saying that global principles hold of the 
world in virtue of its membership to the natural world-kind.  
The systems approach is more ontologically neutral than the natural kinds approach in 
two ways. It is more ontologically neutral in the sense that (i) there is a strong 
motivation from science to import the notion of systems. The scientific motivation for 
systems is independent of metaphysics which makes talk of them seem less ad hoc. (ii) 
the systems approach is not tied to a natural-kinds ontology. One can be a natural kinds 
advocate, undecided on natural kinds, or have a sparser ontology without natural kinds 
while accepting systems as entities in their own right. We can see the systems science 
talks about as groups of individuals tied together somehow – through properties or 
relations – and as individuals in their own right, possibly through the lens of emergence 
or as members of natural kinds. (More on the systems approach in the next section.) 
I will forward two novel strategies which I believe improve on the existing strategies. 
They both posit high-level properties which ground global principles. However, the first 
denies the existence of high-level entities. The second carves a middle ground between 
(S3) and (S4) remaining neutral on the existence of high-level entities. 
The first novel strategy I forward is (S4). This strategy posits high-level properties 
which ground global principles without positing high-level entities like the world-kind. 
It is worth noting that, in my view, these properties would be determinables. This is 




account for functional laws. The same is true of global principles. So, this is not just 
compatible, but can be seen as an extension of the work I have done thus far. 
The idea of positing high-level properties but no high-level entities that realise them has 
not yet been explored. However, it has a lot of promise. In the next section, I show that 
it can be argued for using the exact same evidence as (S3). However, it is more 
parsimonious than (S3) because it posits fewer entities to account for global principles. 
Roughly, this strategy works by allowing for collective properties. So, it allows for 
multiple objects to collectively instantiate a property the individual objects lack. This 
has the benefit of retaining the principle that properties need bearers, it is just that here 
the bearers are a plurality of things rather than a singular thing. To exemplify this, I 
will show how two electrons can individually have indeterminate spins but collectively 
have spin zero. By allowing multiple entities to collectively instantiate properties we do 
away with the need for high-level entities in our ontology.  
Finally, I will forward (S5). High-level properties fit with a variety of metaphysical 
pictures, some involving high-level entities (S3), some not (S4). (S5) posits high-level 
properties but remains neutral on whether the objects which bear them are unified 
high-level objects or not. In other words, it is agnostic about high-level entities at least 
until evidence surfaces to show that there are indeed high-level entities. (S5) has a lot 
going for it. It benefits from more ontological neutrality than the systems approach 
(S3B) while retaining the parsimony of (S4). 
 
4.3 Refining our account of global principles: kinds, systems, or ordinary objects 
Dispositional essentialists are quite receptive to explaining global principles via 
properties of high-level entities like the world-kind or systems (S3). This is because, they 
are seen as the best if not only way to account for global principles within Dispositional 
Essentialism. However, those outside the Dispositional Essentialism fanclub are quick 
to criticise this approach which seems a fit farfetched (Livanios, 2010).  
The complaints against Dispositional Essentialism’s account of global principles are 
generally lodged at the world-kind approach (S3A). This is in part because, for a long 
time this was the only option on the table. The fear is that dispositional essentialists 




the world which it has in virtue of membership to the world-kind. How does the systems 
account improve on this approach? 
Chakravartty proposes the notion of systems to solve Dispositional Essentialism’s global 
principle problem. The idea is that these high-level entities have high-level properties 
which give rise to global principles. However, Chakravartty never explains what he 
means by systems. In fact, the following passage suggests that he uses the word ‘system’ 
to avoid metaphysical explanation: “On reflection, it is clear that the basic idea of the 
response suggested by Bigelow et. al. can be recast in terms that dispense with much of 
the metaphysical jargon. We experiment on and theorize about different kinds of 
systems” (2019, p. 13).  I will return to the positive account of systems, but first I will 
look at what motivates this account. 
4.3.1 Motivating the systems account 
Chakravartty points out that it is not unusual to postulate properties at the system level 
in science. For instance, a biologist might speak of properties of cells or living 
organisms. However, talk of systems is perhaps most easily justified by entanglement in 
Quantum Mechanics. Explanations of this phenomenon involve attributing properties to 
quantum systems that cannot be explained by the properties of their parts. 
When objects are entangled there are properties which can only be attributed to the 
entangled system, but not to its parts (the individual quantum objects). The properties 
of the individual quantum objects are not just unknown but indefinite. They are only 
acquired or fixed upon measurement. The standard example of this is a system of two 
electrons which are anticorrelated with regard to spin, with an overall spin of zero. 
When we measure the spin of the first electron we fix it and, in that same instant, we fix 
the spin of the second. The second electron has opposite spin to the first since their sum 
is zero. Strangely, when one electron is measured the spin of the other is instantly 
determined, even if they are on opposite ends of the universe. 
The mysterious behaviour of entangled systems has led philosophers and physicists to 
think that quantum objects are nonseparable and that the quantum world is holistic 
(Healey, 1991; Teller, 1986; Schaffer, 2010). Broadly holism implies that the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts. The parts of a quantum system (the individual quantum 




object. This problem is all the more pressing given that entanglement is a widespread 
phenomenon rooted in the very foundations of Quantum Physics. To put its commonality 
in perspective Michael Esfeld says that “what has to be accounted for in quantum theory 
is not entanglement, but cases of the absence of entanglement, if there really are such 
cases” (2004, p. 604). Further, Jonathan Schaffer went as far as to use entanglement to 
argue for priority monism. On this view, there is only one object in existence – the world 
– with everything else being a proper part of it (2010).9  
Chakravartty takes this to mean that a) systems exist and b) there are properties of 
systems which cannot be reduced to properties of their parts (2019, §3.2). By using 
scientific evidence for his systems approach Chakravartty can brush away the charge of 
being ad hoc. Positing systems is, arguably, no more ad hoc than scientists positing 
properties of entangled objects. Both are responding to the same situation where the 
data resists bottom-up explanation. 
I will argue that the scientific evidence does not in fact mandate the existence of 
systems. What it does show is that there are high-level properties which cannot be 
attributed to an individual low-level object. So, where someone of Chakravartty’s 
persuasion might say that a) systems exist and b) there are properties of systems which 
cannot reduce to their parts; I am agnostic on a). In my view, we can only be confident in 
b) there are high-level properties. However, first I will compare the systems and kinds 
approaches. 
4.3.2 Systems vs kinds 
Chakravartty clearly uses the term system to avoid metaphysical jargon and 
commitments. This way he can claim to be purely motivated by the scientific evidence – 
not metaphysical bias. This is supposed to do away with concerns of ad hocness. 
Additionally, this makes his view more ontologically neutral than the natural-kinds 
approach. This is because, the systems approach is compatible with the natural kinds 
ontology but not married to it.  
 
9 While I do not endorse Schaffer’s view, Dispositional Essentialism is consistent with different 
views of what objects are fundamental and bear the dispositional properties that give rise to 
laws. Thus, one could endorse Dispositional Essentialism while thinking that there is one big 




There are various ways of answering the question “what is a system?”. A philosopher of 
Brian Ellis’s persuasion can read systems as natural kinds. However, this is not 
necessary. Dispositional essentialists hostile to natural kinds, or who endorse natural 
kinds but reject essentialism about them (Mumford, 2005) can still talk about systems. 
The scientific evidence of systems suffices to justify systems regardless of one’s opinion 
on the natural kinds debate. We can see systems as groups of individuals tied together 
in some distinctive way, say by their properties or relations to one another. Another 
possibility is to see them as individuals in their own right through an emergence lens. 
The notion of ‘systems’ seems metaphysically open, compatible with multiple ontologies. 
While the systems approach is more ontologically neutral than the natural-kinds 
approach it is not open to any ontology whatsoever. To fulfil their purpose in accounting 
for global principles within Dispositional Essentialism, systems will have to have 
properties. Further, these properties will not be held by the system’s parts, or there 
would be no need to postulate the system in the first place. Thus, these properties will 
be ‘basic’ in the sense that they cannot be explained away by lower-level properties had 
by the system’s parts. Further, they will need to have dispositional essences. This places 
limits on the ontological neutrality of the term “system”. It will not be compatible with 
e.g. extreme nominalist views which deny the mind-independent existence of properties, 
regularity views of laws or categoricalist views which separate properties of systems 
from their nomic roles. 
Recent debates on modelling and idealisation in the sciences provide fruitful options for 
understanding systems. Marco Nathan says that systems are idealised models (2015, p. 
261). His view is that dispositions are often not properties of objects but of idealised 
models instead. He believes that this best explains why dispositions may often not 
manifest, to the point where they can even break with regularities. On his view, these 
dispositions hold due to properties of the microstructure of the entities in question. 
These properties may themselves be dispositional – so there may be fundamental 
dispositional properties - however high-level dispositions like fragility are not 
fundamental. For Nathan the properties of systems are not fundamental.  
Before I discuss idealisation (which systems are idealised and what idealisation even 
means) I need to address the dispositional properties Nathan cites. I agree that 
properties like fragility are not fundamental. I find discussions using fragility as an 




level dispositions which are much better candidates for fundamentality. For instance, 
biological properties, mental properties or properties of entangled entities/systems are 
far harder to explain away. 
Back to our main discussion, the first thing to note is that not all systems are idealised. 
The universe in its entirety is the only physically closed system in existence. As such, it 
is not idealised, sidestepping the tension between systems as idealised and real entities. 
Chakravartty argues that the universe may give rise to global principles in virtue of 
being a physically closed system (2019, §3.2). If systems which are physically closed give 
rise to certain global principles, we would expect these principles to hold for the 
universe as the only physically closed system in existence. 
In addition to there only being one physically closed system – the universe – the global 
principles that we are concerned with here look like they would be explained by 
reference to it. The difficulty accounting for global principles within Dispositional 
Essentialism stems from their generality, and the fact that they seem to apply 
everywhere and to many different properties as seen in the example of the conservation 
where many properties e.g. momentum, angular momentum and mass-energy are 
conserved.  
If we only need the system that is the universe to solve the problems laid out by global 
principles, Chakravartty’s proposal will not be that different from Bigelow, Ellis and 
Lierse’s (1992). The idea of a universe-system may be more ontologically neutral than 
the world-kind in the sense that the universe-system could be a kind or not. However, 
the universe-system may not seem like a vast improvement on the world-kind in terms 
of ad hocness.  
On the surface the systems approach can improve on the world-kind approach by 
allowing for systems of various sizes, adding nuance to the debate. The systems 
approach may allow for smaller systems i.e. systems which are not identical with the 
universe. Instead, they would be proper subsets of the universe. However, these smaller 
systems will be less robust than the universe-system as they are not causally closed. It 
is here, in smaller systems, that the issue of idealisation occurs. 
Smaller systems are idealised in a sense. However, this is not to say that they are not 




the sense that they are partial considerations. The notion of system is tied to that of 
focus – what accounts for certain phenomena. When scientists work with small-systems 
they highlight a few variables that are relevant and work with those despite their 
susceptibility to outside influences. So, for instance, we can study the solar system by 
considering only a certain region of spacetime. The spacetime region in question will be 
the most important for understanding the system’s developments. After all, we can’t 
possibly take everything in the universe into consideration every time we consider a 
system. Further, we focus on an appropriate scale, ignoring, say, the microphysical 
makeup of the planets despite the fact that the sum of the microphysical facts may 
explain the higher-level phenomena we study. To facilitate things systems are often 
idealised, meaning that outside influences are taken out of the picture altogether. This 
is despite the fact that other variables, or objects outside the system, could interfere.  
In addition, smaller systems are not impenetrable and mutually exclusive. The variables 
which are decisive for one system may partially or entirely overlap with another. This 
overlap could be spatial, temporal or in terms of certain physical quantities (velocity, 
charge, etc.)  
It seems mistaken to favour the systems view for allowing this nuance by allowing 
systems of different sizes. This is not just because, as we have seen, smaller systems get 
messy (or at least messier than the universe-system we need for global principles). 
Natural kinds advocates tend to see nature as riddled with kinds as Chakravartty may 
see nature riddled with systems. They are not limited to the world-kind. Further, they 
may claim kinds in response to the same evidence as Chakravartty uses for systems. In 
fact, they often do; both Chakravartty and natural-kind theorists use examples from 
biology for instance.  
In the case of global principles, the universe-system may suffice. This avoids a lot of the 
metaphysical issues hinted at with smaller systems. However, when scrutinised, 
Chakravartty’s system approach does not seem to have made much progress over the 
natural-kinds one. Any move Chakravartty makes the natural kinds theorist can mirror. 
This is hardly surprising considering they both create high-level entities in response to 
the same evidence. I concede that the systems approach is more ontologically neutral 
than the world-kind approach as it does not mandate a commitment to natural kinds. 
However, I will now show that there are more ontologically neutral and parsimonious 




4.3.3 A new approach - accounting for global principles without high-level entities 
Ockham’s razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. Philosophers prefer 
more parsimonious or simpler explanations all else equal. ‘Beyond necessity’ and ‘all 
else equal’ are key here. While simpler theories are preferred, more complex 
explanations are better if they compensate for their complexity in explanatory value. 
The aim is to keep one’s ontology as sparse as possible without sacrificing explanation.  
The views I forward in this section are more parsimonious than the accounts of global 
principles in the literature. The natural kinds and systems approaches postulated high-
level entities whose high-level properties account for these principles. The approaches I 
turn to now do away with the first step. They do not postulate high-level entities. (S4) 
banishes high-level entities from its ontology altogether, whereas (S5) remains agnostic 
on whether these entities exist. I argue that global principles do not require high-level 
entities and that, as a result, we ought not to inflate our ontology to include them. 
Within Dispositional Essentialism laws are accounted for via properties. Certain laws 
resist explanation in terms of regular properties. I called these global principles. In 
order to account for such high-level laws, Dispositional Essentialism needs high-level 
properties. Further, until now dispositional essentialists have posited high-level entities 
- such as the world kind or the causally closed system that is the universe - as bearers of 
these high-level properties. (S4) proposes we do away with these high-level entities, 
eliminating them from our ontology altogether. Importantly, this is not to say that (S4) 
requires bearer-less properties. Such a move would undoubtedly raise many eyebrows. 
After all, the very notion of properties seems to require something or things which have 
that property. Rather, my proposal is that ordinary objects can collectively bear the 
high-level properties needed to account for global principles. 
Property-bearing is often assumed to be a one-to-one relation. In other words, for every 
token property there is a single object which bears it. This assumption fuels the 
postulation of world kinds and systems to account for global principles. However, the 
notion of collective properties breaks with this tradition (Cornell, 2017; Caves, 2018). 
Advocates of collective properties allow for property instantiation to be a one-to-many 




Collective properties are not like distributive properties. A group has a distributive 
property if each of its members has said property. Collective properties are properties 
which individuals jointly possess. They are instantiated by the individuals plurally but 
not by the individuals on their own. There are many examples of this in both 
metaphysics and philosophy of science literature. One sort of example is that multiple 
people could jointly (but not individually) surround a building. Another is that seven 
things can jointly (but not individually) be seven. If you allow for the possibility of gunk 
(infinitely divisible substance) you allow complex objects to instantiate properties. 
Whether you take that to involve collective properties will depend on whether you see 
the parts of those objects as objects or not. While there are many examples of collective 
properties, I will focus on the entanglement example as it is the go-to example when 
arguing for high-level entities (Chakravartty, 2019). 
We saw that two electrons may jointly have spin zero, but not have definite individual 
spins. In this case the two electrons can be said to share the superimposed property of 
<up,down>+<down,up> spin. In other words, it is indeterminate which has spin up and 
which has spin down until a measurement is made.10 The individual electrons do not 
have this superimposed property because this property makes reference to the other 
electron. We know that their joint spin is zero. However, the individual electrons do not 
have a fixed spin in this state. They only acquire a fixed spin upon measurement, at 
which point the entanglement is broken. 
The entanglement example nicely illustrates the ambiguities lurking behind talk of 
systems and their properties. Talk of two electrons and the entangled system are used 
interchangeably in the literature. As a result, it is not clear whether entangled systems 
bear properties qua objects in their own right (one-to-one instantiation) or whether the 
objects which are entangled bear collective properties (many-to-one instantiation). I will 
give some reasons for preferring the latter reading. 
One reason to think that we have a collective property in the two-electron example is 
that electrons are more than entangled muddles. They each have individual properties. 
So, each electron will have its own mass and charge. This suggests that they are very 
much distinct objects. How else could they have separate properties? Of course, we could 
include both electron 1, electron 2, and the entangled system 1+2 in our ontology. 
 




However, this would inflate our ontology, bringing me to the second reason for favouring 
the collective property view. 
By allowing for collective properties we do away with the need for high-level entities. 
Recall that dispositional essentialists only postulated high-level entities in order to 
explain high-level properties (and thus laws). Collective properties do away with the 
need for these high-level entities. The ordinary objects we already have in our ontology 
suffice. Ordinary objects bear the properties (and thus ground the laws) in question. 
Further, Ockham’s razor tells us that we must prefer the simpler of two ontologies, all 
else equal. Hence (S4) is born. 
A third point that can be raised in favour of collective properties is that postulating 
high-level entities can be highly problematic. There are examples where collective 
properties simply make more sense. This is easily seen in the case of number 
instantiation. Let’s say we have seven objects. If we believe in the one-to-one property 
instantiation picture, seven things cannot instantiate the number seven. Rather, we are 
now committed to eight things. The seven things that existed already plus the plural 
object which instantiates seven. This seems clearly wrong (Caves, 2018). The 
mathematical case is particularly illustrative because it lands us in a paradox. Without 
collective properties, we need 8 things to instantiate 7, and 9 things to instantiate 8, 
which seems absurd. It is hard to judge if this kind of paradox is unique to mathematics 
or not. However, if we already have everything we need in our ontology to account for a 
property, why keep postulating more entities? 
Global principles operate at such a high-level that entities as big as the world are 
postulated to ground them. This involves a sort of double counting. Our ontology 
contains all the objects in the world qua individuals and qua the world. However, it is 
possible that all the objects in the world collectively bear properties instead. This avoids 
double counting as we do not need a world-kind or universe-system in addition to 
everything else. (S4) points out that ordinary objects can band together to collectively 
share any property which the world-kind can. 
The second, novel strategy is to allow for high-level properties but remain agnostic on 
whether there are high-level entities (S5). High-level properties are compatible with 
multiple metaphysical frameworks. So far it has been assumed that they require high-




also the option of not postulating these high-level entities at all. Instead, high-level 
properties might be shared properties in the sense that two or more objects share them. 
They might also be seen as emergent properties which supervene on various objects. In 
sum, it is not clear that a commitment to high-level properties mandates a commitment 
to high-level entities. 
I have sympathy for the (S5) approach of remaining neutral. We cannot rule out future 
evidence to the effect that high-level entities exist. However, I favour (S4). I argued that 
we do not have sufficient evidence to posit high-level entities to account for global laws. 
This is doubly damning for high-level entities when paired with parsimony concerns. 
Ockham’s razor tells us that we ought not to inflate our ontology unless we have very 
good reason to do so. In the absence of “good reason” my ontology remains high-level-
entity-free. 
4.3.4 Collective properties, emergence and fundamentality 
Accounting for global principles within Dispositional Essentialism requires high-level 
properties. Until now, it was assumed that these high-level properties require high-level 
entities to bear them, such as the world-kind or universe-system (S3). In the previous 
section I argued that we could skip the last step. There is no need for these high-level 
entities. I argued that ordinary objects can come together to collectively bear any high-
level property the world-kind or universe-system was posited to bear. In this section I 
will consider the counter-position. In particular, I will look at Heil’s case that high-level 
properties require a high-level entity to bear them (2012). I will show that his 
arguments do not apply to the kinds of properties needed to account for global principles 
and fail to provide an alternative account of how these principles come to be. 
It is worth noting that Heil’s views are crouched in emergence terms. Definitions of 
emergence vary. Broadly, emergence involves an addition of being. Let’s say property X 
occurs when entities A, B and C and their properties A’, B’ and C’ interact. If X is 
emergent it may be caused by A’, B’ and C’ but it is not reducible to A’, B’ and C’. X 
presents something novel, an addition of being. Our ontology is incomplete if it does not 
contain X in addition to A’, B’ and C’. I am not taking sides on the emergence debate 
here as that is beyond the scope of the thesis and unnecessary for my argument. I can 
simply import Heil’s criticisms of emergence to my collective properties and respond 




debate, and the fact that he would probably see my collective properties as emergent 
anyway, I will be using that language here too. I will show that these criticisms do not 
apply to the properties needed to account for global principles for various reasons. 
4.3.4.1 Heil’s view 
Much of the emergence literature is hostile to the approach to global principles I have 
forwarded in this chapter. The emergence debate is dominated by emergent properties. 
The issue stems from emergent individuals. Some explicitly argue that emergent 
properties require emergent individuals (Jacobs and O’Connor, 2003; Heil, 2012).  
Right on page 1 of his book, Heil promises a metaphysics that “stems, not from a 
nuanced analysis of talk about the universe, but from repeated head-on confrontations 
with the universe.” (2012) Instead of using linguistic tradition and conceptual analysis 
to arrive at metaphysical truths, he proposes we look at the world and draw our 
metaphysics from what we observe. Yet he has some basic metaphysical concepts and 
categories through which he interprets the world. These arguably bias his views. 
Heil has a traditional substance-property ontology.  On his view, substances are basic 
entities. They have no substantial parts i.e. no parts which are themselves substances. 
Further, properties are ways substances are. No substance can be no way at all. 
Further, properties require bearers. Let me explicitly state that I am not arguing with 
the fact that properties require bearers. The issue is that he states a priori that the 
bearers must be single simple substances. In other words, for every token fundamental 
property there will be a fundamental substance, and vice versa. This follows mainly 
from his definition of substances. Substances are bearers of properties (2012, chapter 1). 
More to the point, they are also defined in terms of independence (ibid, chapter 3). 
Following Descartes and Spinoza, Heil sees substances as necessarily independent from 
each other. This prevents two substances from sharing a property, so to speak. 
Heil is mostly averse to emergence. However, he claims that if and when there is a truly 
emergent property it will require an emergent substance as its bearer. According to him, 
this follows by the historical definitions of property and substances (dating back to 
Descartes and Spinoza). By definition, a property is a property of a substance – no 
property can exist without a substance to bear it. Substances are bearers of properties. 




much up for debate. There are intuitions going in both directions and, as we saw in the 
previous section, there is fruitful work being done to show the possibility of high-level 
properties being collectively instantiated. However, it is not just the controversy that is 
a problem for Heil’s conclusion.  
The moral of Heil’s introduction is that we ought not draw radical metaphysical claims 
based on linguistic tradition or conceptual analysis alone. That goes against the aims of 
the book. However, Alyssa Ney points out that “What all of this looks like is a 
metaphysical investigation of our concepts, albeit of a form that isn’t afraid to end up 
with fairly revisionary claims. We start from our concepts, of substance and property, 
and follow them where they lead.” (2014, p. 881) Historical definitions aside, let’s look at 
the empirical arguments Heil gives for his theory. These aim to show that simple 
substances and simple properties are all we need to explain the phenomena we see. 
Limiting our ontology to simple substances and simple properties does not prevent us 
from talking about complex objects and their apparent properties. Heil makes a point of 
saying that he can still talk about tomatoes and their being spherical and red. In fact, 
his views on complex objects help explain why his ontology is so sparse. He argues that 
red and spherical are derived from the properties of the simple substances which 
compose the tomato. Thus, there is no addition of being in the case of the tomato’s 
redness and spherical shape. Heil’s anti-emergent views span the whole of the “special 
sciences”. 
Heil believes that these sciences are tracking real regularities, however he says this 
does not warrant the ontological drama of emergence. In his words “None of this calls for 
ontological drama. … You can fairly speak of levels of description, taxonomic levels, 
levels of explanation, levels of complexity and organization, but it would be a mistake of 
a fundamental sort to imagine that such talk requires us to posit levels of being.” (2012, 
p. 194) Heil strikes an odd balance between allowing for emergent descriptions of the 
world while resisting an emergent ontology.  
According to Heil, special sciences make true and irreducible statements. However, he is 
quick to differentiate between the truth of these statements and their truth-makers. In 
his view, just because we can say true things about macro-entities like volcanos or 
organisms, does not mean that these statements have macro-entities as truthmakers. In 




These claims are true because of the fundamental physics, not because there is any real 
addition of being.  
It is worth noting that, despite his hostility to emergence in the special sciences, Heil 
accepts that emergence occurs. All the examples he gives of possible emergence are from 
physics. The only clear-cut example of emergence he mentions is the example of when 
two particles collide to form a new kind of particle, with the first particles being 
annihilated (2012, pp. 30-31). When faced with the problem of entanglement, he keeps 
an open mind. He does not concede emergence because he remains neutral on the correct 
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. However, he says that if the whole world turned 
out to be entangled we would have a monist world. Here, by monist, I mean a world with 
just one substance – the world itself. Everything else would be proper parts of the world 
– the only true fundamental substance (Schaffer 2010; Heil, 2012, p. 47). This is the 
view whereby the whole world is a fundamental entangled object with fundamental 
properties. He would favour this view because of his understanding of the property-
substance relationship. 
Heil endorses the primacy of physics. He embraces the view that fundamental physics 
provides the truthmakers for every other science. He rejects a levelled view of reality, 
where there are high-level properties and substances. He is willing to accept that special 
sciences make irreducible claims, nonetheless these do not present a new level of reality. 
Their statements are true because of the physics. Naturally, when he talks about 
emergence, the only examples he is willing to concede come from fundamental physics (– 
a point that I will soon use for the benefit of my theory!) 
In sum: Heil proposes an ontology of simple substances and their properties. He admits 
of emergent descriptions in the special sciences but shies away from an emergent 
ontology. Naturally, he only accepts emergence at that most fundamental level. In his 
view everything is explicable by that lower level. This does not shake my view for 
various reasons. 
4.3.4.2 Responding to Heil 
The assumption that high-level properties require high-level entities is also clear in the 
dispositional essentialist literature. Recall the existing strategies for accounting for 




we need global, world-level properties to account for global principles. Additionally, we 
need global, world-level entities to bear those properties. A natural world-kind, of which 
our world is a member, is immediately postulated to explain how our world could bear 
such a property. Similarly, Chakravartty posits systems as bearers of high-level 
properties. Setting aside the issue of whether these philosophers see this as emergence 
or not, they clearly feel the need to postulate high-level entities to bear their high-level 
properties. Before I tackle this issue a caveat. 
I argued that we can indeed have high-level properties without high-level bearers. I did 
this via the notion of collective properties. Collective properties are not to be confused 
with emergent properties. Collective properties are properties instantiated by multiple 
objects. These may or may not be emergent. Take the case of a group of people who 
jointly surround a building. This property could be reduced to the properties of the 
individuals (the spatial locations of the individuals). That said, the property of being 
alive, conscious and/or entangled seem like ideal candidates for both being a) collective 
and b) emergent.11  The properties which explain global principles are not reducible to 
the properties of their parts either. Whether or not that makes them emergent is a 
question for another time. 
In the global principles literature, the need for high-level irreducible properties is 
assumed. What is up for debate is whether those properties require high-level bearers or 
not. I take those who argue that they do to be against collective emergent properties. 
This is because, in their view, any emergent property will be had by an emergent 
individual, not multiple individuals. If this were the case the motivation for (S4) and 
(S5) would be undercut. How can we respond to philosophers like Heil who say that 
these properties require a single substance to bear them? 
First, in all of Heil’s examples of seemingly emergent properties which are realised by 
fundamental entities and their properties, there is no mention of the kind of property 
that would ground a global principle. He never mentions the global principles we have 
been grappling with in this chapter. Conservation laws, symmetry principles or the 
principle of least action are left out of the picture altogether. Yet he is a realist about 
dispositions, so the problem of global principles is a problem for his view too. If he has a 
hypothesis about how these can be explained by simple substances and their properties, 
 
11 See Emergence for Nihilists (Caves, 2018) and Mereological Nihilism and the Problem of 




he hasn’t given it. For whatever reason, global principles do not seem to have occurred 
to him at all. As we have seen, global principles are problematic exactly because they 
resist bottom-up explanation. They involve many different properties, so they simply 
cannot be explained via the nature of individual properties. Further, these principles are 
considered fundamental to current physics, so they really ought to be addressed and 
consistent with our ontology. 
Secondly, and more problematically for Heil, global principles are considered 
fundamental to physics. That would appear to put them in the “fundamental physics” 
category, not in the “special sciences” category Heil takes issue with. While he takes 
special sciences to be translatable or reducible by fundamental physical entities and 
properties, the same sort of explanation cannot be given for global principles as they are 
already fundamental physics. The fact that global principles are fundamental physical 
laws and not dealt with is problematic for Heil. He takes fundamental physics to be, 
well, fundamental. And he seems willing to accept emergence if and only if it is within 
fundamental physics. Yet here we have high-level irreducible phenomena occurring in 
fundamental physics and he doesn’t mention it at all.  
How can Heil deal with global principles? Let’s say Heil accepts that global principles 
are emergent. Recall his commitment to every substance having a property and vice-
versa. This commitment leads him to the view that every emergent property will require 
an emergent entity. Thus, he would need a world/universe level entity. He himself 
suggests that if entanglement has the holistic consequences hypothesised we are left 
with a kind of Monism (2012, p. 46). Here he references Spinoza’s one substance and 
Schaffer’s work on priority monism to back him up. Thus, I take it that were Heil to be 
persuaded of high-level properties like the ones proposed he would advocate for a 
position like (S3) where the world or universe is an entity with properties that ground 
global laws. Except he would take it further, to where the world is the only substance in 
existence. 
If fundamental properties require fundamental substances, we are pushed towards 
accounting for global principles via a global entity (S3).  The search for an entity large 
enough to bear the properties that ground global principles ends at the world- or 
universe-level. This is because the properties in question are so vast that many 
philosophers take these to be predicated of the entire world. Thus, our credence in global 




Pluralism and Monism are forwarded as mutually exclusive and exhaustive options. 
Pluralism is the view that multiple objects at a certain level are fundamental. Monism is 
the view that there is only one fundamental object in existence. The latter is in vogue 
ever since Schaffer forwarded his priority monism. This is the hypothesis that only the 
universe is fundamental and everything else is a dependent part of it (2010). The issue 
here is that if the universe is a fundamental entity it is not clear how each of its parts 
can be fundamental. After all, if explanation ends at the fundamental level it will either 
bottom out (pluralism) or top out (monism).  
In sum: it is often assumed that high-level properties require high-level realisers. This 
assumption has been pretty damning for Dispositional Essentialism. The difficulty this 
view faces in accounting for global principles came to light with the world-kind 
hypothesis, the idea of world-kinds puts some off the view. I think that this is 
premature. As I have shown, high-level properties and laws are compatible with 
multiple ontological frameworks, some of which involve high-level properties and some 
which do not. As for Heil’s case that high-level properties can be reduced to lower-level 
ones, it simply does not apply here. Global principles are fundamental to physics. If you 
are a dispositionalist, those laws are grounded in fundamental properties – so those 
properties will be fundamental too. Many dispositional essentialists may be happy for a 
fundamental system or kind to bear the properties in question. For others, the option of 




In this chapter I tackled the final stumbling block for Dispositional Essentialism’s 
account of laws: global principles. This has been a considerable problem for the view 
with little work done on solving the problem. The problem stems from the fact that 
Dispositional Essentialism grounds laws in properties. Given the generality of global 
principles, extremely high-level properties are needed to ground them. Save Bird’s 
dismissal of global principles, the only attempts to explain global principles have 
involved postulating huge, all-encompassing entities to do the job. In particular, the 




I have not disputed the idea that we need high-level properties to account for global 
principles within Dispositional Essentialism. What I have disputed is the need for the 
high-level entities like world-kinds or universe-systems. I did this by showing that 
global principles can only serve as conclusive evidence for high-level properties within 
Dispositional Essentialism. This is because, within Dispositional Essentialism, laws are 
accounted for via properties. Thus, global principles are compatible with multiple 
ontological frameworks. 
I have argued that world-kinds and universe-systems are not necessary. They inflate 
and complicate our ontology to no explanatory benefit. High-level entities were 
postulated in response to the assumption that property instantiation is a one-to-one 
relationship whereby each token property is instantiated by a single object. I have 
shown that high-level properties are compatible with another picture which rejects this 
assumption and avoids high-level entities altogether. The idea is that property 
instantiation can be a many-to-one relation. Multiple objects can come together to bear a 
collective property. Further, this property can present a significant addition of being, 
being irreducible to the lower level. 
Both the traditional approach and the collective property approach respond to the same 
evidence for high-level properties and laws. Further, I have shown that literature on 
high-level properties switches between talk of these properties being instantiated by 
groups of objects and by high-level objects. The key difference is that one postulates 
additional entities to explain the properties in question, the other does not. My goal has 
been to show that assumptions about property instantiation cut both ways. We are not 
forced to endorse high-level and potentially ad hoc entities. We have multiple 
frameworks to choose from. In the absence of evidence for world-entities or universe-
systems, I propose we kick them out of our ontology. They are not doing any work 




5. Case studies: Conservation Laws and The Principle of Least 
Action  
In Chapter 4 we saw that Dispositional Essentialism has difficulties accounting for 
global principles. Here global principles are high-level, general laws. These laws are 
hard to explain within a dispositionalist framework because they do not follow from the 
nature of a single property. Rather, they constrain many properties, if not the behaviour 
of the whole world. Given that in Dispositional Essentialism, laws are explained via the 
nature of properties, high-level laws require high-level properties. As a result, 
philosophers have hypothesised that there are world-kinds or universe-systems which 
bear global properties which ground these global principles (Bigelow, Ellis, Lierse, 1992; 
Ellis, 2001, 2004; Chakravartty, 2019). In chapter 4, I proposed we do away with these 
high-level entities, allowing global properties to be collectively instantiated by ordinary 
objects. 
Until now the debate on global principles has been quite abstract. This is partially 
because the proposal is neutral on which global principles turn out to be fundamental. I 
provided a general recipe for accounting for global principles within Dispositional 
Essentialism, regardless of which global principles are fundamental. In this chapter I 
will consider the two most discussed global principles in the dispositional essentialist 
literature: conservation laws and the principle of least action. These are often raised in 
criticisms of Dispositional Essentialism’s ability to account for laws. Not much work has 
been done on them, besides referring to the world-kind hypothesis. I will spell out the 
difficulties conservation laws and the principle of least action pose for Dispositional 
Essentialism. After, I will look at the options for accounting for these within 
Dispositional Essentialism. Further, I will contrast the traditional account with my 
novel, more parsimonious, hypothesis. This chapter allows us to put the abstract 
strategies laid out previously into practice. It shows how we can use the metaphysical 
tools at our disposal to account for global principles in practice.   
 
5.1 Conservation Laws 
Conservation laws have challenged dispositional essentialists for decades. They appear 




have become the go-to example (Bird, 2007, p. 213; Livanios, 2010; Ellis, 2001). 
Conservation laws tell us that certain physical quantities are conserved. These include 
mass-energy, momentum, angular moment, number of leptons, etc. This is problematic 
because conservation laws do not seem to be written into the nature of the quantities 
conserved. Individual objects do not conserve these quantities. In fact, it hardly makes 
sense to talk about individual objects conserving a quantity. We cannot see conservation 
locally in the object. Rather, conserved quantities are approximately conserved in 
isolated systems, and perfectly conserved in the universe itself. It does not make sense 
to think of an individual object as conserving momentum. The object can lose 
momentum, transferring it to another object in the system it is embedded in. It is the 
system’s momentum that is conserved. The same applies to all conserved quantities. 
They do not appear to be manifestations of local dispositions. Rather, they appear to be 
high-level facts which are constraining how instances of the quantity evolve. 
Before I lay out the ways in which Dispositional Essentialism can account for 
conservation, a caveat. Conservation laws, symmetry laws and the Principle of Least 
Action are often spoken about as fundamental laws. However, there is a chance that 
they are not all fundamental. In fact, some philosophers argue that one is explicable in 
terms of the other. My proposal is neutral on which global principles are fundamental.  I 
provide an abstract recipe for accounting for high-level laws. The case studies I use aim 
to show how we can apply these metaphysical tools to account for global laws in practice. 
I am neutral on which high-level laws are fundamental, so it is not a problem if the 
particular examples used turn out not to be fundamental. Nonetheless, it is important to 
appreciate the connection between symmetry laws and conservation laws. 
Emmy Noether developed a theorem which showed that for every symmetry there was a 
mirroring conservation law. Her theorem shows e.g. that space translation symmetry is 
tied to the conservation of momentum, that rotation symmetry is tied to the 
conservation of angular momentum etc. (Livanios, 2010; Hanc, Tuleja, & Hancova, 
2004). This makes sense if we think about symmetry laws as telling us how one thing 
can vary without affecting others. For instance, the speed of a train can vary without 
affecting the physics inside the train. Symmetry and conservation laws are both tied to 
invariance. Conservation laws show that certain quantities are always conserved, 




Noether’s theorem could be used to argue that symmetries explain conservation 
(Livanios, 2010) or vice versa. Further, it has even been suggested that this connects 
symmetries and conservation to the Principle of Least Action (Hanc, Tuleja, & Hancova, 
2004). This highlights what is so unique about global principles. They give hint at a 
high-level – global – order to the world. We are still processing how best to translate this 
order into laws.  
A detailed investigation of how global principles relate, and which global principles 
really need explaining is beyond the scope of this chapter. Much more work needs to be 
done to establish a pecking order of global principles and decide which ones are 
irreducible. I won’t be concerned with whether symmetries explain conservation or vice 
versa. Rather, I will be using conservation laws (and then the principle of least action) 
as a case study to show how Dispositional Essentialism can account for global principles. 
Whatever the outcome, the link between conservation and symmetry is not a problem 
for the strategy I set out here. If symmetries turn out to explain conservation (or vice 
versa) so much the better for Dispositional Essentialism. Dispositional Essentialism 
would have one fewer global principle to account for. In addition, it seems likely that 
laying out the foundation for explaining one side of the symmetry-conservation dilemma 
would help shed light on the other. Regardless, until we know which global principles 
are irreducible it will serve Dispositional Essentialism well to be able to explain 
conservation laws and global principles generally. 
5.1.1 Accounts of conservation laws within Dispositional Essentialism 
There are at least three strategies for accounting for conservation laws within 
Dispositional Essentialism 
a) Explain conservation away as the result of other non-global laws or properties 
b) invoke a high-level entity to bear high-level properties that ground conservation 
laws 
c) invoke collective properties which ground conservation laws 
I argue that a) may be possible but is highly implausible. It leaves too much to be 





5.1.2 Accounting for conservation laws via ordinary laws or properties. 
One strategy to account for conservation laws is to explain them away via non-global 
laws or properties. In this section I won’t be concerned with explanations of conservation 
laws via symmetries. I set that debate aside earlier. I will not be taking sides on which 
global principles are most fundamental here. Rather, I look at what strategies we can 
employ to account for conservation laws directly via ordinary laws. 
One way of accounting for conservation laws is to explain them via non-global properties 
or laws. I briefly mentioned this kind of strategy in the previous chapter. In particular, I 
mentioned that Bird, in the absence of an explanation for global principles, suggests 
that they are not genuine laws. They are either meta-statements about laws or they are 
part of the background structure which science aims to eliminate (Bird, 2007, p. 214). 
For Bird, global principles are either dismissible or will be explained away by future 
science. Further, we saw that he said this because he was committed to Dispositional 
Essentialism. Within Dispositional Essentialism laws stem from the dispositional 
essences of properties so there is “no room for further constraints” (Ibid). If global 
principles were genuine laws they would present “further constraints” so Bird rejects 
them. I argued that this is not really an argument (much less a good argument). 
However, I will attempt to construct an argument for accounting for conservation laws 
via non-global properties. 
First, let’s get clear on the difficulty posed by conservation. We can disambiguate 
between two issues here. These are not disambiguated in the literature but seem vital to 
understanding the real difficulty posed by conservation laws. The first is local, the 
second is global. At the local level, we are challenged to account for individual 
conservation laws (particularly mass-energy, as we will see below). At the global level, 
the dispositional essentialist cannot explain why so many different physical quantities 
are conserved: mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc. I will show that the 
second problem is illegitimate. The dispositionalist cannot be expected to give a unified 
account of why so many physical quantities are conserved.  
Prima facie the fact that conservation holds of so many different physical quantities is a 
problem for Dispositional Essentialism. Dispositional Essentialism aims to eradicate 
brute laws and explain all modality from the bottom-up based on the nature of 




only seem to have conservation in common. The concern is that Dispositional 
Essentialism will leave the fact that all these physical quantities partake in 
conservation brute. So, Dispositional Essentialism will be left with a hodgepodge of 
individual conservation laws.  
The difficulty accounting for conservation at this global level is not a problem for 
Dispositional Essentialism. Or at least, it is not a problem for Dispositional 
Essentialism in particular. This is because conservation is not a unified phenomenon in 
the first place. The conservation of these physical quantities does not fall under a single 
unified law (as far as we know) so there is no need to give a unified explanation of them. 
No physical theory offers a unified explanation for the conservation of mass-energy, 
momentum, angular momentum, etc. 
Expecting a global account of conservation would set the bar too high for Dispositional 
Essentialism. By making it clear that all theories are left with a hodgepodge of 
conservation laws the expectations of what Dispositional Essentialism must do to 
account for them changes. There is no single conservation phenomenon to account for. 
Thus, the dispositional essentialist need not explain why these quantities share in 
conservation. Instead, the dispositional essentialist is free to account for conservation 
laws on a case by case basis which fits her theory best. 
The fact that conservation is a collection of individual laws, rather than a unified 
phenomenon, arguably calls the status of conservation as global principles into question. 
What makes the individual conservation laws global principles? Global principles are 
supposed to be more general laws than regular laws like Coulomb’s law, resisting 
bottom-up explanation in terms of individual properties. The question is whether the 
individual conservation laws will be like this. And, if not, was Bird right all along in 
denying the legitimacy of global principles? I will show that he was not. 
The greatest challenge to accounting for conservation is not global, in the sense that it is 
not that so many physical quantities are conserved. Each individual conservation law 
resists bottom-up explanation. The first local obstacle to giving a bottom-up account of 
conservation laws regards the conservation of mass-energy. While other conservation 
laws appear to be about one property e.g. momentum, angular momentum, number of 
leptons, the conservation of mass-energy is not. Mass and energy are not individually 




The universe has a total amount of mass-energy, that amount never changes. It is 
conserved. That said, the amount of mass and the amount of energy of the universe 
could change. This is because mass can be converted into energy and vice versa. The 
first law of Thermodynamics tells us that energy can never be created or destroyed. The 
energy of a system cannot be lost. However, energy can be transformed into mass. There 
is a known metric for this conversion: Einstein’s E = mc2. Here E stands for energy, m 
for mass, c for the speed of light. This equation tells us that energy equals mass times 
the speed of light squared. If the energy of a system declines, there will be a suitable 
increase in mass and vice-versa. 
The conservation of mass-energy presents a unique challenge to Dispositional 
Essentialism because it does not follow from the nature of a single property, in the way 
the conservation of momentum, angular momentum, number of leptons, etc. do. The 
conservation of mass-energy does not appear to follow from the nature of mass or energy 
individually. These two are jointly, not individually conserved. In other words, it is the 
sum of the two which must remain unchanged. 
There are various possible ways Dispositional Essentialism can respond to the problem 
of the conservation of mass-energy. I work under the assumption that mass and energy 
are metaphysically distinct. I take this to be the majority view among experts (Flores, 
2005). However, a philosopher keen on a bottom-up account of conservation could hedge 
their bets on an interpretation of quantum mechanics where mass and energy are 
somehow one. Alternatively, they could say that the conservation of mass-energy is 
special and demands a special treatment. However, all other conservation laws are best 
accounted for from the bottom up. They could argue that high-level properties are only 
postulated when necessary to explain data which resists explanation. The conservation 
of individual properties which are individually conserved does not require this kind of 
special explanation. As a result, these conservation laws do not seem to be part of the 
special class of global principles. I do not aim to settle the status of mass-energy here.  
Mass-energy is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to accounting for conservation. 
The problem of conservation is much broader than the problem of accounting for mass-
energy. In the next section we will see that all conservation laws (not just the 
conservation of mass-energy!) stubbornly resist bottom-up explanation. As we will see, 
these laws do not apply to individual objects but of systems. So much that it hardly 




discussion will flag up what makes conservation laws generally different from regular 
laws (like Coulomb’s law) and deserving of the title of global principles.  
5.1.3 Global principles, World-kinds and universe-systems 
In this section, I will look at key features of conservation laws which differentiate them 
from non-global laws.  I look at the scope of conservation laws, their role as constraints 
and why they seem to be imposed from the top-down. These features discredit bottom-up 
accounts of conservation. This sets the scene for the discussion of top-down explanations 
of conservation laws. In this section, I will show how conservation laws led to the 
postulation of a world-kind hypothesis. In particular, the world-kind allows the world to 
bear global properties which explain this sort of global law. This then will allow me to 
introduce my own proposal for accounting for conservation laws in the next section. 
Usually, we expect all objects with a certain disposition to manifest that disposition in 
like manner, given the right conditions. For instance, we expect all charged objects to 
interact according to Coulomb’s law. This allows us to predict how instances of charged 
objects interact based on a simple equation. If conservation laws were just like non-
global laws, we would expect this to be true for them also. Let’s say momentum has the 
disposition to be conserved and that each object with momentum manifests that 
disposition. We would expect that each object would conserve its own momentum. 
However, this is not the case. Conservation laws (and global principles generally) are 
not observed at the bottom level in this way. Rather, they are observed in semi-isolated 
and isolated systems. 
In order to see conservation laws in action we need to take a step back and look at the 
big picture.  It is not that individual objects conserve momentum. The whole system has 
a certain total quantity of momentum. That total quantity of momentum is conserved. 
Conservation is perfect within the universe as the only perfectly isolated or physically 
closed system in existence. However, it can also be observed in laboratory conditions of 
semi-isolation, where we try to limit the variables at play.  
The fact that conservation is best seen from above does not mean that it has no bearing 
on non-global events. Conservation laws constrain what can and cannot happen. No 




angular-momentum, etc. of the universe. Marc Lange summarises the situation as 
follows: 
“It is not the case that momentum is conserved because electrical interactions 
conserve it, gravitational interactions conserve it, and so forth for each of the 
actual kinds of fundamental interactions. Rather, every actual kind of 
fundamental interaction conserves momentum for the same reason: that the law 
of momentum conservation requires it to do so. The conservation law limits the 
kinds of interactions there could have been, making a nonconservative 
interaction impossible.” (2018, p. 16) 
Prima facie, the dispositions of objects allow for many possible interactions. Many of 
these will run contrary to conservation laws. Conservation laws appear to act as 
constraints because they do not allow any interaction to occur which would alter the 
physical quantity of the system in question. Conservation laws here are the limiting 
factor, not the dispositions of the object. 
The idea that conservation laws (and global principles generally) act as constraints is 
not new. Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse (1992) had already spotted this. They believed that 
once we really got to grips with fundamental laws there would be a knock-on effect. We 
would be able to predict what kind of particles and fields existed, along with their 
essences and how they would interact (p. 386). Indeed, global principles allowed Peter 
Higgs to predict the existence of the Higgs boson. A debate about the implications of 
knowing the final set of global principles is beyond the scope of this chapter. The 
important point to note is how conservation laws particularly, and global principles 
generally, act as high-level constraints as opposed to regular laws.12 
Dispositional Essentialism aims to explain all modality from the bottom-up. In other 
words, it explains laws via dispositional properties. However, conservation laws resist 
this kind of explanation. They appear to reflect high-level regularities, so high-level that 
they only perfectly hold at the universe level. Conservation laws demanded a new kind 
of explanation. They were fertile ground for the creation of the world-kind hypothesis: 
 
12 I revisit the notion of global principles as constraints in my discussion of the principle of least 





“Conservation laws are especially instructive, because they lend themselves 
exceedingly eagerly to our general analysis of laws. Conservation laws do look, on 
the face of things, like descriptions of essential properties of the world as a whole. 
It takes an effort to rewrite them in such a way that they sound as though they 
are describing correlations of some parts of the world with others.” (Bigelow, 
Ellis, Lierse, 1992, p. 386) 
I introduced the world-kind hypothesis in the previous chapter. To recap, this is a 
strategy for accounting for global principles via natural kinds. Natural kinds theorists 
claim that certain objects belong to natural kinds and have certain properties in virtue 
of their membership to those natural kinds. Biological examples - like “mammal”, 
“plant” or “homo sapiens” - are popular. However, for the purpose of accounting for 
global principles, the world-kind is invoked. The idea is that the world is a member of a 
special kind too – the world-kind. The world has special high-level properties. These 
properties explain the high-level laws we witness. They follow naturally from the 
dispositional properties of the world itself.  
The world-kind hypothesis is controversial. It was, for a long time, the only dispositional 
essentialist explanation for global principles. On the one hand it has some appeal. The 
world does seem like a rather unique kind of thing. It is the only physically isolated 
system in existence. Further, we see that this physically isolated system has an order to 
it, conserving various quantities, evolving in ways that require the least action (more on 
this in 5.2). 
On the other hand, it seems rather ad hoc to inflate our ontology to include the world-
kind when we find ourselves in a pinch to explain certain laws (Livanios, 2010). A less 
ontologically loaded way of seeing this is forwarded by Chakravartty (2019). As we saw, 
he replaced talk of world-kinds with talk of systems. He argues that there is good 
scientific evidence for the idea that systems have properties. The world is one big 
physically closed system, so it can have properties that ground global principles.  
As we saw in the last chapter, in my view the success or otherwise of the systems 
approach boils down to one question: are systems ontologically robust or not. Given that 
all the literature on the matter presupposes that global properties require a global 
entity, and Chakravartty never challenges this assumption, I take it that he means that 




the world-kinds approach. The system approach only presents a significant 
improvement on the world-kind approach if you are hostile to natural kinds. After all, 
the system approach still requires us to inflate our ontology to include a global object 
and global properties in order to account for global laws. In light of this, I argue for my 
new and more parsimonious account of conservation laws in the next section. 
5.1.4 My account 
Conservation laws act as top-down constrains on all interactions. They make sure that 
no interaction occurs which would alter the momentum, angular momentum, mass-
energy, number of leptons, etc. of the world. Unable to account for these laws via non-
global objects and properties, dispositional essentialists offered explanations in terms of 
the world-kind or universe-systems. In this section, I forward my alternative account of 
conservation laws via collective properties. I argue that it is a clear improvement on the 
previous models for explaining conservation laws. 
The accounts of conservation in the literature share a similar structure. They start with 
the problem of a high-level law. They realise they need a high-level property to bear it. 
Then they postulate a high-level entity in order to bear that high-level property and 
ground the high-level laws. This high-level entity is global. It is either identical with the 
world as a member of the world-kind or as the all-encompassing physically closed 
system that is the universe. This has various issues. The first, which we explored in 
previous section, is that it seems farfetched to inflate our ontology to include a world-
kind or universe-system in order to bear a high-level property that accounts for high-
level laws. The second problem with a global entity approach stems from double 
counting. If we add a global entity to our ontology, our ontology contains both all 
individual objects and the totality of all those objects regarded as an object in its own 
right. The third and biggest issue is related.  
The biggest issue for the accounts of conservation laws in the literature is that global 
entities are unnecessary. We do not need to double count. In the previous chapter I 
argued at length that the global entity approaches all rely on a common intuition: that 
property instantiation is a one-to-one relation. Each token property requires a single 
bearer. However, as we saw, there is no reason to think that property instantiation 
cannot be a one-to-many relation. In other words, it is possible that some properties are 




There are many cases of possible high-level property instantiation. In biology, cells, 
organs and organisms all have properties (Chakravartty, 2019). In the philosophy of 
mind, mental properties require a detailed network of neurons. Further, this is what 
seems to be happening in the case of global principles like conservation. These seem to 
require a high-level property in order to ground them. Some would argue that if these 
properties are irreducible, there must be a single high-level bearer. This involves seeing 
the cell, organ, organism, mind or brain, and/or world as entities. However, I challenged 
this intuition. We can also see the collection of cells that make the organism, the 
collection of neurons that make up the brain, and the collection of entities that make up 
the universe, as jointly bearing the property in question. In my view this is no less 
sensical or intuitive. In fact, it is more intuitive than seeing these high-level objects as 
further entities. 
My proposal is to do away with the global entity. We do not need it to explain 
conservation laws (or global principles generally). Ordinary objects can collectively bear 
any property the world-kind or universe-system was postulated to bear. Take the 
conservation of mass-energy. One way to explain this is to postulate a high-level entity – 
the world-kind or universe-system – which has a high-level property that grounds this 
law. My proposal is different. 
Individual objects do not conserve mass-energy. An object could lose mass if the system 
it is embedded in gained energy. However, jointly, fundamental particles conserve mass-
energy. My proposal is that the collection of relevant objects, in this case particles with 
mass and energy (or mass-energy if it turns out to be the same thing) jointly instantiate 
the property responsible for the conservation law. They jointly have a fixed amount of 
mass-energy to go around, they collectively instantiate properties (and thus 
conservation laws) that prevent any one of them from acting in such a way as to alter 
the sum off mass-energy. 
All we need to account for global laws within Dispositional Essentialism are high-level 
properties. These high-level properties are compatible with both the existence and the 
non-existence of high-level entities. On my view, if global entities are unnecessary, we 
ought to do away with them. Ockham’s razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond 
necessity. All else equal, our philosophical training tells us to prefer the more 





Conservation laws resist bottom-up explanation. Rather, they seem to be top-down 
constraints on ordinary interactions. It is not that ordinary objects conserve momentum, 
angular momentum, mass-energy, number of leptons, etc. Rather, the world has a total 
quantity of these. This quantity is conserved. If the conservation of momentum is 
grounded in the dispositions of momentum, it will be grounded in the dispositions of the 
world’s momentum. The world’s disposition to conserve its total momentum constrains 
how ordinary objects interact. Ordinary objects cannot interact in ways which throw off 
the cosmic balance. They cannot interact in ways that alter the sum of certain quantities 
in the universe. 
Conservation laws force the dispositional essentialist’s hand. Unable to account for them 
from ordinary properties they must postulate high-level properties that ground these 
high-level laws. I do not take issue with this. However, until this point every attempt at 
postulating a high-level property has been accompanied by a global entity. This is what I 
take issue with. I have shown that these high-level entities are unnecessary. Further, I 
have argued that they are undesirable. They inflate our ontology to no explanatory 
benefit. 
In sum: there are various ways of explaining conservation laws from a dispositional 
essentialist perspective. Conservation laws may be explicable in terms of symmetry 
laws, though I set this aside in this chapter. Additionally, conservation laws may be 
explained via high-level properties. These may be properties of a global kind or collective 
properties. In my view the latter – the collective property approach – is the best. 
However, it is worth emphasising the choices the dispositional essentialist has. 
Conservation laws are not an insurmountable challenge. They can be accounted for in 
various ways within the framework of Dispositional Essentialism. 
 
5.2 The Principle of Least Action 
The principle of least action is one of the most general, well-established, and 
philosophically controversial laws of nature. It allows us to calculate the trajectory of 
any object, or the evolution of any system via its initial and final positions. It stipulates 




term for the difference between kinetic and potential energy. The principle of least 
action, thus, shows that systems always evolve in such a way as to minimize action. 
Historically, the simplicity and generality of the principle of least action has led 
scientists to link it to hopes of a universal theory and philosophers to hypothesise that 
“nature is thrifty in all its interactions thanks to the perfection of God.” (Terekhovich, 
2018, p. 189) However, our focus is not on historic speculations but on how Dispositional 
Essentialism can accommodate this principle. 
Dispositional Essentialism’s ability to account for the principle of least action has been 
hotly debated (Katzav, 2004, 2005; Ellis, 2005; Smart and Thébault, 2015). The principle 
of least action is an architype global principle. It does not seem to follow from the 
dispositions of individual fundamental objects. Prima facie, there are many different 
trajectories an object can take, or many different ways a system can evolve. Prima facie, 
these are consistent with the dispositions of the objects in question. However, according 
to the principle of least action, no action-wasting moves are made. The trajectory which 
minimises action is favoured time and time again. 
The principle of least action does not seem to be the manifestation of a particular 
property had by a particular class of objects. It is not like Coulomb’s law which appears 
to be grounded in the dispositions of charge, dictating how charged objects interact. 
Rather, the principle of least action constrains all interactions between all things. It is 
all pervasive at all times. Further, it is not operating at the local level of individual 
objects alone. The principle of least action is seen in semi-isolated systems and 
ultimately will hold most perfectly of the entire world. Given that the universe is totally 
physically isolated, it is where global principles like the principle of least action are 
perfectly observed. The fact that the principle of least action operates at such high levels 
makes it problematic for Dispositional Essentialism. This is because, as we saw, 
Dispositional Essentialism aims to explain modality from the bottom-up via 
fundamental properties.  
In what follows I will look at three ways that the principle of least action can be 
reconciled with Dispositional Essentialism. The first two are found in the literature; the 
third is my own proposal. These are: 




(ii) invoke a high-level entity to bear high-level properties that ground the principle 
of least action 
(iii) invoke collective properties which ground the principle of least action 
These three strategies somewhat mirror the three strategies available for accounting for 
conservation laws. I will argue that there are various ways of accounting for the 
principle of least action. I start by showing that it is possible to account for the principle 
of least action via motion laws as per (i). However, in my view this strategy is not 
explanatorily satisfactory. After, I look at (ii) and (iii). (ii) regards the world-kind or 
universe-system hypothesis. I will keep the exposition brief as I have already explained 
the world-kind hypothesis; however, this will provide fruitful discussion on the nature of 
the principle of least action and global laws generally. (iii) is my strategy of using 
collective properties to account for global principles. I argue that both (ii) and (iii) are 
possible, but that we ought to favour my strategy – (iii) – as it is more parsimonious to 
no explanatory disadvantage. 
5.2.1 The Principle of Least Action vs regular motion laws  
There are various ways of explaining the trajectory of an object or the evolution of a 
system. Each physical theory – classical physics, general and special relativity, quantum 
physics, etc. – has its own laws for this. The principle of least action, in one form or 
another, exists in all these physical theories (Smart and Thébault, 2015; Terekhovich, 
2018). My focus will be mainly on the classical physics case as an exposition of each 
variant is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, my conclusions take the 
pervasiveness of the principle of least action into account. In what follows I look at the 
first strategy the dispositional essentialist can use to explain the principle of least action 
i.e. to explain it via non-global laws.  
In classical physics, the motion of an object must follow certain laws. For instance, 
Newton posited that objects will either persist in a state of rest or uniform action unless 
forces act upon them. According to Newton, F = ma, i.e. force is equal to mass times 
acceleration. Using his laws of motion, we can determine the trajectory of an object via 
its initial position, its velocity and the forces acting upon it or via its position at a couple 
instants and the forces acting upon it. Forces are important to this kind of explanation 




apple, and there is nothing to prevent it falling, the gravitational force directs the apple 
to the ground (Terekhovich, 2018). 
The principle of least action provides an alternative way to calculate the trajectory of 
the apple. In particular, the principle of least action allows us to calculate the trajectory 
of the apple using its initial and final positions. Whichever trajectory expends the least 
action is the one which occurred.  
Not only are there various laws we can invoke to calculate the trajectory of an object, or 
the evolution of a system, these explanations are not independent of each other. As we 
saw, Newton’s work allows us to calculate the trajectory of an object simply by its 
position at couple of instances and the forces that act upon it. However, this does not 
seem so different from the principle of least action. The principle of least action seems 
like a limiting case of this, whereby we have the initial and final positions specifically – 
rather than any positions whatsoever. However, the principle of least action is providing 
a unique insight into the workings of the universe and a new kind of explanation for 
motion.  
The principle of least action brings new information to the table. Whereas Newton 
explains motion in terms of forces, the principle of least action explains motion in terms 
of kinetic and potential energy. The force of the principle of least action lies in its 
generality. It tells us that the trajectory of all objects and the evolution of all systems, 
everywhere at all times, minimize action. This sort of high-level regularity requires 
explanation from a dispositional essentialist perspective, given that one of the aims of 
this view is to account for all modality. Let’s see how the first strategy fairs – explaining 
the principle of least action via motion laws. 
According to Joel Katzav, we can deduce motion laws from the principle of least action. 
He points out that, by extension, we can derive the dispositions of things via the 
principle of least action. The principle of least action allows us to derive the motion laws; 
the motion laws allow us to deduce the dispositions objects have. This is Katzav’s 
preferred direction of explanation. It goes from the top – the principle of least action – 
down to motion laws and finally dispositions. The principle of least action can account 
for motion laws. However, the reverse is also possible - motion laws can account for the 




The principle of least action can be deduced from the laws of motion. “For example, the 
restricted version of the PLA [principle of least action] that is used in classical particle 
mechanics … can be derived from the Lagrange formulation of the equations of motion 
of such systems” (Katzav, 2004, p. 212). (For a discussion of how this can be done in 
other physical theories see Terekhovich (2018)). He also points out that explaining the 
principle of least action via these motion laws is consistent with Dispositional 
Essentialism. By extension, we can deduce the principle of least action from ordinary 
dispositions. The ordinary dispositions ground the motion laws from which we deduce 
the principle of least action. This is in keeping with Dispositional Essentialism’s 
ordinary mode of explanation. 
We can derive the principle of least action from motion laws and vice versa. However, 
the question arises of which explanation is better. Are the motion laws fundamental and 
the principle of least action derivative or vice versa? Katzav argues for the explanation 
that goes from the principle of least action down, to motion laws and then dispositions. 
In fact, he doesn’t even consider the “explanation” from dispositions to motion laws to 
the principle of least action an “explanation”. He says that we can deduce the principle 
of least action from motion laws, but he is careful to differentiate deduction and 
explanation. He does not see this move as explanatory. 
The explanatory force of the principle of least action lies in its generality. It is a prime 
candidate for a global principle exactly because it explains high-level patterns of 
behaviour in terms of a simple, unifying law. Any system is compatible with a number of 
motion equations. The principle of least action is able to predict the actual motion 
equation in all these cases. In Katzav’s words “The deductions that the PLA [principle of 
least action] affords seem to gain further explanatory strength from their unifying force. 
Such deductions appeal to a single scalar quantity in order to decide how the objects 
within a physical system will evolve, no matter how complex the system and its 
evolution.” (2004, p. 212) 
The principle of least action also appears explanatory because there is a version of it in 
all major scientific theories. “It applies, in one form or another, to all physical theories 
including general and special relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and 
even string theory.” (Smart and Thébault, 2015, p. 388) We can deduce the principle of 
least action from the laws of each of these theories. However, each theory has different 




different in each case (Terekhovich, 2018). The principle of least action survives, 
remaining through paradigm change, making it seem more fundamental and better 
established than the laws being used to explain it.  
For Katzav, explaining the principle of least action via motion laws is the only way of 
saving Dispositional Essentialism. He presents us with a choice: either the principle of 
least action is explained bottom-up via motion laws or Dispositional Essentialism is 
false. This is because, on his view, Dispositional Essentialism requires all modality to be 
grounded by the dispositions of fundamental objects. Thus, for Dispositional 
Essentialism to work global principles like the principle of least action must be 
explained from the bottom-up.  
Katzav grants that the principle of least action can be deduced from motion laws. He 
sees this move as weak for the reasons given. As he points out, scientific explanations 
tend to go from the top (the principle of least action) down. Smart and Thébault (2015, 
section 5) counter that the fact that scientists use that direction of explanation does not 
guarantee that that is the direction of the metaphysical explanation. In other words, we 
cannot know simply from this that the top-level does, in actual fact, explain the bottom 
level. Nonetheless, I agree with Katzav that bottom-up accounts of the principle of least 
action are not compelling. The principle of least action captures a high-level regularity, 
which requires explanation. Further, it seems more fundamental than the laws invoked 
to explain it. However, I leave this avenue open for dispositional essentialists. It is not a 
problem for my view if the tides turn and physics uncovers more warrant for a bottom-
up account of the principle of least action. If anything, it is good for Dispositional 
Essentialism as it has one fewer global principle to worry about. My work leaves it up to 
science to determine which global principles are fundamental. 
However, I disagree with Katzav’s view that we must explain the principle of least 
action from the bottom up or do away with Dispositional Essentialism. In my view, 
rejecting a bottom-up explanation of the principle of least action is not cause to abandon 
Dispositional Essentialism. There is room in our metaphysics for both the principle of 
least action and Dispositional Essentialism. In what follows I will look at other ways of 





5.2.2 Back to world-kinds 
Ellis contra Katvaz argued that dispositional essentialists need not account for the 
principle of least action from the bottom-up – via non-global laws. According to Ellis, the 
pressure for this sort of account is only a problem for naïve dispositionalism. Here naïve 
dispositionalism is the view that ordinary objects and their dispositions ground all laws. 
Ellis sees himself as a sophisticated dispositional essentialist where “A more 
sophisticated dispositionalist takes the view that how things are disposed to behave 
depends also on what kinds of things they are, what kinds of properties they have, and 
how these kinds of things and properties are placed in the natural kinds hierarchies to 
which they belong.” (2005, p. 90)  
Ellis’ sophisticated Dispositional Essentialism consists of more than a basic level of 
objects and their dispositions. He is a realist about natural kinds, and he believes that 
natural kinds (and thus members of these kinds) have certain dispositions. As we saw, 
he believes that the world, as a member of the world-kind, has certain global properties 
that can give rise to global principles. For Ellis, if the world has dispositions there is 
little mystery to the principle of least action.  
“Lagrange’s principle of least action applies to all physical systems, and I would 
suppose it to be of the essence of the global kind in the category of objects or 
substances. If this is so, then, of course, every continuing object must be 
Lagrangian, i.e. disposed to evolve in accordance with the principle of least 
action.” (2005, p. 91) 
On Ellis’ view, the dispositions of the world don’t just account for the principle of least 
action – they make it metaphysically necessary. For Ellis, global principles are not 
causal laws. They are not rooted in a causal power a property can trigger. They do not 
require “triggering” at all. After all, the universe is causally closed so, by definition, 
nothing can trigger them to manifest. Global laws are also not spontaneously triggered 
in the way an atom spontaneously decays. Rather, they are ever-manifesting. I will 
delve into this notion of non-causal laws soon but first I look at Katzav’s objection to the 
necessity of the principle of least action. 
According to Katzav, Ellis’ proposal makes things worse. Interestingly, on Katzav’s 




is because, the principle of least action requires that many different trajectories or 
motion equations are possible for every system. According to Katzav, the principle of 
least action presupposes that there are different trajectories an object can take or 
different quantities of action a system can expend. This makes sense of us saying that 
the trajectory which minimizes action occurred. After all, if there were no other possible 
trajectories that would be trivial. In Katzav’s words: “The PLA (principle of least action), 
accordingly, presupposes its own contingency.” (2005, p. 92) 
Katzav’s objection to Ellis presupposes that the principle of least action requires 
physical contingency. In other words, he assumes that the quantity of action could have 
been otherwise. However, Smart and Thébault (2015) show that this is not the case. 
They argue that Ellis’ move is legitimate because the principle of least action is logically 
contingent, and this is the only kind of contingency that is necessary. They are building 
on a point Bird made (2007) in a different context.  
Bird is sceptical of global principles. He sees the presumption of the physical 
contingency of the principle of least action as a misnomer. This is because he ultimately 
expects that the dispositions of regular objects will show that their action could have 
only been so as to minimize action. He sees the principle of least action as an a posteriori 
way of figuring out and explaining why systems evolved in a certain way when, in 
reality, they could have only evolved that way anyway. Again, I set aside Bird’s 
scepticism of global principles as I have already argued against it in the previous 
chapter. The important point that Bird makes is that “It is natural to say that the PLA 
(principle of least action) chooses one path from many possible paths. But the 
mathematics of the PLA do nothing to show that such paths are metaphysically possible. 
The sense of ‘possible’ is a mathematical/logical one.” (2007, p. 214) 
Smart and Thébault second Bird’s point about contingency (2015, section 4). However, 
they use it to argue that the principle of least action can indeed be accommodated in the 
way Ellis proposes. Many trajectories are logically possible. We can imagine that the 
trajectory of an object could have been different, expending double the action. Those 
imaginings are consistent with the laws of logic. However, the fact that we can imagine 
a violation of the principle of least action does not mean that it could actually occur in 
practice. According to Smart and Thébault, there is no reason why we should demand 
physical contingency. In other worlds, there is no reason to assume that the trajectories 




Thébault but I think we can put the point across more forcefully still. It seems odd to 
think that the principle of least action requires its own physical contingency. It is 
bizarre that a global law, which constrains all interactions, requires the possibility of its 
own violation. 
Earlier we saw that global principles are often spoken about as constraints. They 
constrain how systems evolve. In the case of conservation laws, we saw that there were 
many possible interactions objects could have, conservation laws constrain which 
interactions can occur in practice. No action can occur which alters the total amount of 
mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, leptons, etc. There is a strong parallel 
here with the principle of least action as another global principle. Prima facie, there are 
many different trajectories an object can take, or ways a system can evolve. The 
principle of least action tells us which one actually occurs. The trajectory which requires 
the least action occurs. The principle of least action constrains because it does not allow 
systems to expend unnecessary action.  
Global principles – conservation laws and the principle of least action particularly – are 
contrasted with all other laws. Ellis differentiates causal laws from global laws. A causal 
law is a law grounded in an ordinary causal power of an ordinary object. It is subject to 
being triggered by external properties, and its manifestation is conditional on the 
conditions to manifest. However, the principle of least action is not like this. In Ellis’ 
words “…the truthmaker for the principle of least action is not what we should 
ordinarily think of as a causal power, because the property of Lagrangianism is a truly 
universal property – one that is possessed by every object in the universe.” (2005, p. 91) 
Moreover, the principle of least action cannot be triggered. It applies to everything at 
the global level, so nothing external can trigger it to manifest.  
For Ellis, the principle of least action is a global law. It is a global law because it applies 
to everything in existence. It cannot be triggered but it is always manifest. Hence, it 
resists bottom-up explanation and constrains all interactions within the world. Ellis is 
not the only one to differentiate high-level laws from causal laws. This sort of distinction 
is familiar in the literature on non-causal explanation. Lange contrasts causal laws with 
laws that constrain. Global principles, as I have called them, are of the latter type. In 
his words: “an explanation by constraint works precisely by providing information about 




interactions. As “constraints”, those laws do not depend on the particular kinds of 
interactions there actually happen to be.” (2018, p. 18)  
The idea of a continually manifesting disposition may seem at odds with the way I have 
portrayed Dispositional Essentialism. I gave the most common reading of properties as 
dispositions to certain manifestations (M) given certain stimuli (S). However, some are 
critical of this kind of a reading (Vetter, 2012, 2015; Heil, 2017). They prefer to see 
properties simply as dispositions to manifest. On their view, properties may not always 
manifest because they compete with so many other dispositions, which may win out. 
This provides a useful framework for understanding dispositions of the world and global 
principles. 
If the world has dispositions, those dispositions are ever-manifest. There can be no 
external stimulus for global dispositions or dispositions of the world. The world is 
causally closed and incorporates everything in existence. Thus, there are no competing, 
triggering or inhibiting dispositions. Nothing can be external to the global whole, acting 
on it. If the world has ever-manifesting dispositions, Ellis is right: there is no mystery to 
why the global principles they ground are exceptionless. Global principles are the 
manifestations of those dispositions. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that this debate could easily be 
rephrased in terms of Chakravartty’s systems mentioned in the previous chapter. We 
could replace world-kind with universe-system. However, the objections and responses 
raised would still apply. The key issue here is whether postulating a high-level entity to 
explain the principle of least action works. I have shown that this is a live option for 
dispositional essentialists. However, this strategy can be improved via the collective 
property machinery I introduced earlier. 
5.2.3 My account of global principles within Dispositional Essentialism 
In this section I forward my proposal, explaining how we can do away with high-level 
entities when accounting for the principle of least action. Again, I keep my exposition 
brief as I argued for this approach in the previous chapter and showed how it can be 
applied in the section on conservation. 
In the literature it is assumed that, if there is a global property which grounds the 




presupposes that property instantiation is a one-to-one relationship whereby every 
token property is instantiated by a single object. However, in the previous chapter I 
argued against this assumption. I argued for the possibility of collective property 
instantiation. Briefly, collective properties are properties that are instantiated by 
multiple objects, as opposed to instantiated by a single object. 
Global entities are not necessary for global properties and global laws. The collection of 
fundamental objects that makes up the universe can collectively bear any property the 
world-kind or universe-system was postulated to bear. The universe is nothing over and 
above the sum of fundamental entities, their properties and the high-level properties 
they collectively bear.  
Ellis argued that the world-kind or universe-system instantiates a non-causal 
Lagrangian disposition, and that this disposition gave rise to the non-causal principle of 
least action. My proposal is simply that the collection of fundamental objects in the 
universe jointly instantiate the Lagrangian disposition instead. This explains why all 
objects, down to the most fundamental, obey the principle of least action. 
In sum, my view is that the world or universe is the collection of its constituent entities, 
rather than an entity in its own right. The collection of fundamental objects in the 
universe can collectively instantiate any property that the global entity was postulated 
to bear. Further, I argued that we ought to favour this reading because it is more 
parsimonious. Rather than postulating a world-kind, with the world as its member, and 
the Lagrangian property; I simply postulate the latter – the Lagrangian disposition to 
minimize action.  
Conclusion: 
I have shown that there are various avenues available for the dispositional essentialist 
to account for the principle of least action. The first – (i) - is to try to explain this 
principle away as the result of non-global laws. (ii) is the dominant one in the 
dispositional essentialist literature. (ii) invokes a high-level entity whose properties 
ground the principle of least action. Finally, I forwarded my proposal - (iii). This is an 
improved strategy relative to the world-kind one. Rather than postulating a high-level 
entity, I have argued that the collectivity of entities in our current ontology can do the 




My goal has been to show that there are quite a few ways out of the global principle 
conundrum for dispositional essentialists. The principle of least action is not as damning 
for the view as it first seems. It is not a problem for my view if the principle of least 
action is explained from the bottom-up per (i). If anything, it is a victory for 
Dispositional Essentialism to have one fewer global principle to account for. However, I 
find this solution unlikely. As a result, I forwarded a way of coping with the principle of 
least action taken as a serious global principle. I take my collective property approach to 
be an improvement on the existing world-kind approach. It is more parsimonious to no 




6.  Ontic Structural Realism as an alternative to Dispositional 
Essentialism 
Ontic Structural Realism is a highly controversial but increasingly debated view in the 
philosophy of science. Its controversy lies in its metaphysics. Broadly, Ontic Structural 
Realism is the view that only structure exists. However, it is not always clear what that 
means. Structure could be taken to mean abstract structure – higher-order relations 
among properties – or mathematical structure, say, lawlike equations. This explains 
why Ontic Structural Realism raises so many eyebrows, accused of being unable to 
account for causation and having relations but no relata. However, increasingly ontic 
structural realists talk about modal or concrete structure (Esfeld and Lam, 2011; 
French, 2014). In this chapter, I look at the history of Structural Realism and how Ontic 
Structural Realism came to be. I will show that Ontic Structural Realism and 
Dispositional Essentialism both aim to ground modality and I will consider the 
arguments for Ontic Structural Realism’s approach to this. In doing this, we will see the 
often unappreciated proximity between these two views. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I introduce Epistemic 
Structural Realism. This is the view that all we know is structure (rather than the view 
that all there is is structure). Epistemic Structural Realism provided the historical and 
philosophical context for the development of Ontic Structural Realism. We will see how 
the arguments for the view that we only know the structure of reality (the epistemic 
view) paved the way for some philosophers to argue that all there is is structure (the 
ontic view). 
In the second part of this chapter I will lay out the scientific arguments given for Ontic 
Structural Realism. These are probably the biggest factors in the increasing popularity 
and debate of this view. We had already seen that physics breaks with traditional 
ontology by allowing objects to have entangled properties. In section 6.2 we will see that 
physics causes problems for individuating objects. Further, we will see why ontic 
structural realists argue that their view best accommodates the science. 
The third and final section is the longest. It covers the metaphysical arguments for 
Ontic Structural Realism, varieties of Ontic Structural Realism, the ontology of 
prominent ontic structural realists, and the proximity of this view to Dispositional 




Structural Realism to Dispositional Essentialism (Esfeld, 2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2011; 
French, 2014; Chakravartty, 2019). I am interested in this as the proximity of these 
views is vital to my thesis which, ultimately, aims to forge a hybrid view between the 
two. There is additional benefit in focusing on authors who compare Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism as these authors tend to be the most explicit 
and engaged with the metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism. As a result, they give 
the clearest picture of the underlying ontology of the view. We shall end by seeing that 
Steven French – perhaps the best known ontic structural realist – claims that this view 
is a reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism. Whereas Dispositional 
Essentialism takes properties to be fundamental and laws derivative, Ontic Structural 
Realism takes laws and symmetries to be fundamental and properties to be derivative. 
This sets the scene for my next chapter where I argue contra both views that there is no 
metaphysical priority between properties and laws. Properties and laws are 
symmetrically dependent on each other. 
  
6.1 Epistemic Structural Realism  
In this section I will give a brief overview of how Ontic Structural Realism’s predecessor 
– Epistemic Structural Realism – came into our philosophical consciousness and gained 
traction. I will focus on the most common arguments given for this view. In particular, I 
will explain why structural realists believed it to be the only view able to accommodate 
the complex history of science and the resultant challenges to both realism and anti-
realism in science. Then, in the following sections, we will look at how Epistemic 
Structural Realism allowed for the creation of another competing view: Ontic Structural 
Realism. These two views differ on whether they take Structural Realism to be best 
understood as an epistemic thesis about what we can know or an ontological thesis 
about what actually exists. 
Epistemic Structural Realism was forwarded as a solution to the two most famous and 
contradictory arguments in philosophy of science. The first is known as the no miracles 
argument. It fuels scientific realism – the view that our best scientific theories are 
getting at truth. The second is pessimistic meta-induction. This fuels anti-realism about 




little or no reason to assume that our current scientific theories about the unobservable 
are any closer to the truth than their predecessors were. 
According to the no-miracles argument, it would be a miracle if our best scientific 
theories were not true (Putnam, 1975; Worrall, 1989). Our best scientific theories have a 
wide range of application. They are not just able to explain why our world works the 
way it works, they are able to predict the future. They tell us what will happen before it 
happens. If these theories are not at all true, their success would be an accident. Given 
how often they are right, this would seem rather miraculous. Yet, miracles provide poor 
scientific explanations. Ergo, scientific realism is true. 
On the other hand, we have the pessimistic meta-induction argument, pulling us 
towards anti-realism (Laudan, 1984). The pessimistic meta-induction argument points 
to the fact that predictively successful theories are constantly being overturned. They 
get replaced by even more successful theories which in turn end up being replaced by 
even more successful theories, and so on. Take the example of Newtonian physics. 
Newtonian physics was highly predictively successful. 
 “Newton’s theory of gravitation had a stunning range of predictive success: the 
perturbations of the planetary orbits away from strict Keplerian ellipses, the 
variation of gravity over the earth’s surface, the return of Halley’s comet, 
precession of the equinoxes, and so on. Newtonians even turned empirical 
difficulties (like the initially anomalous motion of Uranus) into major successes 
(in this case the prediction of a hitherto unknown trans-Uranian planet 
subsequently christened Neptune). Physicists were wont to bemoan their fate at 
having been born after Newton – there was only one truth to be discovered about 
the ‘system of the world’ and Newton had discovered it.” (Worrall, 1989, p. 103) 
Despite its predictive success, Newtonian physics has been superseded by Einstein’s 
relativistic physics.  
Newtonian physics clearly has a wide range of applicability and predictive success. 
However, as we reach large macro-scales it breaks down. At this scale, Einstein’s 
relativity theory is required for accurate prediction. However, this theory has involved a 
reconceptualisation of space and time that Newton could scarcely have imagined. 




exactly the same from all point of views. Nothing can be simultaneous for two agents but 
not for a third. Einstein paints a very different picture of spacetime. Spacetime is finite 
and non-absolute. The gravitational forces of objects can warp the spacetime around 
them. This allows objects that travel fast enough to slow down time from their 
perspective so that they decay at a slower rate than the objects around them (Dainton, 
2010; Stanford, 2006).  
Despite the success of Einstein’s relativity over Newtonian mechanics “Newtonian 
mechanics is still the physics we use to send rockets to the moon” (Stanford, 2006, p. 9). 
This is because it works at that range and is much simpler than the more advanced 
theory. However, that does not make the Newtonian mechanics “true”. Newtonian and 
relativistic space and time are completely different. Space and time cannot both be finite 
and infinite, absolute and relative. If Einstein’s theory is true, some aspects of Newton’s 
views on the nature of spacetime are false. We might be tempted to think that Einstein 
got it right, but we have good reason to resist this conclusion.  
General Relativity is great at explaining and predicting the workings of the universe on 
a large scale. On the other end of the spectrum we have Quantum Mechanics – our best 
science of the smallest entities in the universe. The issue is that these two views do not 
mesh well. An explanation of why is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say that 
scientists are still working on how to reconcile General Relativity with Quantum 
Mechanics. These two seem inconsistent despite their predictive success in their own 
domains. The pessimistic meta-induction advocate would use this to not only undermine 
our confidence in these theories, but also our confidence in any future theories which 
supersede them. They would point out that time and time again theories are overturned 
so the next theory will probably be overturned too. However, this level of pessimism may 
not be warranted. 
While Newtonian physics was overturned by Einstein’s relativity, Newtonian physics 
can still be regarded as a limiting case of Einstein’s relativity. By this I mean that, for a 
certain scale (which covers most uses) Newtonian physics and Einstein’s relativity both 
work. Further, as mentioned above, Newtonian physics is often our theory of choice at 
that scale because it is much simpler. This overlap is perhaps not surprising given the 
level of predictive success of Newtonian physics. It would, indeed, be miraculous if 




In Understanding Inconsistent Science, Peter Vickers surveys the history of science to 
show many examples of theories which are not even internally consistent. However, he 
shows that inconsistency is not always equally damning when the goal is proximity to 
truth. If two criminals get confused about a previously agreed alibi that is indeed very 
damning (2013, p. 1). However, other inconsistencies may be minor. If three of us go to 
lunch and I say “your third costs £27” but then pressed by the other person I say “fine, it 
was £27.05” these two do not seem inconsistent in a meaningful way. Certainly, many of 
the inconsistencies that lead to theory change are meaningful but that does not render 
the past views entirely false. As Vickers put it “A set of inconsistent assumptions can be 
approximately true in the strongest possible sense: when every assumption is true 
except for one, which itself is approximately true.” (2013, pp. 73-4) We do not yet know 
how Quantum Mechanics and Relativity will be reconciled. Detailed speculation is 
beyond the scope of this work. However, it seems likely that the view that supersedes 
them will retain some of what made them individually successful. Perhaps we will even 
be able to look back and see them as limiting or special cases of the bigger picture to 
come.  
This tension between the no-miracles argument and the Pessimistic meta-induction 
brings us to Epistemic Structural Realism (henceforth Structural Realism), popularised 
by John Worrall (1989). Worrall proposed Structural Realism as a systemic solution to 
the no-miracles-pessimistic-meta-induction gridlock. Worrall accepted that there is a 
cumulative aspect to scientific theories, whereby new theories improve on the older 
ones. However, he argued that there was also a non-cumulative aspect of theory change. 
In his view, we could single out this non-cumulative aspect. In particular, he pointed out 
that, as theories change, the underlying ontological assumptions about the world are 
generally not retained. In fact, they shift radically.  
Structural Realism accepts radical shifts at the theoretical level of science, however it 
also addresses the cumulative aspect of science. The idea that current theories improve 
on their predecessors allows for progress in science. According to Structural Realism, 
there is progress at the structural level (more on what structure can mean below). The 
equations of old predictively successful theories often work as limiting cases of the 
newer theories. This point is illustrated by the examples of Fresnel and Maxwell’s 




Frensel believed that light was the manifestation of disturbances originating in a source 
and transmitted in an all-pervading mechanical medium – ether. His equations outlined 
the motion of light and enjoyed predictive success. The most famous prediction being the 
“prediction of the white spot at the centre of the shadow of an opaque disc held in light 
diverging from a single slit.” (Worrall, 1989, p. 116). Yet, Maxwell’s electromagnetic 
theory superseded Frensel’s. Seeing light as wave-like changes in an electrical and 
magnetic field enjoyed a wider range of explanatory and predictive success. While it is 
true that Maxwell hoped to be able to give an account of the electromagnetic field in 
terms of some underlying mechanical medium – like ether - his attempts and those of 
future scientists failed to do so. This led to the eventual rejection of an underlying 
medium and acceptance of the electromagnetic field as primitive (ibid, p. 108) Light can 
be a disturbance in an electromagnetic field. However, light can also travel through 
empty space not requiring a medium or electromagnetic field at all. That said, there is a 
sense in which there is progress from Frensel’s to Maxwell’s theory. Frensel’s equations 
act as limiting cases of Maxwell’s equations. In other words, Frensel’s equations still 
work – they would still allow us to make correct predictions – for certain values. 
However, Maxwell’s equations have a much wider range of success. 
Earlier we saw that Newton and Einstein had extremely different views of the nature of 
space and time (or spacetime). These are logically inconsistent with each other: the 
truth of one entails the falsity of the other. If spacetime is relativistic it is not absolute. 
If it is finite it is not infinite. However, there is a sense of continuity between these 
views. Einstein’s theory superseded Newton’s, enjoying a wider range of predictive 
success. However, Newton’s theory is still observationally indistinguishable and 
predictively successful at a certain scale. At the scale of everyday events, and 
movements of nearby planets we can use Newtonian laws. It is only when we look at the 
macroscale that we need relativity theory and witness spacetime warping. Newton’s 
equations are limiting cases of Einstein’s (Worrall, 1989, p. 103) 
Structural Realism acknowledges both the continuity and discontinuity of science. It 
says that, at the structural level, science is cumulative. As theories change our 
knowledge of the structure of reality is increased and refined. Previous knowledge is not 
lost but is added to. Structural Realism nods to the no-miracles argument. It agrees that 
it would be miraculous if our best science is mostly wrong. However, it takes the root of 
the success of our best science to lie in it mapping the structure of reality correctly. And, 




One issue that pops up in discussions of Structural Realism is what is meant by 
structure. What does it mean to say we know the “structure” of reality? I will talk about 
this in more detail in the discussion of Ontic Structural Realism where this takes on a 
new level of urgency and difficulty. However, in the present case, the structure of reality 
is mathematical and relational. On one hand, the structure can seem entirely 
mathematical – a collection of equations. However, those equations are laws of nature, 
expressing relations between the properties of unobservable entities. The mathematical 
equations in Newton’s theory were supposed to encapsulate the relations between force, 
mass, acceleration, etc. Our structural knowledge of these things is improved upon by 
Einstein. General Relativity introduces new data about the structure of the world on a 
macro-scale. Some of this data contradicts Newton’s predictions, but Newton’s equations 
still function as limiting conditions of Einstein’s. This understanding of structure can be 
traced back to Poincaré (1905) who says that these equations express relations, and if 
the equations remain true, it is because the relations preserve their reality.” (p. 162 
cited in Worrall, 1989, p. 118) 
This section purposed to briefly lay out Epistemic Structural Realism as historical 
context for understanding Ontic Structural Realism. It is far from comprehensive and 
does not aim to defend the view. Nonetheless, there are some important criticisms which 
deserve a brief discussion. In particular, I will look at Newman’s objection, the issue of 
counterexamples and scepticism over the structure/nature dichotomy. An understanding 
of the strength of this view will help motivate the view I look at in the next section – 
Ontic Structural Realism. This is a new, much more radical Structural Realism which 
takes structure to be all that exists. Ultimately, I want to bring similarities between this 
view and Dispositional Essentialism to light. This will motivate my own view, which is a 
hybrid between the two, but for now I will wrap up the topic of Epistemic Structural 
Realism. 
The first objection to Structural Realism I look at was forwarded by Max Newman in 
1928. It was levelled at Bertrand Russell’s ‘causal theory of perception’. Russell stated 
that we could only really know the structure of reality, paving the way for Structural 
Realism as we know it today. Newman objected that this trivialises knowledge, leaving 
us with no real knowledge of the world. In his view knowing the structure of reality does 




“Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the structure W, provided 
there are the right number of them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is 
known involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically 
deducible from the mere fact of existence, except (" theoretically ") the number of 
constituting objects.” (Ibid, p. 144) 
Structural Realism fails to fix reference to the things that instantiate structure. The 
structure of the world can be instantiated by literally anything – electrons or cakes. 
According to Newman, at best Structural Realism tells us how many things instantiate 
the structure. Even this is arguable as there could be two things instantiating a part of 
the structure and we would be none the wiser. Thus, all we know about reality is the 
minimum number of things that make it up. 
There are various possible responses to Newman’s objection. First, recall that his was an 
objection to a specific kind of structural realism with a specific understanding of 
structure. He took issue with the view that no matter how hard we try, or how much 
science we do, we cannot know anything non-structural. Here by structure he means the 
abstract mathematical structure of the world. Thus, we cannot know anything intrinsic 
about what instantiates the structure. For Newman we barely have enough to refer to 
the objects instantiating the structure. All we have are abstract theorems which could 
be instantiated by anything. 
“Now if an aggregate A consists of objects of which nothing is known but their 
existence (supposing such a statement to have a meaning) it cannot, I think, be 
shown that there is a system of “real” relations with the field A and structure W. 
Even the assigning of names in such an aggregate is difficult to justify. We 
cannot say “Let this be a and that b,” for there is no possible way of explaining 
the reference of “this” and “that”” (Newman, 1928, p. 145). 
One way of dealing with this is to bite the bullet. The structural realist may well think 
that all that can be known about reality is its abstract structure. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will not be interested in this kind of response.  
Another kind of response is to reject the idea that all we know about reality is its 
abstract structure. As I hinted at earlier, the notion of structure has many 




mathematical or modal. Let’s look at one of the “abstract theorems” F = ma – force 
equals mass times acceleration. Sure, the abstract structure can be instantiated by 
anything which is equal to the product of two things. However, the question is whether 
that is all the information the structural realists takes this equation to give us. 
While Structural Realism is not primarily a view about properties, I am interested in 
what Structural Realism (particularly Ontic Structural Realism) tells us about these. In 
the example of F = ma, to think that we know nothing about F is reminiscent of the 
Categoricalist view of properties (French, 2014, p. 118). However, I am obviously biased 
towards dispositionalist views of properties which I argued for at length early in this 
thesis. Within a dispositional essentialist framework we do know the essential nature of 
F – force - when we know what it does. And nothing can take F’s place in the structure 
of the world. This is because F’s role is uniquely written into its essence. What 
properties do and what they are are two sides of the same coin. Similarly, if we take the 
structure of the world to be the result of the properties of underlying objects, seeing 
those properties as dispositions helps us latch onto those objects.  
Along the lines of the previous response, structural realists can claim that by knowing 
the structure of the world we do know something beyond mathematical formalisms. This 
response hangs on what the structural realist takes structure to mean. As we saw, 
Russell took structure to be abstract structure. Abstract structure here means higher-
order, formal properties of relations (Chakravartty, 2007, p. 40). In contrast concrete 
structures “are relations between first-order properties of things” (Ibid, p. 41). The same 
abstract structure can be instantiated by different concrete structures (ibid, p. 40). The 
concrete structure cannot be multiply realised. At least not if we see properties as at all 
modal or dispositional. To know the relations between first-order properties is to know 
those properties, at least within the dispositional property framework argued for in this 
thesis.13 Thus, one way out of the Newman objection is to take it that we have 
knowledge of the concrete structure of the world.  
 
13 While I brought up dispositionalism about properties as a parallel here, the parallel isn’t 
perfect. It is possible to have this sort of view about properties but not objects. We can pair the 
idea that properties are known via there structure or dispositions with a multitude of views of 
objects. A dispositionalist could believe that the same group of properties can be multiply realised 
by different objects, or we can have a structuralist view of objects where all there is to being a 
certain kind of object is having certain properties. Later in the chapter we will look at Esfeld’s 





In addition, as we shall see later, Ontic Structural Realism provides another escape 
from Newman’s dilemma. This is because Ontic Structural Realism holds that reality is 
structural. Thus, by knowing the complete structure of the world we know all there is to 
know about it. Like with Epistemic Structural Realism, this view takes on different 
tones according to how we understand structure. 
Stathis Psillos has argued against the nature and structure dichotomy of Structural 
Realism. On his view, this distinction is artificial because the structure and nature of 
entities are entwined. Contra structural realists he points out that “when scientists talk 
about the nature of an entity, what is normally understood is a bunch of basic properties 
and a set of equations, expressing laws, which describe the behaviour of this entity.” 
(1995, p. 31).  Further, in his view science and philosophy are moving away from 
positing unknown entities outside of the empirical realm. Thus, he concludes that the 
“nature of an entity is nothing ‘over and above’ its structure and that knowing the one 
involves and entails knowing the other.” (p. 32) 
The structural realist can respond to Psillos by softening the nature/structure divide 
without losing it altogether. In other words, they can show that our structural 
knowledge tells us something about the thing realising it. On the one hand, we can 
concede that Psillos has a point in the sense that knowing the structure of a thing may 
tell us about the nature of the thing itself. Back to our previous example, for 
philosophers of a dispositionalist inclination if F = ma (if force equals mass times 
acceleration) the relation to mass and acceleration is written into the nature of force. 
The behaviour of force is a manifestation of its nature. However, this is not to cave in to 
Psillos’ view that the structure/nature divide is made up. The idea that the structure of 
the world is a manifestation of its nature is consistent with the view that we do not, and 
even cannot, have a full understanding of the nature of unobservable entities.  
We know of unobservable entities because of their properties and the effects those 
properties have on the world. However, our methodology for studying the microphysical 
is limited “We are restricted, as it were, to poking and prodding at them with 
bombardments, and ‘seeing’ (through instruments) how they react. This informs us 
about the reactions, responses, and outputs that the fundamental entities produce in 
 
view of objects. He believes that properties and objects are only separable in thought so by 





response to testing…” (Williams, 2011, p. 77) This methodology allows us to build a 
dispositional or structural profile of the world. Some facts about unobservables elude us. 
If they are structural or dispositional facts we may come to refine them through theory 
change. If there are non-structural facts, these will be beyond the grasp of science and 
the empirical realm (Ibid). For now, we work with the dispositional and structural 
profiles we are able to study scientifically and fill in the blanks regarding the ultimate 
nature of the unobservable. The blanks we will fill in are often deemed wrong as 
theories change. The structural realist is right to think that our epistemic limitations 
are responsible for dramatic shifts in our understanding of unobservables.  
The subject of the rest of this chapter – Ontic Structural Realism – responds to this kind 
of objection by saying that all there is is structure. Ontic Structural Realism rejects 
hidden natures by saying that structure is all there is. As a result, by knowing the 
structure of reality we know all there is to know about it. While this looks consistent 
with Psillos’ view, Psillos is actually quite critical of it. This is because he fears that 
structure cannot account for modality or causation so that we do indeed need more than 
structure to tell the full story (2006, 2012). Nonetheless, we will see that Ontic 
Structural Realism has strong scientific and metaphysical motivations. Further, it 
comes in many flavours or degrees, some of which are more concerned with making 
sense of causation and bringing modality into the structure. I will cover some versions of 
Ontic Structural Realism and show how close its moderate versions come to 
Dispositional Essentialism. This will ultimately serve my goal of drawing up a new kind 
of dispositionalist view, fortified by the insights of Ontic Structural Realism. 
The third and final objection I will consider here is quite different from the other two. 
Rather than poking holes at the conceptual framework of Structural Realism, it uses 
case studies to undermine the claim that structure is retained through entity change. 
This idea is key to Structural Realism. The idea that structure is preserved through 
theory change is what allows structural realists to respond to the pessimistic meta-
induction and it is what makes the theory a form of scientific realism to start with. 
The third objection proceeds by counterexample. Juha Saatsi and Peter Vickers (2011) 
point out that Kirchhoff’s theory of light was predictively successful, yet its success 
cannot be accounted for by Scientific Realism. Scientific realists argue that predictively 
successful theories owe their success to the fact that they are getting at truth. Kirchhoff 




“remarkable accuracy” (Ibid, p. 30). Yet that accuracy is not owed to the theory’s truth. 
At the theoretical level, Kirchhoff worked in the old ether paradigm. At the structural 
level, he seems to have got a lot wrong. 
 “The predictive accuracy achieved is prima facie amazing for two reasons: it 
turns out that Kirchhoff’s derivation turns on crucial assumptions regarding the 
amplitude of light waves that: (i) differ considerably from the actual situation (as 
described by Maxwell’s equations, for example) in various respects, and (ii) as a 
matter of fact are inconsistent.” (Ibid) 
While this example is particularly striking, Vickers points out that there are quite a few 
cases where successful theories rely on faulty assumptions some of which will be 
structural (2016). Further, as we dig up examples in the history of science more 
examples may continue to pop up.  
There are various responses the structural realist can give to counterexamples. One 
response is to try to narrow down which parts of the theory are doing the work. “Worrall 
makes the distinction in terms of the ‘content’ of a theoretical claim, which is idle, and 
the ‘structure’ of a theoretical claim, which is working and thus merits our doxastic 
commitment.” (Vickers, 2016). However, this is difficult to do. It is hard to single out an 
aspect of structure which “works”, and which will evade every counterexample. It is 
even harder to do this in a way that does not seem ad hoc (Ibid). 
A second kind of response realists can give is that the success-to-truth inferences they 
make are generally reliable however they are not fool proof. The Kirchhoff case is one of 
the rare ones in which the success of a theory is a fluke rather than the result of its 
truth. Along those lines, the structural realist can argue that counterexamples are less 
of a challenge to Structural Realism than the original pessimistic meta-induction 
challenge to realism. Pessimistic meta-induction tells us that all our previous theories 
have been falsified so we have reason to think all our current theories will be too. The 
evidence at worst shows that sometimes structure is retained and sometimes it isn’t. If 
on the whole the core structural findings of a theory tend to be retained, we will have 
better evidence for inferring their truth than their falsity. I’m sure structural realists 
would point out that there are not that many counterexamples where a successful 




Another way of looking at the problem is to accept that structure can change and that 
that is not necessarily a problem for Structural Realism. After all, structural realists are 
the first to say that structure changes in theory change. The structure of the prior 
theory generally becomes a limiting case of the structure of the successor theory. 
Sometimes the previous theories rely on faulty assumptions and are overturned as we 
get to a better understanding of reality. The problem only arises if the structural realist 
believes that successful structure is immune to error. However, Structural Realism as a 
view thrives on some amount of error and the idea that that error gets weeded out 
through theory change. This is based in the view that structure tracks real patterns in 
the world, the better our understanding of the world the more detailed our map of those 
patterns becomes. We simply can’t assume that any particular part of structure is 
immune to error and will survive theory change as we do not know what new light the 
successor theory will cast on that structure. 
 
6.2 Epistemic Structural Realism vs Ontic Structural Realism 
Structural Realism was initially an epistemic thesis. In other words, it was a thesis 
about what we know about the world. It was the view that we can only know the 
structure of the world. Structural Realism has since been reimagined as an ontological 
thesis – a thesis about what the world is like, independent of our knowledge of it. Ontic 
Structural Realism has been summed up by the controversial slogan “There are no 
things. Structure is all there is.” (Ladyman and Ross, 2007, p. 130) Broadly, it is the 
view that reality is structural. There is not a hidden reality over and above the structure 
captured by a final and complete science. However, as we have seen, what exactly is 
meant by structure is a controversial matter. Later in this chapter, as we discuss 
different versions of Ontic Structural Realism, we will see that there is not a one-size-
fits-all answer. To begin with ontic structural realists were mostly eliminative and saw 
structure as mathematical, others argue that the structure is modal (French, 2014) or 
causal, drawing inspiration from causal views of properties like Dispositional 
Essentialism (Esfeld, 2004). However, I leave this for later. In this section my concern is 
with the arguments that spawned the view. 
Ontic Structural Realism can be argued for in two different ways. The most common 




mechanics has led to much revisionary work in metaphysics. It has discredited 
traditional metaphysics and classical physics which took objects to be discrete and 
discernible individuals which individually bear properties. In this section, we will see 
how Ontic Structural Realists have used this work to argue for their view. The other 
kind of argument, which I leave for the next section, looks at the metaphysical case for 
Ontic Structural Realism. 
6.2.1 Scientific motivations for Ontic Structural Realism 
In this section I will show how the case for Ontic Structural Realism has been built on 
the issues Quantum Mechanics raises for our ability to individuate objects, particularly 
sub-atomic particles. In traditional metaphysics objects are individuated by their 
properties. According to the principle of identity of indiscernibles, if two things have all 
the same properties they are the same thing. Thus, we can differentiate objects by their 
properties. For instance, this chair cannot be the same as that chair because this one is 
red and here, that chair is blue and there. If two chairs share all the same properties, 
and are in the exact same location, they are not two chairs. They are one and the same 
chair. In this section I will show why ontic structural realists argue that this sort of 
discernment does not work at the subatomic level. Further, I will show why they argue 
that the individuality of particles in underdetermined by the evidence and that Ontic 
Structural Realism is the solution. 
We have already looked at one way in which quantum mechanics defies traditional 
metaphysics. Quantum entanglement poses serious problems for the idea that reality is 
build out of fundamental objects and their respective fundamental properties, or that we 
can discern entities by their properties. Our best science tells us that quantum objects 
collectively share properties. I will not give a detailed explanation of entanglement as I 
covered this issue at length in chapter 4. That said, it is worth explaining how 
entanglement can motivate Ontic Structural Realism. 
Michael Esfeld sees entangled properties as relational properties. Recall that if 
quantum objects are entangled they have joint properties which cannot be attributed to 
individual objects. Entanglement cannot be explained from the bottom-up. Entangled 
properties do not supervene on basic properties. They are basic properties. They are 




According to Esfeld “‘Being entangled with’’ is a property that is predicated of at least 
two quantum systems; it is thus a relational property.” (2004, p. 604).  
In addition to entanglement being a relational property, it is extremely widespread in 
nature (ibid). It is so widespread that entanglement has led philosophers and physicists 
to see argue that quantum objects are nonseparable and the world is holistic (Esfeld, 
2004; Healey, 1991; Teller, 1986; Schaffer, 2010). The second follows from the first. If we 
cannot separate the objects which constitute our world, their basic properties being 
relational and collectively borne, the world looks like an interwoven whole rather than a 
collection of independent particles and their properties. For some, the relational and 
holistic nature of the world points to Ontic Structural Realism (Esfeld, 2004). Ontic 
Structural Realism sits comfortably with reality as a relational web. However, 
entanglement is not doing all the work here. The most famous argument for Ontic 
Structural Realism draws from other aspects of physics. 
The best known argument for Ontic Structural Realism stems from the 
underdetermination of the identity and individuality of particles. Again, the idea is to 
show that Ontic Structural Realism best accommodates the physics. 
Sub-atomic particles do not behave as we would expect given our experience of the 
macro-world. Particles of a kind, like electrons, are not distinguishable. Particles are 
categorised “according to their possession of different values of a certain small subset of 
their properties, such as rest-mass, charge, spin, etc.” (French, 1989, p. 435). So, we 
cannot differentiate particles on the basis on their intrinsic properties (properties which 
they have independently of other objects). In addition, we cannot differentiate particles 
by spatio-temporal properties since they do not have well-defined spatio-temporal 
trajectories and may not be impenetrable (so two particles could occupy the same 
position at once) (French, 1989, p. 443). 
The following figure illustrates the ways in which two particles can be distributed 
between two boxes: 
••  (A)  •• (B) • • (C) 
In classical physics arrangement (A) and (B) represent one state of affairs where (C) 





arrangement (B) particles 1 and 2 are in the right-hand box. In classical physics (C) 
could represent two cases: either particle 1 is in the left box and particle 2 is in the right 
box or vice versa. If the distribution of electrons in the boxes is random, there is a 25% 
chance situation (A) will obtain, a 25% chance (B) will obtain and a 50% chance (C) will 
obtain (French, 1989, p. 435). However, this is not the case within quantum mechanics. 
In Quantum Physics situation (A), (B) and (C) are given an equal weight of 1 so there is 
an equal 33,(3)% chance of any one of these situations obtaining. (C) is taken to 
represent one scenario, as opposed to two scenarios, because the two situations are 
indistinguishable. This is known as the indistinguishability postulate. According to this 
“there is no way of distinguishing states which differ by a permutation of the particles 
only. In other words, particle permutations are not regarded as observable in quantum 
statistics and do not give rise to countably distinct complexions.” (French, 1989, pp. 440-
1) This conclusion is widely accepted because of its empirical success; “to get the right 
statistics in quantum mechanics, whether for bosons or for fermions, we must count 
[permuted] arrangements… as one and the same.” (Redhead and Teller, 1992, p. 204)  
While many take the indistinguishability of particles to mean that they are not 
individuals, this is not the only metaphysical picture available. As Ladyman and Ross 
point out, failing to individuate quantum objects via their qualitative or spatiotemporal 
states, they may be given a transcendent individuality (2007, p. 134). We can still 
quantify how many particles are in a system even if we cannot individuate them. Thus, 
philosophers can argue that they are individuals in some other primitive sense. We can 
count them, we just cannot distinguish them.  
One way to argue for the individuality of particles is to point out that discernibility is an 
epistemic notion (about what we can know) and identity is a metaphysical one (about 
what there is). So, our inability to differentiate two particles does not prove that they 
are not distinct. Nature might allow for indistinguishable objects. Further, some work 
has been done on alternative interpretations of the mathematics which allows for 
indiscernible individuals (an explanation of this is beyond the scope of this thesis, for 
more information see Redhead and Teller, 1992). However, it is worth noting that 
interpretations of quantum objects as individuals will still have to answer to why 
quantum statistics hold. They have to accommodate the uncomfortable fact that a 
permutation of two objects is not considered a different state from a statistical 




One of the main – if not the main – arguments employed for Ontic Structural Realism is 
that the individuality of particles is underdetermined by the evidence (Ladyman and 
Ross, 2007, p. 135; French 1989, p. 445; 2014, chapter 2) and that Ontic Structural 
Realism avoids this problem. In other words, quantum mechanics cannot conclusively 
determine whether particles are individuals or not. Quantum mechanics shows that 
particles do not behave as classical objects, in intuitive ways. However, the question of 
how we ontologise the data is a metaphysical one. 
Ontic Structural Realism markets itself as the way out of the underdetermination 
problem. It dissolves the dilemma. Within this view there is no question of whether 
particles have transcendent individuality or not. Rather, the structure of the particles is 
all there is to the particles. Thus, there is no need to prod at further, mysterious, ways 
of individuating them. According to Ladyman and Ross, that sort of reasoning relies on 
an outdated metaphysics which philosophers try to impose on the science (2007). These 
ontic structural realists claim instead to be taking their ontology from science (Ibid; 
French, 2014). Science gives them a structural picture of subatomic particles and that 
suffices. 
In the next section, I will look at some metaphysical arguments for Ontic Structural 
Realism. We will see that many of these motives are shared by Dispositional 
Essentialism, making these views closer than they first seem. In the course of the 
metaphysical exposition we will look at different varieties of Ontic Structural Realism. 
 
6.3 A shared agenda: the metaphysical motives for Ontic Structural Realism and 
their proximity to Dispositional Essentialism 
Ontic Structural Realism and Dispositional Essentialism are seldom mentioned 
together. They move in different circles, so to speak. Dispositional Essentialism is 
usually discussed in the metaphysics literature. It does not aim to radically reform our 
ontology, but to inform our understanding of properties. Ontic Structural Realism, on 
the other hand, tends to be discussed in the philosophy of science literature. Even its 
moderate forms are revolutionary, throwing traditional metaphysics out the window. 




I begin this section by laying out the differences between Dispositional Essentialism and 
Ontic Structural Realism and giving an overview of different kinds of Ontic Structural 
Realism. After, I will look at the work of prominent philosophers who contrast these two 
views (French, 2014; Esfeld, 2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2011). These philosophers are 
keener to tackle the metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism. As a result, they are 
probably the best sources for understanding the ontology of Ontic Structural Realism. 
Their work will also serve to lay the foundation for the rest of this thesis where I 
forward my own novel view of properties, laws and the relationship between them. This 
will be a sort of hybrid view – a combination of Ontic Structural Realism and 
Dispositional Essentialism’s ontologies. 
6.3.1 Ontic Structural Realism vs Dispositional Essentialism 
In what follows I will show that Ontic Structural Realism and Dispositional 
Essentialism are quite close views. They share a similar motivation, although their 
ways of tackling the same issues will differ (Chakravartty, 2019; French, 2014; Esfeld, 
2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2010). My goal for the rest of this chapter is to showcase the 
proximity between these views, and the work comparing them, in order to lay the 
groundwork for the next chapter where I finally forward my own view – a novel view 
which is a hybrid between the two. Before I move onto the similarities between the 
views, I will recap Dispositional Essentialism and show how Ontic Structural Realism 
differs. I then look at different versions of Ontic Structural Realism.  
Dispositional Essentialism is primarily a view about properties. Or better, it is a cluster 
of similar views about properties all of which share the core idea that at least some 
properties are inherently dispositional. This is often understood to mean that properties 
are dispositions to certain manifestations given certain stimuli (Bird, 2007). However, it 
can also mean that properties are dispositions to manifestations simpliciter (Vetter, 
2015; Heil, 2017). Some feel that dispositions are properties of fundamental objects 
(Bird, 2007; Heil, 2012), others accept that natural kinds can have properties (Ellis, 
2001) and I have argued in the last two chapters that objects can collectively bear 
properties. Dispositional essentialists usually believe that dispositions give rise to laws 
(I have taken this as the default position in my work), although some think dispositions 




Dispositional Essentialism comes in various shades regarding how exactly we cash out 
properties. Dispositional Essentialism does not comment on objects or take 
revolutionary stances on the fundamental ontology of the world. Dispositionalists, by 
and large, take a traditional stance on the object-property ontology. They see objects as 
bearing properties. These properties are often taken to be universals, assuming a 
traditional universal and particular ontology (e.g. Bird, 2007; Mumford, 2004). The same 
cannot be said for Ontic Structural Realism. 
Ontic Structural Realism is arguably primarily a view about objects. It is a view about 
everything in existence, namely that everything is structural. However, in all its forms 
it is radically revisionary about objects. If you like ordinary objects, this is not the view 
for you.  
There are many varieties of Ontic Structural Realism. Like with many views in 
philosophy, there may be as many kinds of Ontic Structural Realism as there are ontic 
structural realists. This is made particularly confusing by the fact that ontic structural 
realists often restrict themselves to the scientific literature and are not keen to spell out 
the metaphysics of their view (e.g. Ladyman and Ross, 2007). Sometimes they are even 
hostile to metaphysics (ibid), but we cannot do away with the metaphysics as the view is 
nothing if not a metaphysical view. It is hard to even make sense of the statement that 
only structure exists without metaphysics. 
6.3.1.1 Varieties of Ontic Structural Realism: Objects, relations and dependence 
Traditionally objects have been seen as fundamental; there is debate on which 
properties or relations (if any) are to be counted as non-supervenient or fundamental 
alongside objects. These views do not constitute Ontic Structural Realism because they 
allow objects to exist independent of their place in the structure of the world. Ontic 
Structural Realism does not. 
There are various ways of cashing out the ontological dependence between objects, 
properties and relations in Ontic Structural Realism. It is worth noting that ontic 
structural realists generally do not talk about properties in the traditional sense. 
Rather, they talk about structures. According to Esfeld, “Structures are properties, too, 
in a broad sense of the notion of properties, namely relations instead of intrinsic 




Ontic Structural Realism takes relations to be fundamental. This leaves some room for 
wiggle regarding the status of objects. There are at least three different ways of cashing 
out the ontological dependence between relations and objects in Ontic Structural 
Realism in the literature: 
1) Relations are fundamental. There are no objects. We may use the notion of 
objects to navigate everyday life but ultimately all there is is structure. 
2) Relations may be ontologically primary, with objects being ontologically 
secondary or dependent on the relations. Objects are no more than nodes in a 
structural web. 
3) Both objects and relations may be fundamental. In this case, there is no 
ontological priority of one over the other (Esfeld and Lam, 2011, pp. 145-7). 
The first position is eliminative about objects. The second takes relations to be 
ontologically primary and objects to be dependent on them. The third rejects ontological 
priority claims between objects and relations. Rather these are symmetrically dependent 
on each other.  
Ontic Structural Realism is generally associated with the first two positions which are 
eliminative or deflationary about objects. Ladyman and Ross (2007) and French (2014) 
have written the most prominent books on Ontic Structural Realism. They both endorse 
these sorts of views. I will start with a note on Ladyman and Ross’s position, although I 
set these authors aside after to focus on others who are more engaged with the 
metaphysics of the view. 
Ladyman and Ross endorse position 2, that objects depend on relations. They 
characterise Ontic Structural Realism as the view that “the world has an objectively 
modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on 
the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals.” (2007, p. 130). This is important as the 
modal nature of Ontic Structural Realism will reappear as a key motivator for this view, 
in French (2014) and Esfeld and Lam’s work (Esfeld, 2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2011). 
Ladyman and Ross are highly motivated by the scientific case for Ontic Structural 
Realism. They take the physics to undermine traditional objects. The 
underdetermination of the individuality of objects motivates their move to a purely 




objects exist over and above the structure we can learn about. Nonetheless, Ladyman 
and Ross do not eliminate objects entirely. In their words: “there are objects in our 
[Ladyman and Ross’s] metaphysics but they have been purged of their intrinsic natures, 
identity, and individuality, and they are not metaphysically fundamental.” (2007, p. 
131) Objects exist as nodes in structure, they are not fundamental but dependent on the 
fundamental relations or structure. 
French, possibly the most famous advocate of Ontic Structural Realism, has advocated 
for the eliminative version - 1. He believes that the world is an elaborate structural 
network, nothing else. Objects are a mere façon de parler. Talk of objects helps us 
navigate everyday life but is not scientifically robust. In French’s words, we ought to 
commit to the “structures underpinning quantum statistics and reconceptualise (or 
eliminate) our putative objects in terms of this structure.” (French, 2014, p. 43) A 
detailed explanation of this is beyond the scope of this chapter. French himself says that 
much of his book was required to expand on this notion (ibid). I will revisit French’s 
work in 6.3.3 where I look at why he says that Ontic Structural Realism is a reverse-
engineering of Dispositional Essentialism and I look at the positive metaphysical system 
he proposes. 
Esfeld (2004, 2009) and Lam (Esfeld and Lam, 2011) roughly argue for position 3 but 
with a caveat. They believe that the distinction between objects and relations is not an 
ontological one but a conceptual one. This is an intuition shared by French although his 
view is eliminative whereas theirs is not (Esfeld and Lam, 2011, p. 150). As we shall see, 
they believe that objects cannot exist without relations and vice versa. In that sense 
they depend on each other for existence. In the next section, I will look at what led them 
to this position. I will now show why Esfeld argues that Ontic Structural Realism shares 
the motives of Dispositional Essentialism, and how that must inform the understanding 
of the view for it to be successful. This will help us understand the strength behind 
Esfeld and Lam’s Ontic Structural Realism. 
6.3.2 Esfeld’s Ontic Structural Realism 
According to Esfeld, the arguments for Dispositional Essentialism apply to Ontic 
Structural Realism. In particular, Dispositional Essentialism is argued for on the basis 
that it avoids quidditism and humility about properties. It does this by making those 




is to work as a form of realism, the structure must be causal. In the next subsections, I 
will look at the motivations for Dispositional Essentialism, followed by the motivations 
for Ontic Structural Realism and why Esfeld says they overlap. Finally, in the last 
subsection I will look at Esfeld’s proposed ontology for Ontic Structural Realism. 
6.3.2.1 The motivations for Dispositional Essentialism 
To recap, the two main contenders for how we view properties are Categoricalism and 
Dispositional. According to the first, properties have no essential modal features. 
According to the second, properties have essential modal features. Properties are 
dispositions to certain manifestations. 
Within Categoricalism properties are identified by their quiddity or primitive character 
that makes them different from any other property. Properties have a transcendent 
identity which is independent of the causal roles they play. David Lewis who 
championed this view saw what properties do – the roles they play – as contingent 
(Lewis, 1986; Miller, 2004). In our universe charge happens to act in accordance with 
Coulomb’s law. Like charges repel each other, opposite charges attract each other. 
However, in another universe mass might happen to behave this way and charge might 
act differently. Just the fact that we can imagine these two switching roles is taken to 
show that their roles are not essential to them. 
Dispositional Essentialism, the alternative view, takes properties to be dispositions to 
certain manifestations (Bird, 2007; Vetter, 2015). It is in charge’s nature to repel an 
object with the same charge and attract an object with the opposite charge. This is what 
we mean when we say an object is charged. Further, dispositions are how ordinary folk 
and scientists acquaint themselves with properties. When we imagine worlds where 
mass does what charge does (and vice versa) we are really imagining a world where we 
switch the names of mass and charge Two strong motivators for this view, which feature 
heavily in Esfeld’s work, are the fact that it avoids the quidditism and humility present 
in Categoricalism. 
Quidditism, as we saw, is the view that properties possess an intrinsic aspect or nature. 
This primitive character is independent of and separate from their modal profile. Even 
on the thinnest conception of quiddities – as the distinct numerical identity of properties 




properties are and what they do are not linked. Humility follows from quidditism. 
Within Categoricalism we can never acquaint ourselves with the nature of properties. 
We can only know the causal relations properties enter into in our world but these are 
contingent. They are not of the essence of the properties in question. We can never truly 
identify or know a property because we do not have access to its quiddity. Thus, we are 
left epistemically humble, unable to know properties (Lewis, 2006; Esfeld, 2009). Let’s 
see how this fits with Ontic Structural Realism. 
6.3.2.2 The motivations for OSR 
Earlier in this chapter we looked at the scientific arguments for Ontic Structural 
Realism. However, in this section we will look at the metaphysical case for the view. 
Metaphysical arguments for Ontic Structural Realism make the case that this view 
avoids conceptual issues of competing views, offering a better metaphysical package. As 
we shall see, this view is thought to close the gap between our epistemology and 
metaphysics, avoiding Newman-type objections.  
The gap between epistemology and metaphysics, refers to the gap between what we can 
know and what there actually is. Epistemic Structural Realism leaves this gap open. On 
this view, we can only know the structure of reality but remain ignorant of its nature. 
This position has led to objections like Newman’s objection, that if all we know is 
structure, we do not know much about the world at all. At best we know the number of 
things that realise the structure and the abstract relations between them, however we 
remain entirely clueless about the ultimate nature of reality.  
This gap between the epistemology and metaphysics of Structural Realism is 
reminiscent of the problems for Categoricalism – quidditism and humility - mentioned 
above. In both cases there is a divide between the knowable (the structure or behaviour 
of properties) and the nature of the thing in question. In both cases we are left ignorant 
or humble to the nature of the universe on the basis that we simply can’t access the 
essence of the things in question (Esfeld, 2004, p. 614). 
A gap between metaphysics and epistemology appears in all views which allow us to 
know the full relational profile of reality without knowing anything at all about its 
intrinsic nature i.e. Categoricalism and Epistemic Structural Realism. Naturally, there 




– Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. Dispositional Essentialism 
solves the problem of quidditism and humility about properties by taking the relational 
to reflect the intrinsic nature of reality. The behaviour of properties reflects what those 
properties are. Ontic Structural Realism does something similar regarding the concrete 
world and concrete objects. It gives a new level of reality to the structural. The structure 
of the world is the world. A concrete object is its structure. There is nothing else to it. So, 
by knowing the structure of the world, we know the world. The gap is closed, and 
humility is avoided. 
Epistemic Structural Realism says that our knowledge of the world is in principle 
limited to its structure, with its nature being hidden to us. Ontic Structural Realism 
accepts the first part – that our knowledge of the world is structural. However, it rejects 
the second part – that the nature of the world is hidden from us. Ontic Structural 
Realism takes the structure to be all that there is to know, and all that exists. The idea 
of transcendent identity for individuals or categorical basis are met with suspicion. As 
we shall see in the next section, Esfeld thinks that for this view to be a truly successful 
form of realism, that structure will have to be causal structure or else the gap remerges. 
6.3.2.3 Esfeld and Lam’s Ontic Structural Realism 
Esfeld’s Ontic Structural Realism is both inspired by the scientific arguments and 
metaphysical arguments for this view. On the scientific side, he writes amply about the 
entangled nature of reality (2004). On the metaphysical side, he is motivated to close the 
gap between epistemology and metaphysics allowing us to know the intrinsic nature of 
reality via its structure. In this section I will look at Esfeld and Lam’s proposed ontology 
for Ontic Structural Realism.  
Esfeld and Lam’s Ontic Structural Realism is moderate (Esfeld 2004, 2009; Esfeld and 
Lam, 2011). It aims to be the least metaphysically revolutionary it can whilst 
accommodating the arguments for Ontic Structural Realism. In what follows we will see 
why Esfeld and Lam (ibid) reject radical or eliminative Ontic Structural Realism. We 
will see why they argue that objects and relations are both fundamental and 
symmetrically dependent, as well as what that looks like for them. In addition, we will 
revisit the parallels between the arguments used for Dispositional Essentialism and 





Radical or eliminative forms of Ontic Structural Realism have received a lot of criticism. 
The idea that there could be relations without relata (objects which stand in those 
relations) is baffling. Additionally, Esfeld and Lam (2011) point out that this situation is 
not much better for philosophers who allow objects but claim that these are ontologically 
dependent or secondary to relations. This is because, at the fundamental level, they still 
have relations without relata. However, ontic structural realists are often moved to 
make relations fundamental, and objects secondary or mere façons de parler for the 
scientific arguments we looked at above.  
As we saw the individuality of objects is underdetermined by science. According to the 
principle of identity of indiscernibles, if two objects share all the same properties, they 
are one and the same object. We cannot differentiate quantum objects via their 
properties. All electrons have the same mass, spin and charge. Further, it is hard to 
differentiate them spatiotemporally. Additionally, they do not follow regular statistics. 
They follow special statistics which do not count permutations of electrons as separate 
states (see section 6.2 for more details). Their individuality is highly debated in light of 
this. 
The fact that quantum physics underdetermines the individuality of objects has led 
ontic structural realists to be deflationary or eliminative about objects. Philosophers like 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) take objects to be ontologically secondary, with some like 
French eliminating them altogether (2010, p. 14). However, Esfeld and Lam argue that 
this does not warrant making relations prior to objects. We still quantify quantum 
objects. For instance, if two electrons are entangled, we know that there are two 
electrons standing in that relationship. That does not mean that they have transcendent 
individuality, however it leaves the status of objects relative to relations open. The 
science does not favour a particular reading of priority dependence between objects and 
properties (2011, p. 150). 
To avoid these issues, Esfeld and Lam propose that the distinction between objects and 
relations/properties is not an ontological one but rather a conceptual one “anchored in 
our thinking and language” (2011, p. 150). Interestingly, French says something similar 
(2010, p. 18). He agrees that the distinction between objects and relations is conceptual. 
However, where Esfeld and Lam are drawn to a more moderate view, French endorses 




Esfeld and Lam sum up their view on the relationship between properties and objects in 
what follows:  
“Following Spinoza’s Ethics (1677), properties are modes, that is, concrete, 
particular ways in which objects are. There is no ontological distinction between 
objects and their properties in the sense of modes: the modes are the way in 
which the objects exist. Objects do not have any existence in distinction to their 
ways of existence, and their ways of existence do not have any existence in 
distinction to the objects. One can draw a conceptual distinction between objects 
and their ways of existence, but not an ontological one, applying to reality. In 
reality, there is only one type of entity, namely objects that exist in particular 
ways.” (2011, pp. 150-1) 
The structure of the world intermeshes and entwines in many complicated ways. Some 
of these give rise to what we see as objects. We are able to abstract away certain ways 
those objects are, comparing them, this explains our talk of properties. However, for 
Esfeld and Lam, these two are not separable in reality. We cannot have a property-less 
object or a property which isn’t “had” by anything. All things are certain ways, all ways 
are ways that something is. In this sense they depend on each other for their existence. 
Moderate Ontic Structural Realism still breaks with traditional ontology in many ways. 
This is especially worth emphasising given the fact that Dispositional Essentialism 
plays such a prominent role in motivating the view. Esfeld’s dispositional essentialist 
motivation should not be taken to mean that his view ends up being a sort of 
dispositionalism with a dispositional causal structure. 
As mentioned previously, Dispositional Essentialism does not tend to require a 
revisionary metaphysics. Many dispositional essentialists explicitly take the view that 
properties are universals (Bird, 2007; Mumford, 2004). None that I know of reject 
traditional objects. Esfeld and Lam’s Ontic Structural Realism breaks with 
metaphysical tradition and traditional ontology in many ways. First, they allow mutual 
dependence between properties and objects. The reality of these two is entwined to the 
point that they are only separable in thought – not reality. Mutual ontological 
dependence (though I defend it in the next chapter in the case of properties and laws) is 
usually frowned upon. Most philosophers tend to think that there must be one thing 




Second, traditional metaphysics revolves around how to conceptualise and relate 
universals and particulars. The distinction between these two categories is taken to be 
ontological and seldom questioned. Yet, Esfeld and Lam (2011) are forthcoming in 
saying that their metaphysics does not leave room for such ontological categories. “As 
with any metaphysical position, there is a certain price to pay in order to make this 
position available. One has to abandon the view of properties being universals that are 
instantiated by particulars, that is, objects.” (p. 151) After all, they do not endorse a 
metaphysical distinction between these two. However, in their view this is a small price 
to pay as the distinction between universals and particulars has been debated for 
thousands of years without becoming much more intelligible (p. 151).  
Finally, Esfeld and Lam may accept objects in their ontology, but this involves a 
significant revision to our understanding of objects. Not only are they dependent on the 
relations, but they are not individuals. In their view, there is no transcendent 
individuality of objects. Nothing differentiates one object from another (2011, p. 152). 
They accept a numerical plurality of objects but that is about it. 
As we saw in earlier sections, Esfeld drew a strong parallel between the motivations for 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism (2009). This parallel further 
informs his view of what Ontic Structural Realism is, or should be, in order to work. 
According to Esfeld, just like properties cannot be categorical if we are to know them, 
the structure of the world must be causal for us to know it. 
“ontic structural realism has been conceived notably by Steven French and 
James Ladyman as a position that is able to vindicate a certain form of scientific 
realism with respect to fundamental physics. Against that background, the claim 
of this paper is that ontic structural realism is suitable as a form of scientific 
realism only if it commits itself to causal structures, that is to say, only if the 
essence of the fundamental physical structures is taken to consist in the power to 
produce certain effects. If, by contrast, the fundamental physical structures are 
regarded as being categorical, a commitment to scientific realism in the sense of 
the fundamental physical theories (the current ones, or some future successors of 
them) being in principle able to reveal the real constitution of the fundamental 
physical structures is blocked by the fact that the whole domain of causal 




as well supervene on other fundamental physical structures than those ones 
admitted by any of the past, current or future physical theories.” (2009, p. 188) 
In sum, Ontic Structural Realism is based on what science tells us about fundamental 
physics. However, if it were to commit to mathematical or abstract structure alone, it 
would fail at this. If the structure is abstract it is in a sense Categorical. We do not truly 
know the nature of reality – which is blocked from our epistemic access. The gap 
between epistemology and metaphysics reopens and we may be forced back to the kind 
of Structural Realism Newman got his hooks into. Esfeld concludes that for Ontic 
Structural Realism to function it must bring the structure into the empirical realm. The 
structure is causal.  
I find Esfeld (and Lam)’s work on Ontic Structural Realism compelling in many regards. 
They appreciate the similarities between the case for Dispositional Essentialism and 
Ontic Structural Realism as ways to avoid quidditism and humility and bridge the gap 
between epistemology and metaphysics. This in turn affects what kind of Ontic 
Structural Realism they endorse. To truly avoid quidditism and account for causation 
and the concrete structure of our universe, the structure must be causal. These ideas 
will be revisited in my next chapter where I forward my own view, which is a sort of 
hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. It will differ 
from Esfeld and Lam’s in many ways, particularly in their take on objects – my concern 
is more with properties and laws. However, my view of the relationship between 
properties and laws will take some influence from their view on properties and objects 
as ontologically dependent. 
6.3.3 French’s Ontic Structural Realism  
6.3.3.1 Ontic Structural Realism as a reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism 
A major selling point of Dispositional Essentialism is the promise of an elegant 
framework for explaining laws. Laws are necessary consequences of the dispositions of 
properties. As the dispositions of properties are fixed, the laws are fixed too. So, within 
Dispositional Essentialism, laws are necessary – they necessarily follow from the nature 
of the properties they are about. Thus, laws supervene on properties. The dispositions of 




applies. After all, Coulomb’s law outlines how charged objects interact, and this is 
grounded in the nature of charge itself. 
Ontic Structural Realism, like Dispositional Essentialism, aims to give a robust account 
of modality avoiding the likes of quidditism, humility and regularity views of laws. 
French makes the first step towards this by elaborating on the notion of structure 
within his view. He claims that the structure of the world is inherently modal (2014, p. 
263). Further, he takes laws and symmetry principles to be the fundamental 
constituents of this structure.  
Dispositional Essentialism is a properties-first, laws-second view. How does this 
compare to Ontic Structural Realism and why does French claim that Ontic Structural 
Realism is a reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism? 
Recall, in chapter 3 we saw that Jessica Wilson (2012) argued that we need 
determinables in our ontology to account for modality. By determinables Wilson meant 
determinable properties. Properties like charge or mass are determinable relative to 
their determinates – particular charges or masses – as they are more general. They 
cover all possible determinates and are the sorts of properties we see featured in laws 
like Coulomb’s law or the law of gravitation which outline how charge and mass behave 
generally. The idea is that determinable properties explain why these high-level laws 
occur. Without them, something is left out of the picture. French cites Wilson and is 
persuaded of the need for determinables. He argues that we need determinables to be 
part of the fundamental ontology of the world (French, 2014, p. 284). However, by 
determinables he means determinable laws and symmetries (Ibid, p. 290) not properties 
(confirmed by personal correspondence). 
On French’s view laws and symmetry principles form the basic structure of the world. 
Properties depend on these. So, properties are secondary to the modal structure. He sees 
this position as quite close to Dispositional Essentialism. Whereas Dispositional 
Essentialism is a properties-first, laws-second view; Ontic Structural Realism places 
laws and symmetries first, seeing properties as ontologically secondary. French sums up 
the relationship between these views by saying that his Ontic Structural Realism is a 




“by reverse-engineering dispositionalism, we are led naturally to the structuralist 
view. So, whereas the dispositionalist takes the laws to arise from or be 
dependent in some way upon the properties… I shall invert that order, taking the 
properties to be dependent upon the laws and symmetries. Because of this 
inversion, I have to relocate the modality, shifting it along the line of dependence 
from the properties to the laws and symmetries themselves.” (French, 2014, p. 
264) 
I will look at the nature of his fundamental base – and how he accounts for the concrete 
structure of our universe – in section 6.3.3.3. Before I advance, I must address a quick 
concern for his view that Ontic Structural Realism is a reverse-engineering of 
Dispositional Essentialism. Ontic Structural Realism puts laws and symmetries first 
and properties second. Dispositional Essentialism puts properties first and laws second. 
What is missing? Dispositional Essentialism makes no mention of symmetries of course! 
In order to appreciate the full sense in which Ontic Structural Realism is a reverse-
engineering of Dispositional Essentialism we must appreciate that there is no gap here. 
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, Dispositional essentialists expect to explain 
symmetries via properties as they would any other law. They would either do this by 
explaining them away as by-products or meta-statements about other laws (Bird, 2007, 
p. 214) or by seeing them as laws which must be explained by reference to properties of 
natural kinds or systems (Bigelow, Ellis, Lierse, 1992; Chakravartty, 2019). 
Alternatively, I proposed that they could be accounted for via collective properties. All 
these possibilities share a feature – they explain global principles via properties, be they 
properties of quantum objects or natural kinds. Thus, for the purposes of comparing 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s accounts of modality, the 
term “law” can be used liberally here to include symmetry laws.  
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism both aim to ground modality in 
the fundamental ingredients of the world. Further, they both use the same categories - 
properties and laws - in their attempts to do so. However, they take opposite stances on 
which of these is fundamental and which is dependent. 
As such, it would appear that the main difference between how these views account for 
modality is the direction they take the dependence between properties and laws to go in. 
Chakravartty illustrates this point by differentiating Dispositional Essentialism from 




whereas Ontic Structural Realism has a top-down approach (2019, p. 15). As a result, 
the success of either depends on the persuasiveness of taking the one to be fundamental 
over the other. In other words, the success of either view depends whether the case for a 
bottom-up or top-down approach to modality is more convincing. 
Next, I will look at the reasons we might have to prefer Dispositional Essentialism or 
Ontic Structural Realism’s accounts of modality. I will be particularly interested in 
French’s case for favouring Ontic Structural Realism i.e. French’s case for taking laws 
(as opposed to properties) to be fundamental. He argues that Dispositional 
Essentialism’s properties-first approach fails to ground modality. As a result, his view 
emerges victorious. I show the case for both views. And, in the next chapter, I will argue 
that we have no reason to prefer the ontological dependence to go one way rather than 
another. However, in what follows I will highlight the importance of determinables for 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s ability to account for 
modality. This further pushes the similarities between their metaphysics. Finally, I end 
this section on French by giving some more detail to his metaphysics and spelling out 
what role properties have in his Ontic Structural Realism. 
6.3.3.2 Ontic Structural Realism vs Dispositional Essentialism 
French argues that Dispositional Essentialism falls short of its goal of accounting for 
modality and avoiding regularity views of laws. In sum, the bottom-up approach does 
not work. In his view, we ought to abandon Dispositional Essentialism in favour of Ontic 
Structural Realism, placing the modality at the law level. This is the only way to truly 
ground modality and avoid regularity views of laws. He conceptualises the problem in 
terms of determinables and determinates. The issue for French is that laws are 
determinable (or general) where properties are determinate. I will proceed to explaining 
why French holds this view. I will show that his argument is most successful against 
Bird-style Dispositional Essentialism. It need not cut ice with the modified Dispositional 
Essentialism I proposed in chapter 3. I will then show what we can learn from these 
arguments, paving the way to later discussions of my hybrid view. 
The difficulty for traditional Dispositional Essentialism is that contemporary physics is 
built out of functional laws. Here I follow Armstrong in taking a functional law to be “a 
determinable law that governs a class of determinate laws.” (1997, p. 245) There are 




the issue in 3.6 and will go into more detail in 7.4). For instance, determinables are 
often viewed as sets of determinates. Alternatively, determinables may be seen to differ 
from determinates in terms of specificity.  So, determinates are more specific than 
determinables. Either way we can get a sense of what determinables and determinates 
are by example. Red is a determinate of colour, however it is also a determinable of 
scarlet and crimson. Similarly, quadrangle is a determinate of shape, however it is a 
determinable of square and rectangle. As a result, a determinable law will be one that 
holds at the determinable level (for instance a law that’s true of colour) and a 
determinate law will hold at the determinate level (in this case red, blue or yellow).  
French’s criticism is lodged at traditional Dispositional Essentialism, which takes 
ordinary properties to ground general laws. It is especially damning in light of Bird’s 
popular exposition of the view in Nature’s Metaphysics (2007). As we saw, Bird takes 
“pure” or fundamental dispositions to be single-track. That is, fundamental dispositions 
are characterised by a single stimulus and manifestation condition (2007, p. 21). We can 
infer that laws regarding single-track dispositions will be fundamental. These will be 
laws of the type ∀x((Px ∧Sx)→Mx) where a determinate property, taken with a 
determinate stimulus give rise to a determinate manifestation. So only determinate 
properties are fundamental. These directly ground equally determinate laws. However, 
science is not built on determinate laws relating determinate properties (Vetter, 2012). 
Determinate laws would give us little information about the world, only outlining the 
behaviour of maximally specific and previously studied properties. Science is concerned 
with determinable laws and properties (for a full explanation of this kind of laws see 
section 2.3.1 entitled “functional laws”). As these are multi-track or “impure”, Bird 
would take it that these laws are not basic and are mere conjunctions of determinate 
laws which are grounded in determinate properties. This leaves the determinable laws 
of current science as brute regularities among determinate laws, which would mark a 
failure of the explanatory aims of Dispositional Essentialism to ground all modality in 
properties.  
Bird-like Dispositional Essentialism is left in an awkward position. The fact that all 
determinate charges behave in similar ways, so similar that their behaviour is predicted 
by a single equation, calls out for an explanation. In light of Dispositional Essentialism’s 
seeming inability to account for determinable laws, French argues that we should take 




avoiding the regularity view. Thus, French invited those inclined towards Dispositional 
Essentialism to abandon their view in favour of Ontic Structural Realism (2014, p. 264). 
However, as we saw, determinate-only Dispositional Essentialism is not the only option 
on the table. 
French’s objection is lodged at a specific form of Dispositional Essentialism. To be fair, 
that is the standard kind of Dispositional Essentialism in the literature. However, in 
chapter 3 I argued that Dispositional Essentialism can weasel its way out of the problem 
of accounting for function laws by introducing determinable properties into its ontology. 
If we are realists about determinable properties, and allow those properties to be 
dispositional, there is much less mystery surrounding how we come to have 
determinable laws. Determinable laws are about determinable properties, from a 
dispositional properties-to-laws perspective, the determinable properties ground the 
determinable laws. We see this even with regards to global principles, which may well 
be the hardest laws to account for (see chapters 4 and 5 for my proposal of how to 
accommodate them within Dispositional Essentialism). 
The take home message here is how vital determinables are in accounting for modality 
from a structuralist or dispositionalist perspective. This will be key to my view, which is 
hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s views of 
modality. As we saw, Dispositional Essentialism requires determinables to truly account 
for modality (Wilson, 2012; chapter 3). Laws are determinable, so we require 
determinable properties to account for them. On the ontic structural realist side, French 
readily accepts Wilson’s point about the need for determinables to account for modality. 
However, he understands determinables to be laws. Later, I will argue that 
determinable laws require determinable properties and vice versa. For now, I 
underscore the importance of fundamental determinables. 
6.3.3.3 The relationship between properties and laws in Ontic Structural Realism 
Ontic Structural Realism tends to be eliminative or deflationary about objects. We know 
that French is eliminative about objects (2014; Cei and French, 2011), but what about 
properties?  
French’s stance on properties can be confusing. He sends mixed messages. These mixed 




relationship between properties and laws. On the one hand, as we saw, French takes 
laws to be fundamental and properties to be secondary. This is witnessed in various 
places. Like when he says that he inverts Dispositional Essentialism by “…taking the 
properties to be dependent upon the laws and symmetries.” (2014, p. 264, emphasis my 
own) He also says: 
“I see physics as having provided an inventory of laws and symmetries—that is, 
features of the structure of the world—with properties, sparse or otherwise, as a 
kind of metaphysical by-product, and take these laws and symmetries as both 
determinables in themselves and as elements of the fundamental base of the 
world.” (ibid, p. 285, emphasis my own) 
He always talks about determinables – laws and symmetries – as fundamental. Then he 
uses terms like “dependent” or “by-product” to refer to properties. This paints a very 
clear picture. Laws are fundamental and properties are dependent on them. However, 
this is not the full picture. 
In other parts of his work, French clearly states that reality is not merely determinable. 
More to the point, he states that the fundamental level cannot be purely determinable. 
If it were, there would be no way to differentiate the actual world from other possible 
worlds, with a different instantiated structure but the same laws. 
French’s proposal is that the fundamental level of reality is composed of both 
determinates and determinables. We saw that by determinables he meant laws and 
symmetries. By determinates he means properties. These act as initial conditions or 
‘existential witnesses’ to determinates. In his words: 
 “…given the inherent modal nature of the laws and symmetries it cannot be the 
case that the fundamentality base of this, the actual, world is entirely 
determinable. Here the determinates act as ‘existential witnesses’ for the 
determinables in that they are indicative of the non-modal aspect of the latter. 
Thus it is determinables plus determinates that form the fundamentality base 
and in this world that base is composed of groups and the relevant 
representations together with laws plus the relevant initial conditions.” (French, 




So, while French at times appears to brush away properties as ontologically secondary, 
they clearly play an important role in his ontology. He echoes Wilson (2012) when he 
says that we need both fundamental determinables and determinates in our ontology. 
Fundamental determinables account for the modal aspects of reality. Fundamental 
determinate properties act as ‘existential witnesses’ to the determinables. Without this 
second part the fundamental level of reality would not account for what is instantiated 
i.e. anything that concretely exists or happens in our world. 
Finally, French acknowledges that some may find his inclusion of instantiated 
properties or initial conditions inconsistent with Ontic Structural Realism. There is a 
concern that introducing determinates into one’s ontology is to introduce a non-
structural element. However, he says that if the project of structuralism is to have a 
completely determinable ontology it is “made of straw” (2014, p. 286/7). Indeed, this 
objection seems to be based on the idea that structure refers to purely abstract or 
mathematical structure. Yet, an ontology based on that kind of structure alone would 
not work. We need to be able to differentiate between concrete and abstract structure 
somehow. Indeed, French does not see determinates as non-structural but as giving data 
on the concrete, instantiated, structure of the world. These are needed to get a full 
picture and to differentiate the actual world from other possible worlds (ibid). 
6.3.4 Chakravartty’s perspective on the debate between Dispositional Essentialism and 
Ontic Structural Realism 
Chakravartty has said a lot about Structural Realism and Dispositional Essentialism, 
some of which was mentioned already, particularly in the global principles chapters. For 
the purposes of this chapter I will look at his arguments in Physics, Metaphysics, 
Dispositions, and Symmetries – à la French (2019). In this paper he assesses the 
differences between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. He 
argues that French’s reasons for preferring the structuralist position fail. The science 
does not deliver a verdict either way. 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism are in the business of 
accounting for modality. Dispositional Essentialism places the modality at the property 
level: fundamental properties give rise to laws. Ontic Structural Realism does the 
reverse: laws and symmetries are fundamental, properties are derivative. Chakravartty 




up” approach to reality whereas Ontic Structural Realism has a “top-down” approach 
(2019). He then teases out the reasons why French prefers his top-down approach. 
We already saw one reason for preferring a top-down approach. In French’s view 
determinables (laws and symmetries) are better suited to ground modality than 
properties (determinates). In chapter 3 I argued that Dispositional Essentialism could 
follow French (2014) and Wilson (2012) in introducing fundamental determinables, with 
the caveat that these are fundamental determinable properties. In fact, this seems like a 
more natural way to go. Talk of determinables generally refers to determinable 
properties (Wilson, 2012). The fact that French takes determinables to be laws seems 
rather odd considering that determinable act as shorthand for determinable properties. 
Regardless, French has a response to this move. 
French would counter that global principles cannot be accounted for via properties. At 
the very least, he would argue that taking global principles as fundamental is better 
than what the dispositional essentialist does (French, 2014). At the time of French’s 
book, the world-kind hypothesis was the only option for accounting for global principles 
in the dispositional essentialist literature. However, as we saw in chapters 4 and 5, 
there are new (and I argue improved) ways of accounting for global principles these 
days. In particular, Chakravartty (2019) has suggested that systems have properties. 
Briefly, he argued that there is much warrant for and talk of systems and their 
properties in science, so this is not ad hoc. Further, I forwarded another solution. I 
argued that objects can collectively share properties. This is even more parsimonious 
than Chakravartty’s approach as it does not postulate high-level entities at all. 
French would maintain that Ontic Structural Realism’s account of modality should be 
preferred because it is a better view for reasons I will soon give. Likewise, a 
dispositional essentialist would claim the reverse. There is no clear victor when it comes 
to accounting for modality. Both views are responding to the same scientific evidence, 
and neither is clearly more parsimonious or less ad hoc than the other. However, until 
now I have only considered whether these views are able to account for modality. There 
is a wider story. If we take a step back at look at the whole picture there are bigger 
reasons for preferring one view over another. These reasons get to the core of French’s 




Dispositional Essentialism retains a traditional ontology. At the fundamental level there 
are dispositional properties and the objects which bear them. Those properties give rise 
to laws. French’s fundamental level has laws, symmetries and properties. There are no 
objects. Objects are eliminated from his ontology altogether (2010, 2014). French’s 
ontology is appealing because it is supposed to be more parsimonious and to give a 
neater explanation “read off the science” so to speak. However, Chakravartty contests 
the idea that Ontic Structural Realism is “read off the science” (2019).  
As we saw, physics puts traditional objects under duress. Objects are entangled. Reality 
may be non-separable and holistic. Quantum objects cannot be differentiated by their 
properties or spatio-temporal location. These objects obey odd statistics. The principle of 
permutation invariance tells us that there is no difference between electron A being in 
box A and B in box B, and electron B being in box A and electron A being in box B. In 
quantum statistics permutations of electrons count as one and the same event, not two 
distinct events. Scenarios which only differ with regard to electron permutation are 
weighed as one single possibility. The science leads French to be eliminative about 
objects. However, Chakravartty argues that the science does not deliver decisive blows 
either way.  
Science does not point to the elimination of objects. It underdetermines the individuality 
of objects. These are two very different things. “A lot hangs here on what one means by 
‘object’. For instance, French often writes as though it is a truism that the concept of any 
given object, in order to have genuine content, must include some information regarding 
whether it is (or is not) an individual.” (Chakravartty, 2019) However, this need not be 
the case. There is increasing awareness of the literature and caution in the use of the 
term “object”. While some philosophers will continue to cling to classical objects, this is 
not true for all.  
Chakravartty points out that Dispositional Essentialism is not at odds with the science 
provided it takes the term object with a pinch of salt. In Chakravartty’s words, the 
physics does not suggest “an obvious problem for the idea that less-restrictively-
conceived objects have properties, some or all of which may be dispositional.” (2019, p. 
12) The science undermines classical objects, leaving their identity underdetermined. 
The move to eliminate objects is a controversial one. French adopts this but we need not. 
The science does not deliver a knockout blow for either view. For my part, I do not aim 




Nonetheless I make sure the view I forward next is compatible with multiple 
conceptions of objects and not reliant on outdated understandings of objecthood. 
 
Conclusion: 
Until now Dispositional Essentialism was our focus. In this chapter, I introduced Ontic 
Structural Realism. There is a strong case for this view. It has a substantial history, 
with roots in early 20th century epistemic structural realists who argued that we only 
know the structure of the world, not its nature. Ontic Structural Realism takes 
structuralism to a new level, arguing that all there is is structure. In the first half of the 
chapter we looked at the many scientific and metaphysical reasons for this controversial 
view. 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism keep very different company. 
However, we saw that there is a growing awareness of the proximity between these 
views. Both stem from a desire to explain modality. Both aim to avoid quidditism and 
humility, they reject Categoricalism or quidditism in attempts to close the gap between 
epistemology and metaphysics. 
Ontic Structural Realism comes in various flavours or degrees. I have not been 
concerned with the most radical forms of Ontic Structural Realism here. Rather, I have 
looked at intermediate and moderate versions. In particular, I have looked at the work 
of those who compare Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism as these 
authors tend to give the most detailed metaphysical pictures of Ontic Structural 
Realism anyway. This sets the scene for the next chapter where I forward my own view. 
It is a sort of hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. 
Before I delve into my hybrid view, I close this chapter with a nod to what I have learnt 
from these authors and a hint of what I take from them in what is to come. 
First, we saw that Esfeld and Lam (Esfeld, 2004 and 2009 and Esfeld and Lam, 2011) 
argued that if Ontic Structural Realism is to avoid quidditism and humility, and really 
close the gap between epistemology and metaphysics, the structure cannot be abstract. 
They argue that it must be causal. They also view objects and properties as separable 




argument in the next chapter where I argue that there is a good argument for the 
metaphysical interdependence of properties and laws.  
Second, I looked at French’s work (2010, 2014). He argued that Ontic structural Realism 
was a reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism. Where Dispositional 
Essentialism puts properties first and laws second, Ontic Structural Realism puts laws 
first and properties second. Chakravartty puts this in a new light, saying that 
Dispositional Essentialism gives a bottom-up (from properties to laws) account of 
modality where Ontic Structural Realism’s is top-down (from laws to properties). On his 
view (contra French) science cannot dictate which we choose. Finally, French deals with 
the issue of accounting for the concrete universe by saying we need determinable (laws) 
and determinate (properties) in our ontology.  
In some ways my view will differ the most from French’s. At the same time, I will 
borrow liberally from his conceptual framework (and on Chakravartty’s pushback). They 
argue about whether a bottom-up or top-down approach is better – whether properties 
or laws come first. I argue that neither is the case. In the next chapter I make my case 
for the symmetric dependence of properties and laws. I show that if we are 
structuralists, we have good reason to abandon both Dispositional Essentialism and 






7. Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism: a 
hybrid view 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism both aim to ground modality in 
our fundamental ontology. Thus far this thesis has focused on their individual methods 
for doing so. We have seen that there are important similarities between their 
approaches which make Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism closer 
than they might first seem. Dispositional Essentialism takes properties to be 
fundamental and laws to be dependent. Ontic Structural Realism takes laws to be 
fundamental and properties to be what needs explaining (French, 2014). Hence, French 
claims that Ontic Structural Realism is a reverse-engineering of Dispositional 
Essentialism (ibid). Alternatively, Chakravartty claims that Dispositional Essentialism 
has a bottom-up approach to modality whereas Ontic Structural Realism’s approach is 
top-down (2019). 
In this chapter I forge a middle ground – a hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism 
and Ontic Structural Realism. My hybrid view takes properties and laws to be mutually 
dependent on each other. I begin by talking about ontological dependence in section 7.1. 
Then, I return my focus to Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. In 
7.2 and 7.3, I fill in some gaps left by these views. Both aim to explain modality via 
determinate properties and determinable laws. I argue that both ontologies leave gaps. I 
argue that, in order to fill those gaps, determinate laws and determinable properties 
need to be let into the fold. In 7.4, I address lingering issues for our understanding of 
determinates, determinables, and the relationship between them. 
In 7.5 I argue for my symmetric dependence view. I argue that symmetric dependence 
provides the best framework for understanding the relationship between properties and 
laws in dispositionalism and structuralism. These views reject the transcendent 
individuation of properties so that properties are relationally individuated by the laws 
they enter into. At the same time, laws are relations between properties. I use this to 
show that the quest to determine whether properties are fundamental (Dispositional 
Essentialism) or laws are fundamental (Ontic Structural Realism) is misguided. Neither 
can be prior to the other. Properties and laws depend on each other for their identity 




Finally, in my concluding section, I recap my hybrid view and tie up some loose ends. I 
argue for the symmetric dependence of properties and laws. I see this as a merger view 
or hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism with respect 
to modality. My hybrid view is able to incorporate the dispositional essentialist insight 
that laws depend on properties. It also makes sense of the ontic structural realist view 
that properties depend on laws. It is unique in accepting both claims at the same time. I 
show that by doing away with the dogma of ontological priority between properties and 
laws, the two claims can co-exist in a cohesive view. 
 
7.1 Ontological dependence 
Before I get into the meat of this chapter – my proposed modifications to Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism, symmetric dependence and my hybrid view 
– I will say a bit about ontological dependence. Ontological dependence refers to 
metaphysical dependence – when one thing depends on another for its essence, identity 
or existence. Ontological dependence has popped up a lot in this thesis. Dispositional 
essentialists think that laws ontologically depend on properties. French proposes that 
properties depend on laws. However, I have not said much about what ontological 
dependence means. In this section, I will look at ways this term can be understood, 
hinting at the discussion of properties and laws to come. 
Ontological dependence is a flexible term. It can mean a variety of things depending on 
context. Broadly, it refers to the dependence of one thing (or kind of things) on another 
thing (or kind of things). Here I take thing as a broad term for any kind of metaphysical 
entity, including objects, properties, and laws.  
A lot of work has been done on breaking down ontological dependence into types, giving 
sets of conditions and specifications for different flavours. Perhaps best known is the 
difference between rigid and non-rigid existential dependence (Lowe, 2005). A thing 
rigidly depends on another if it could not exist without it. For instance, a set depends on 
its members. It would not be the same set without those exact members. Non-rigid 
existential dependence is more flexible. For instance, within an Aristotelian framework, 
a universal depends on its instances. However, it does not rigidly depend on any 




only dogs in existence, the universal depends on them. At the same time, the 
dependence is non-rigid because the universal could exist without Fido and Rover 
provided another dog (say Rex) instantiated it (ibid). 
There are many kinds of ontological dependence in the literature. Sometimes the 
dependence refers to identity dependence, dependence for existence, or dependence for 
essence. They are given detailed analyses, with examples and counterexamples fleshing 
out the space of possible types of ontological dependence. However, I follow Barnes’ 
(2018) lead in staying neutral on the definition of ontological dependence.   
It is worth noting that ontological dependence should not be confused with grounding. 
Grounding is a relatively new notion in metaphysics. Grounding is asymmetric (two 
things cannot ground each other), irreflexive (a thing cannot ground itself) and 
transitive (if x depends on y, and y depends on z, x depends on z). It is also well-founded 
meaning that grounding chains must terminate in something fundamental. Because 
grounding is so popular, and these two terms get conflated, some philosophers assume 
that ontological dependence shares all these formal features. However, this is mistaken 
(Barnes, 2018). Formal features like asymmetry are not built into the definition of 
ontological dependence. They are built into the notion of grounding. 
Grounding explanations run in reverse of ontological dependence explanations. 
Grounding tells us why something occurs. If A grounds B, A generates B according to 
the formal features we saw above. However ontological dependence simply tells us what 
depends on what. So, if we want to speak about this example in terms of ontological 
dependence, B ontologically depends on A. So, where the grounding goes from A to B, 
the ontological dependence goes from B to A. I avoid talk of grounding in this chapter. I 
take it that if B depends on A, there is a sense in which A metaphysically explains or 
gives rise to B. I say “metaphysically explains” as this terminology is looser than the 
grounding terminology. It does not presume the set of formal features that grounding 
does. This is especially important given that later in this chapter I will argue that 
ontological dependence (and hence metaphysical explanation) may be symmetric. There 
is no room for such a thing in the grounding literature. 
In sum, grounding is a far more restrictive notion than ontological dependence (Tahko 
and Lowe, 2016; Barnes, 2018). We cannot simply assume that all ontological 




model the grounding theorists endorse. Doing so would beg the question, assuming a set 
of formal characteristics for ontological dependence. These formal characteristics are 
still up for debate, and indeed will be debated later in this chapter where I argue for the 
possibility and existence of alternative species of ontological dependence.  
Ontological dependence is a flexible notion with a large catchment. Most commonly 
ontological dependence is explained in modal terms. To say that X ontologically depends 
on Y is to say that X could not exist without Y existing (Tahko and Lowe, 2016). 
However, the modal variety has been criticised for being too coarse-grained. There are 
examples where a thing cannot exist without another existing, but we would not say 
that there is an ontological dependence link between the two. 
Famously, there is the issue of necessary existents. Many believe that certain entities 
necessarily exist, such as numbers or God. Thus, for any contingently existing thing, we 
could say that it could not exist without numbers or God. If God necessarily exists, my 
hat cannot exist without God. Yet it is missing the point of ontological dependence to say 
that my hat is ontologically dependent on God (ibid). Ontological dependence loses its 
explanatory value here. Another example of where the modal analysis of ontological 
dependence may go astray is in the example of children and their parents. We can say 
that a particular child could not exist without their parents. In one sense this is true: 
had the child’s parents not existed the child would not have existed either. However, in 
another sense this is false. The child can exist without their parents. Once the child is 
born, the parents can die, and the child will not fall out of existence. 
Given the problems with the modal account and, again, the fact that ontological 
dependence is a broad term, there are alternative accounts of ontological dependence. 
One kind of ontological dependence which will feature heavily in this chapter is identity 
dependence.  
When I talk about identity dependence, I refer to identity in the sense of individuality 
rather than a relation of identity (Lowe, 2012; Tahko and Lowe, 2016). An example of 
the relation of identity is to say that Clark Kent is or “=” Superman. I am not interested 
in this relation here. Rather, I am interested in what makes a specific thing (object, 
property, law, etc.) the kind of thing it is i.e. what individuates it. So, for instance, take 
a birth or a death. What individuates that event among others like it is the person who 




thing for its individuation. In other words, if gets its identity at least partially from that 
thing. It is important to note that identity dependence is tied to dependence for 
existence. After all, it is not clear what it would be for a thing to exist without its 
identity – or the thing it gets its identity from – existing (Tahko and Lowe, 2016, section 
4.2). 
One controversy surrounding identity dependence is whether it can be symmetrical i.e. 
whether two or more things can depend on each other for their identity. This is 
especially controversial as it would seem to imply that two or more things could depend 
on each other for their existence. This issue is particularly relevant for the views looked 
at in this thesis – Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. 
Both Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism have been accused of 
requiring symmetric dependence. This is because dispositional or structural views 
identify entities like properties purely via their relations to further properties, so all 
entities in the structure depend on each other for their existence (Barker, 2013; Jaag, 
2014; Lowe, 2012; Yates, 2018). Some philosophers see this as a vice of the views. Much 
rides on how we view symmetric dependence. I leave discussions of whether properties 
and laws symmetrically depend on each other for section 7.5, where I cover these issues 
in depth. 
In sum: ontological dependence is a flexible term and can be fleshed out in a variety of 
ways. In her paper – Symmetric Dependence – Elizabeth Barnes (2018) remains 
relatively neutral on what is meant by ontological dependence. I follow her in thinking 
that we can remain somewhat neutral on the precise definition of ontological 
dependence. However, I take it that if one thing ontologically depends on the other, it 
will not be able to exist independently of that thing. So, I take dependence for existence 
as a requirement for or inevitable consequence of ontological dependence. 
 
7.2 Dispositional Essentialism 
Dispositional essentialists by and large have traditional ontologies. They take properties 
to be universals (Ellis, 2001; Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2007; Tugby 2015). Further, they do 
not argue for revisions to our concept of objects in the way ontic structural realists do. 




properties and laws. They typically take properties to be fundamental and laws 
derivative. As we saw in chapter 2, “properties” here refers to regular, instantiated, 















Figure 3. This figure depicts standard Dispositional Essentialism. The 
small circle represents determinates, in this case determinate 
properties. The big circle represents determinables, in this case 
determinable laws. The arrow represents ontological dependence. 
Within Standard Dispositional Essentialism, determinable laws are 
ontologically dependent on determinate properties. 
In chapter 2 we saw that this picture is oversimplified. There is a huge problem with the 
idea that determinable laws ontologically depend on determinate properties. The issue 
stems from the fact that the modality of a determinate property at best can 
metaphysically explain, or give rise to, a determinate law i.e. a limiting case of the 
determinable law. However, it cannot give rise to the determinable law because this law 
covers both the behaviour of the particular determinate and all others, including 
determinates which may not even be instantiated. It seems odd to think particular 
instances of a general law metaphysically explain the general law. Or, in other words, it 
seems odd to think that the general law is ontologically dependent on the instance. 
Rather, it seems like we get the instances from the general law. The elegance and 
precision of laws like Coulomb’s law cry out for explanation. The fact that all the 
determinate charges obey Coulomb’s law cannot be left brute. This goes against the 




In chapter 3 I argued that the problem can be solved via realism about determinable 
properties. This solution was inspired by Wilson’s work (2012). She points out that we 
need both determinate properties and determinable properties in our ontology as they 
fulfil very different functions. We need determinables to give us the modal facts about 
the world. These explain the general laws we see. Determinates, on the other hand, act 
as ‘existential witnesses’ to determinables. They are instantiated properties. Without 
instantiated properties we would have a purely modal, or hypothetical, world without 
any concrete instantiated things. In light of these proposed modifications, my previous 
representation of Dispositional Essentialism in figure 3 no longer holds. I have 














Figure 4 - depicts modified Dispositional Essentialism. Determinate 
properties cannot give rise determinable laws. Determinable properties 
are needed. The arrow represents the ontological dependence of 
determinable laws on determinable properties. I will look at the 
relationship between these categories and determinate properties in 
section 7.4. 
Figure 4 changes two things relative to figure 3 (standard Dispositional Essentialism). 
The first thing it does is add determinable properties. This is because determinate 
properties cannot explain the existence of determinable laws. Dispositional Essentialism 
aims to explain all modality from the nature of properties. As such, it cannot leave the 
fact that all the determinates obey the same determinable law unexplained. This would 
run counter to the explanatory aims of Dispositional Essentialism. The determinable 




the existence of these laws are determinable properties – the properties the laws are 
about. 
The second thing it does is change the ontological dependence arrow. I remove the arrow 
representing the ontological dependence of determinable laws on determinate 
properties. I run the ontological dependence from determinable laws to determinable 
properties. Determinable laws ontologically depend on determinable properties. Another 
way of looking at this is that determinable properties give rise to determinable laws. 
Here by give rise to, I mean that they are the metaphysical explanation or cause of 
determinable laws. They are prior to determinable laws and are the reason we have 
these laws. The change of the ontological dependence arrow is needed for determinable 
properties to do the work they were posited to do. After all, if we could have 
metaphysically explained determinable laws via determinate properties we would not 
have posited the determinable properties to begin with. 
I have one more change to make to the depiction of Dispositional Essentialism. The 
picture painted thus far is glaringly incomplete to me. Within Dispositional 
Essentialism, properties give rise to laws. This is because these properties are modal or 
dispositional. The laws encode those dispositions. The laws lay out the ways in which 
the property can manifest. Thus, we cannot have a dispositional property without that 
property giving rise to the corresponding law.  
We cannot posit a dispositional property without generating a corresponding law. I have 
shown that determinate properties cannot generate determinable laws. We need 
determinable properties to do this. Yet, as dispositional properties, determinate 
properties will also give rise to laws. Dispositional properties are modal, they are law-
generating. The laws determinate properties give rise to cannot be determinable laws, 
as these far outstretch the modality of the determinate properties. Rather, determinate 
properties will give rise to determinate laws. These laws are limiting cases of the 





















Figure 5. This figure illustrates my proposed changes to Dispositional 
Essentialism. Rather than determinable laws ontologically depending 
on determinate properties, they ontologically depend on determinable 
properties. For every dispositional property there will be a law of 
suitable scope. I will look at how the determinates and determinables 
relate further in section 7.4. 
Before I move on, there are a couple things to note. The first concerns the status of 
determinates. I have been uncritically employing Wilson’s framework here. That 
framework gives separate roles to determinables and determinates. Determinables give 
us modal facts about reality whereas determinates give us non-modal facts. On the one 
hand, I think that this gives us valuable insight into the nature of these categories. On 
the other hand, this can be taken with a pinch of salt as there is a sense in which all 
properties – determinates included – are modal within Dispositional Essentialism. I 
leave this topic for section 7.3 where I expand on how to understand this distinction. 
The second thing to note is that determinates are not necessarily single-track. Recall 
that Bird thought that fundamental properties would have a simple-stimulus 
manifestation condition. Contra Bird, Barbara Vetter shows that determinate properties 
can be irreducibly complex (2015).  
As we saw in chapter 3, Vetter differentiates between two different levels at which 
properties are divergent or multi-track. The first is the level we have been looking at of 
determinates and determinables. Take the example of charge. Charge is determinable in 





Further, any charged object will have a specific charge. This is because if an object has a 
determinable it will have a determinate of that determinable. 
At the other-level – the level of the individual determinates e.g. specific charges – Vetter 
says that these are irreducibly and fundamentally multi-track. This is because each 
charge will encode the possibilities to react in a myriad of ways to every other charged 
object they may encounter. Even the determinate law for that determinate charge will 
allow for a variety of manifestations depending on the situation the charge manifests in. 
Multi-track does not equate to determinable. The fact that an individual charge (or any 
other determinate) is multi-track does not mean that it is determinable. This is because 
it has all the corresponding single-track dispositions at once. Vetter explains that 
“Having a determinable property entails having one of its determinates, to the exclusion 
of all others. Having the multi-track disposition electric charge, on the contrary, entails 
having all the corresponding single-track dispositions.” (2015, p. 53) Dispositions are 
multi-track in a fundamental way that goes beyond being determinables. After all, 
determinables require one determinate instantiation to the exclusion of all others, 
whereas multi-track properties have all the single-track dispositions at once. 
That said, determinate laws may seem more open than determinate properties. This is 
because the determinate laws may still contain variables. Take Coulomb’s law (see the 
table below). This law determines the electrical force (F) by multiplying the charges of 
the objects (Q1 and Q2), dividing their sum by the square of the distance between them 
(r2), and multiplying the result by Coulomb’s constant (K). So, the electrical force is 
proportional to the charge of the objects and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them.  













A determinate charge has the disposition to a possible infinitude of potential 
manifestations. This is reflected in the determinate law. This is seen in Determinate CL 




solutions according to what other charged object the determinate charge encounters and 
at what distance they are to each other (what value Q2 and r assume). The determinate 
law, which encodes the dispositions of the determinate property, is flexible in the sense 
that it has other variables. However, it has these because the manifestation of the 
charge depends on its interplay with other charges in the world. 
Vetter (2015) proposes a different sort of determinate of Coulomb’s law. This is of the 
kind I called “Solution to CL” in the figure above. In this version all the variables are 
filled in so we can calculate the exact result. There is only one outcome. If a charge of 
magnitude 5 meets another charge of magnitude 8, and they are at a distance of 10 
units, the force exerted will be a specific amount. I do not take these to be the 
determinate laws generated by the individual determinate properties. Rather, this 
solution to Coulomb’s law – this kind of uber determinate law – encodes the dispositions 
of multiple determinate properties. In particular, it encodes the dispositions of multiple 
determinate properties in contact with each other and the distance between them. The 
determinate property, on its own, cannot generate or metaphysically explain this kind of 
law. 
There are two things worth noting before moving on. First, I do not see this flexibility of 
determinate laws as problematic. This is because the flexibility is already built into the 
dispositional properties. It is because each determinate charge can manifest in so many 
ways that the determinate law is so flexible. The determinate property manifests 
differently according to what other determinates it comes in contact with. Second, not 
all determinate laws are so flexible. Take, for instance, Einstein’s mass-energy 
equivalence: E = mc2. According to this law, the quantity of energy (E) is equal to the 
quantity of mass (M) multiplied by the square of the speed of light (c2). This law only has 
two variables – mass and energy. If you know the determinate magnitude of one of those 
variables you can calculate the other. There are no other variables left. On a side note, 
this does not mean that mass and energy will not appear in other laws with more 
variables, it just so happens that this aspect of their disposition is fixed. In sum: 
determinate properties can be irreducibly multi-track. When this occurs, the 
determinate law will not have a unique and single solution. It will contain other 






7.3 Ontic Structural Realism 
Broadly, Ontic Structural Realism is the view that only structure exists. Interpreting 
this claim has proven problematic. In the previous chapter, I laid out Steven French’s 
Ontic Structural Realism (2014). I favour his reading for two reasons. First, French may 
well be the most prominent and published ontic structural realist. If anyone is an 
authority on the view, he is. Second, he is one of the most metaphysically engaged ontic 
structural realists. He gives the most detailed picture of the metaphysical assumptions 
and implications of the view. 
In the previous chapter we saw that the motivations for Ontic Structural Realism are 
complex. They often reference quantum mechanics as requiring a revolution in how we 
perceive objects. I will not rehash these arguments here. Rather, I focus on the 
underlying ontology as regards the question of how properties and laws relate.  
According to French, Ontic Structural Realism (like Dispositional Essentialism) aims to 
account for modality. Dispositional essentialists take the properties of ordinary objects 
to give rise to laws. Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. It takes laws and 
symmetries to be fundamental – the fundamental structure of the world – and 
properties to be derivative.  
In French’s view, Dispositional Essentialism fails to account for laws. Dispositional 
Essentialism aims to explain all modality on the basis of properties which are 
determinate. However, determinate properties cannot explain laws because laws are 
determinable. If we take the determinate properties (as opposed to the determinable 
laws) to be fundamental, the fact that they all obey the same general law remains 
unexplained. French follows Wilson (2014). He agrees with her view that we need both 
determinates and determinables in our ontology. As we saw, Wilson argued that we 
need the determinables (by which she means determinable properties) to explain 
modality and determinates tell us what determinables are actually instantiated in our 
world. French gives his own twist to these ideas. 
French agrees that we need both determinables and determinates. According to him, we 
need determinable laws in order to give us the modal structure of reality, and 
determinate properties to give us the non-modal facts which differentiate our world from 




as standard Dispositional Essentialism: determinate properties and determinable laws. 
However, he inverts the direction of the explanation in Dispositional Essentialism. He 
relocates the modality “shifting it along the line of dependence from the properties to the 














Figure 7 – depicts Ontic Structural Realism as an inversion of 
Dispositional Essentialism. It depicts French’s shift of the dependence, 
so that determinate properties ontologically depend on determinable 
laws. 
Figure 7 represents French’s Ontic Structural Realism as a perfect inversion of 
Standard Dispositional Essentialism (figure 3). However, it must be noted that these 
two are not perfect mirror images of each other. Dispositional Essentialism takes 
determinate properties to be fundamental but not the determinable laws. As noted in 
the previous chapter, in French’s work there is a tension between dependence and 
fundamentality here. On the one hand, properties are dependent on laws (2014, p. 264). 
On the other hand, we need both properties and laws in our fundamental ontology as 
they fulfil different explanatory needs (p. 290). We need the laws (determinables) to give 
us modality. However, we also need properties (determinates) to give us the non-modal 
facts about our world. Thus, we need both properties and laws in our fundamental base 
for that fundamental base to be sufficient to account for all aspects of our world. We 
could take French’s view that properties are needed in the fundamental base to mean 
that properties are not ontologically dependent on laws. However, I do not read French 
this way. French explicitly claims that properties are “metaphysical by-product[s]” of 
laws (ibid, p. 285). This implies that properties ontologically depend on laws. They 




I argued that Standard Dispositional Essentialism was incomplete. Determinable laws 
were relations between determinable properties and determinate properties instantiate 
determinate laws. So, it should not come as a surprise that I think that ordinary Ontic 
Structural Realism’s ontology is incomplete for similar reasons. 
The first modification I propose is to add determinable properties to the ontic structural 
realist ontology. Again, this goes back to the root of what properties and laws are. In 
ontologies that reject Categoricalism, properties are identified or individuated by the 
relations they enter into: the laws they follow. However, the laws are also individuated 
by the properties they relate. Laws of nature are, by definition, relations between 
properties. In fact, we can argue that this leap from laws to properties runs deeper than 
the reverse. Even within Categoricalism, laws are relations between properties (see 
chapter 2). Laws require the properties they relate to exist for their existence (this can 
and will be used to argue for symmetric dependence – see section 7.5).  
Laws are relations between properties. Laws require properties if they are to be more 
than abstract relations. Properties differentiate laws from each other. But why do I 
insist that French’s ontology have determinable properties? Determinable laws are 
relations between determinable properties. The law of gravitation is a relation between 
the determinable properties force, mass and distance. These properties are determinable 
as the law covers all possible solutions. The laws exist independently of which 














Figure 8. This figure represents modified Ontic Structural Realism. On 
this view determinable laws give rise to determinable properties. The 




Figure 8 takes determinable laws to give rise to determinable properties. I have left 
their relation to determinate properties blank, as I look at the relation between 
determinates and determinables in section 7.4. I took the determinable laws to give rise 
to determinable properties because Ontic Structural Realism puts laws first. Within 
Ontic Structural Realism, laws give rise to properties. In other words, properties are 
ontologically dependent on laws. Naturally, the determinable laws give rise to the 
determinable properties (rather than the reverse).  It would be off to say that the 
determinable properties do not exist, because then it is unclear what it is that the 
determinable laws relate or are about. However, the picture is still incomplete.  
Recall that in 7.2 I argued that just as determinable properties require laws, 
determinate properties require determinate laws. The instantiation of a determinate 
property instantiates a determinate law. The determinate law encodes the full set of 
dispositions of the property in question. The point holds for Ontic Structural Realism 
too. Within Ontic Structural Realism properties have no transcendent existence. They 
are nodes in a relational structure. Determinable properties are nodes in the 
determinable structure – they are what determinable laws relate. Similarly, 
determinate properties will be nodes in the determinate structure; they will be the 
things determinate laws are about. Thus, for every determinate property there will be a 
determinate law. Given that we are talking about Ontic Structural Realism, that 

















Figure 9 – depicts a more complete Ontic Structural Realism, where 
determinable properties ontologically depend on determinable laws 
and determinate properties ontologically depend on determinate laws. 
The only thing missing is the link between the determinable and 
determinate level, which I look at in section 7.4. 
Figure 9 depicts my proposal for Ontic Structural Realism. Before, determinable laws 
explained determinate properties, or determinate properties were dependent on 
determinable laws. Now I have determinable laws giving rise to determinable 
properties. After all, determinable laws are relations between these properties. In 
addition, determinate properties depend on determinate laws. After all, these properties 
have no transcendent being above the relations they enter into. The ontological 
dependence arrow always goes from properties to laws. This is in keeping with French’s 
requirement that properties depend on laws, or are metaphysical by-products of laws 
(rather than the reverse). Complete Ontic Structural Realism is quite similar to 
Complete Dispositional Essentialism. It has the same categories, but the dependence 
runs in reverse. Ontic Structural Realism remains a reverse-engineering of 
Dispositional Essentialism.  
Before I advance, it is worth noting a few things. First, this picture remains incomplete 
still. I have said nothing about the relation between determinables and determinates, 
yet there is clearly a relation here. I address this issue in the next section.  
Second, what I have said here may point to a different sort of link between properties 
and laws. If laws give rise to properties, properties depend on laws. But if laws are 
relations between properties, surely laws depend on properties too. This seems to 





on Ontic Structural Realism which is a laws first view. However, I take this point on 
board and even argue for symmetric dependence in section 7.5. 
Finally, the link between properties and laws runs deep, deeper than what I have said 
here. Later in this chapter I will show that properties and laws depend on each other for 
their identity as well as existence. Within these views, properties are no more than 
nodes in a relational structure, they depend on their relations for their essence and 
existence. Further, laws are relations between properties. They are individuated by the 
properties they relate. This will give a new dimension and depth to the link between 
properties and laws. Further, it will help show why determinable properties and laws 
would come in pairs (and the same for determinate properties and laws). 
 
7.4 What is the relationship between determinates and determinables? 
Thus far I have argued that we need determinate properties and laws, and determinable 
properties and laws. However, I have not said anything about how these relate to each 
other. In this section I will look at important ways in which the determinates and 
determinables are related. However, I will also show why it is mistaken to think that 
one explains the other in the sense that one is fundamental and the other derivative. I 
argue that, despite the close relation between determinables and determinates, neither 
can be fully explained by the other. They are both independently needed in our 
fundamental base as they fulfil independent explanatory roles. 
First, let’s recap the most common features attributed to the determinate-determinable 
relationship as these inform much of the debate on which explains which. In 3.1 we saw 
that:  
a) Determinates under the same determinable resemble each other in a way 
that they don’t resemble determinates of different determinables. In the case 
of determinate properties, yellow resembles blue in a way that it cannot 
resemble circular or square; in the case of determinate laws, a determinate of 
Coulomb’s law resembles another in a way it won’t resemble a determinate of 
Newton’s law of gravitation. 




c) If something has a determinable property it must have a determinate 
property. If something enacts a determinable law, it will enact a determinate 
law. 
d) Determinables do not fix determinates 
e) Determinates fix determinables (Johansson, 2000; Funkhouser, 2006; Wilson, 
2012 with my own additions). 
7.4.1 Overdetermination and the case against fundamental determinables 
As we saw in 3.2, philosophers are often deflationary or eliminativist about 
determinable properties. This is partially due to a push to slim down their ontology: a 
minimal ontology is considered more parsimonious and desirable. Further, this move is 
motivated by apparently convincing arguments. I will look at these arguments in this 
subsection before arguing, in the next, that we do need determinables as well as 
determinates in our ontology. 
One good argument for saying determinables are less robust than determinates, is that 
determinates appear to explain determinables, but not the reverse (Gillett and Rives, 
2005). If an object has a determinable it must have a determinate (c). The determinable 
does not fix the determinate (d), in other words, the determinable does not give us any 
information about which determinate is instantiated. However, the determinate does fix 
the determinable (e). In other words, if we know what determinate an object has, we 
know what determinable it has. There is no room for wiggle. 
There is a sense in which determinables look like collections of determinates, or 
abstractions of determinates. They do not seem to add much to the object that 
instantiates them given that the determinate suffices to explain the behaviour of the 
object, the evolution of the world and the determinables themselves. 
Causal overdetermination can be invoked to argue that determinables are superfluous 
(Gillett and Rives, 2005). An event is causally overdetermined if there are multiple 
distinct and sufficient causes for its occurrence. This is such that any one of these causes 
is sufficient to explain the occurrence of the event. This kind of overdetermination is 
often frowned upon due to parsimony concerns. If we give multiple different sufficient 
causes for an event it can seem like we have not decided which really caused it. That 




sufficient causes for something to happen such that it is truly overdetermined. Each 
case of overdetermination requires individual attention to figure out whether it is 
vicious or acceptable. In the case of determinates and determinables, determinable 
explanations are often seen as problematically overdetermined. Let’s look at how 
overdetermination might be damning for determinables. 
Stephen Yablo’s (1992) example of Sophie the pigeon (see 3.2) has been invoked by other 
philosophers to argue that determinables are irrelevant to the causal story, and so 
should be removed. Say Sophie the pigeon was taught to peck at red objects. She is 
pecking at a red object. This could be explained by the fact that the object is red. It could 
also be explained by the fact that the object is scarlet or crimson. The determinate and 
determinable explanation seem interchangeable. The determinate and determinable 
explanations overdetermine Sophie’s behaviour. Let’s look at another iteration of the 
Sophie example which can be used to argue that it is the determinate explanation that 
does the work, not the determinable explanation. 
Imagine that Sophie has only been trained to peck at crimson objects. The fact that the 
triangle is crimson determines that Sophie will peck on it. There is no need to explain 
her behaviour also by the fact that the triangle is red. But worse, explaining her pecking 
by the fact that the triangle is red leaves something out and is blatantly misleading. 
There are plenty of red objects she will not peck at e.g. scarlet or maroon objects. Here 
the determinate property is doing the work. Sophie the pigeon is not an isolated 
incident. 
Any time we can give a determinable cause for an event, a determinate cause will also 
be available. However, the reverse is not true. The determinable cause often leaves 
something out. Determinate explanations are more fine-tuned, accounting for all 
scenarios. Determinable explanations, being general, will often miss nuance and provide 
an incomplete story. This is not just the case in the Sophie example. It is a problem for 
any explanation where a specific determinate or set of determinates could cause X but 
not others. For instance, say I have a drug that will numb the pain of a patient but if I 
give them too much it will kill them. If I want to explain the effect the drug had on a 
specific patient, the general properties of the drug will not do. The determinate quantity 
administered and the determinate weight of the subject, explain the effect the drug had. 
Thus, determinable explanations appear not only unnecessary but incomplete. As such, 




Armstrong (1997, chapter 16) provides an alternative argument for why determinables 
might depend on determinates. It is particularly interesting for our purposes because he 
speaks explicitly about the case of determinate and determinable laws. This as opposed 
to only talking about determinate and determinable properties, as much of the literature 
does. Each determinate property instantiates a determinate law. According to 
Armstrong, determinable laws are universals of the determinate laws. They cover all 
suitably related determinate laws. So far, so good. However, Armstrong views 
determinate laws as more fundamental than the determinable laws (whereas I don’t for 
reasons I will give soon). 
Armstrong is an Aristotelian about universals. He shows us how Aristotelianism can be 
a motivation for having determinables as secondary to determinates. By Aristotelianism 
about universals I mean the view that only immanent universals exist. In other words, 
Armstrong only believes in universals which are instantiated at some point in 
spacetime. Here Aristotelianism can be contrasted with the less popular Platonism. On 
the platonic view universals exist independently of their instantiations. The platonist 
would allow for a universal to exist without ever being instantiated, whereas that is 
nonsense for the Aristotelian.  
In Armstrong’s view, determinables are ontologically dependent on determinates. 
Determinables depend on determinates for their existence. This is because within the 
Aristotelian framework Armstrong uses, a universal cannot exist without its instance 
existing. In his words: 
“The existence of the determinable universal is entailed by, and so supervenes 
upon, the existence of each and every determinate universal falling under it. 
And, if the doctrine of the ontological free lunch is correct, the determinable is 
already ‘in’ the determinate, and so is no increase of being.” (1997, p. 247) 
As we have seen, many philosophers believe determinates are more fundamental than 
determinables. In their view, determinates explain determinables. This leads some to 
say that we do not even need both in our ontology. Worse, having both leads to 
overdetermination. In 7.4.2 I recap why we need both fundamental determinates and 
determinables in our ontology and in 7.4.3 I re-visit the overdetermination worry and 




7.4.2 Why we need fundamental determinates and fundamental determinables 
I will now recap some reasons why determinables are not expendable and are needed in 
our fundamental base. I will also respond to Armstrong’s argument that Aristotelianism 
about universals implies that determinables are dependent on their instances - 
determinates. I will respond first by saying that even within Aristotelianism there are 
different ways of interpreting the relationship between these determinates and 
determinables. There is a case for saying that the determinates also depend on the 
determinables. Second, Aristotelianism about universals is just one framework for 
viewing the issue. It is one option on the menu. Other options like Platonism could be 
used argue for the reverse i.e. that determinates are second to determinables.  
We saw that there is a huge problem with the idea that determinates explain 
determinables within the views under consideration. Dispositional essentialists hoped to 
explain determinable laws via determinate properties. However, in chapter 3, we saw 
that determinate properties cannot account for the general claims of determinable laws. 
It is true that determinate properties will be modal within this view. However, they only 
encode the modality of determinate laws. A determinate property will only encode the 
dispositions that determinate has.  
In chapter 3 I argued at length that the issue of accounting for functional laws within 
Dispositional Essentialism is fixed via fundamental determinables. Fundamental 
determinable properties are able to give rise to determinable laws. Qua Wilson (2012), I 
argued that we need both determinates and determinables in our ontology. The 
determinates tell us what is instantiated and the determinables give us the modality 
(more on this distinction soon). 
Without fundamental determinable properties Dispositional Essentialism is at a loss to 
explain why all the determinate properties obey the same general law or equation. This 
clashes with the dispositional essentialist goal of accounting for all modality from 
properties. Thus, we need fundamental determinables. But what of Armstrong’s claim 
that determinables are dependent on their instantiations? 
Recall that Armstrong is an Aristotelian about universals. He only believes in 
instantiated universals. For a universal determinable property or law to exist, the 




dependent on determinates – their instances. While this argument is compelling, we are 
not committed to an Aristotelian framework. But, before I dive into that, it is worth 
noting that an Aristotelian framework is not committed to one-way ontological 
dependence of determinables/universals on determinates/instantiations. 
While immanent universals will depend on their instances, we can argue that the 
reverse is also true. We can argue that instances also depend on the universals. 
Armstrong does not posit natural kinds and essences. However, most Aristotelians see 
instances as dependent on their kinds, or the universals of which they are instances. 
Indeed, universals were posited in part to explain why different properties resemble 
each other. For instance, there appears to be a commonality between different 
magnitudes of charge or different shades of red. For the universals advocate, these 
properties resemble each other exactly because they are instantiations of the same 
universal. Without the universal to unify them the resemblance would be accidental or 
brute. The universal plays an explanatory role, being responsible for the instantiations. 
As Barnes put it: 
“Immanent universals depend on their instances. Part of what it is to be a 
universal, on this picture, is to have instances. And individuals depend on their 
kinds—part of what it is to be those particular individuals is to instantiate those 
kinds. If being F is essential to x, then anything that fails to instantiate F isn’t x. 
Part of what it is to be x is to be F. And so, plausibly, we can say that x depends 
on being F.” (2018, p. 56) 
Barnes points out that the instances may be equally dependent on the kinds to which 
they belong and of which they are manifestations. This looks like essence or identity 
dependence. And, if one thing depends on another for its identity there is a sense in 
which it depends on that thing for its existence. After all, it is not clear how a thing can 
exist without its identity or the thing from which it derives its identity. Barnes’ 
suggestion is that, just as immanent universals depend on their instances, instances 
depend on their universals. If this is true, immanent universals are symmetrically 
dependent on their instantiations.  
In this example, Barnes is talking about kinds. She is saying that it is not just the kind 
that depends on its instance, but the instance depends on the kind it is an instance of. 




stance on kinds. Barnes said “individuals depend on their kinds—part of what it is to be 
those particular individuals is to instantiate those kinds.” (ibid) Replace the words 
individuals and kinds for instantiated properties and universals and you have that: part 
of what it is to be those instantiated properties is to instantiate those universals. This is 
true for any property. If you believe in universals, all instantiated properties are 
instances of a universal. You cannot have an instance without the universal. A 
determinate property is a manifestation, or concrete materialisation, of that universal 
and acts accordingly.  
The main downside to this view will be symmetric dependence. As we shall see in 7.5, 
dependence is often assumed to be linear, so that it cannot loop around in this way. 
However, I will argue, as Barnes does, that we should not let such assumptions bias us 
when confronted with examples which may be best explained via symmetric dependence. 
For me symmetric dependence is not a problem, so the Aristotelian avenue remains 
open. However, I will leave the more detailed discussion of dependence for the next 
section. 
Say Aristotelianism could only be seen through Armstrong’s lens, with determinables 
being less fundamental than determinates. The views under consideration – 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism – are not wedded to 
Aristotelianism. The main rival view of universals – Platonism – has been defended 
within Dispositional Essentialism (Tugby, 2013). Ontic structural realists rarely talk 
about what they mean by properties, so the topic is open. 
Platonism about universals is the view that universals exist independently of their 
instantiations. So, for instance, we could have a world where a colour is never 
instantiated. The fact that the universal happens not to occur does not mean that it does 
not exist. Within this framework we do not have determinables being dependent on their 
instances. The determinables exist independently of their instances. Yet the arguments 
for why the instances may depend on the universal remain. It seems like the instance is 
what it is in virtue of the universal it instantiates. At the same time, I would argue that 
the determinates still have a part in our fundamental base. As we have seen, what 
determinates are instantiated is not explained by determinables. What properties and 
laws are instantiated in our world needs to be accounted for in our fundamental base. 




We need fundamental determinables, as well as determinates, in our fundamental base. 
Determinates alone are unable to account for modality. I have argued that Armstrong’s 
argument, that immanent universals/determinables asymmetrically depend on their 
instances, is not damning for fundamental determinables. The immanent universal 
framework is not wedded to his one-way dependence. In other iterations, there is a case 
to be made that the dependence between universals and their instances is symmetric or 
mutual (more on symmetric dependence in section 7.5). Further, even if the immanent 
universal framework required this asymmetric dependence, we would not be wedded to 
it. There are many different theoretical frameworks in the properties literature. For 
friends of universals, there is Platonism. Platonism does not support the view that 
determinables depend on determinates. If anything, it implies the reverse. Further, 
universals are just one framework for understanding properties. Others, like trope 
theories, deserve their own exploration although such exploration is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Now, let’s revisit the criticism that if we have both determinates and 
determinables in our ontology, causation is overdetermined. 
7.4.3 Overdetermination revisited 
One of the biggest hurdles for a view like mine – which has fundamental determinates 
and determinables – is the threat of overdetermination. The issue is that determinates 
seem sufficient to explain any given event. If a charged object is attracted to another, we 
can explain the attraction via the determinate charges. We do not need to bring charge – 
the determinable – into the picture. But do these explanations really compete? 
The causal exclusion argument in the philosophy of mind provides a fruitful debate on 
overdetermination. This argument aims to undermine all theories of mind aside from 
the identity theory – the view that mental states simply are physical states e.g. that 
there is no difference between certain neurons firing and pain. The causal exclusion 
argument generally targets non-reductive physicalism. Broadly, non-reductive 
physicalists think that mental states are connected to physical states but cannot be 
reduced to them. Mental states are often described as higher-level properties which 
could be realised by a myriad of physical states. For instance, pain might be realised by 
c-fibres firing in a human, d-fibres firing in an octopus and something else entirely in a 
Martian. Yet, all three may feel pain. Thus, mental states are often seen as multiply 




If I touch a hot pan, and pull my hand away, there are two different explanations for my 
behaviour. One invokes the mental property, the pain I felt. The other invokes physical 
properties i.e. what neurons were firing in my brain at the time. The causal exclusion 
argument points out that the non-reductive physicalist is left with two distinct causes 
for my behaviour, and one must go. My behaviour is overdetermined. I cannot say that 
my neurons caused the behaviour without risking making my being in pain irrelevant to 
my recoil. If I say I recoiled because of pain, I risk dismissing the role my brain 
chemistry played in causing my behaviour. Daniel Stoljar (2008) aims to dispel this 
argument by focusing on the notion of distinct causes. In particular, he explores what is 
meant by “distinct”. What counts as a distinct cause is key to the causal exclusion 
argument in the philosophy of mind as well as the overdetermination argument 
regarding determinates and determinables. 
Stoljar points out that the person making the causal exclusion argument faces a 
dilemma. If the notion of distinctness is too strong then it will not apply to mental vs 
physical states (or, as we shall see, to determinates and determinables). If the notion of 
distinctness is too weak the kind of overdetermination described is rampant and 
therefore the non-reductive physicalist (and, as we shall see, the realist about 
determinables) need not worry about it. 
Exclusion 1 is a form of the exclusion argument with a strong notion of distinctness. In 
particular, Stoljar goes for strong modal distinctness whereby “F is strongly modally 
distinct from G if and only if it is possible that F is instantiated and G is not and it is 
possible that G is instantiated and F is not.” (p. 266) In other words, in this iteration, 
two things must be entirely modally independent of each other to be distinct. This kind 
of exclusion argument may succeed against the dualist - someone who believes the 
mental and physical to be entirely different. If they say that my brain state causes me to 
pull my arm away from the hot pan, and that my mental state also causes me to pull my 
arm away, the event is overdetermined in a strong way. However, this kind of 
overdetermination will be rare. In fact, using such a strong notion of distinct benefits 
the non-reductive physicalist as they do not claim that mental and physical properties 
are strongly modally distinct. As a result, they do not risk this kind of strong 
overdetermination. 
Exclusion 1 will not hold for the non-reductive physicalist as they would not take it that 




Even if pain can be multiply realised, it seems that the realisers cannot exist without 
the pain existing. The non-reductive physicalist may argue that my pain neurons cannot 
fire without being accompanied pain. More importantly for our purposes, determinates 
and determinables are clearly not strongly modally distinct. You cannot have a 
determinate without a determinable. So, determinates and determinables do not count 
as distinct causes here and would not be target to this kind of causal exclusion 
argument. If anything, determinates and determinables are better at dodging the 
problem. Pain might be inhibited by a painkiller, but a determinate cannot ever exist 
without the determinable being instantiated.  
One might object that the notion of distinctness levelled in Exclusion 1 is too strong. We 
can reformulate the causal exclusion argument with a weaker definition of distinct. Let’s 
call Exclusion 2 a version of the causal exclusion argument which takes distinct to mean 
numerically distinct. In other words, everything which is not numerically identical, or 
identical in every way, is distinct. This argument will be very different from Exclusion 1. 
Exclusion 2 is better targeted at the non-reductive physicalist, attempting to catch them 
invoking competing causes.  
Stoljar points out that this form of the argument has many exceptions. If no numerically 
distinct things may be causes, we risk eliminating many plausible causes of things. For 
instance, my having 70 000 hairs on my head seems to justify my not being bald, but so 
does my having 80 000 hairs. These are numerically distinct, and don’t really seem to 
compete. More importantly, Stoljar gives a very, very, pertinent example of an exception 
to this argument. He mentions Sophie, the pigeon. She is pecking at something crimson. 
We could also say that she is pecking at something red. Yet these two are numerically 
distinct so they cannot both be causes for the pecking. “But then, by the exclusion 
principle that invokes numerical distinctness, being red is not relevant” (p. 273) This is 
very bizarre. If Sophie is trained to peck at all red things, can the redness of the thing 
she is pecking at really be deemed “not relevant”. Even more pertinently, Stoljar 
explicitly says that Yablo’s pigeon is “no counterexample” to Exclusion 1 (p. 273). It 
doesn’t fall under Exclusion 1 at all. So, whether determinates or determinables count 
as competing causes, and run afoul of the causal exclusion argument, is completely down 
to what definition of distinct (causes) we use. 
Determinates and determinables cannot be said to be distinct causes using a strong 




have the determinate without the determinable. And, in many metaphysical 
frameworks, we cannot have the determinable without the determinate. They are so 
joined that (as we saw in chapter 3) Shoemaker argues that the powers of the 
determinable are a subset of the powers of the determinate, so that these two are never 
in causal competition.  
I do not see determinates and determinables as being in causal competition. Their 
relationship is too intimate for them to be pulled apart as separate causes with 
competing powers. Stoljar does a good job at showing that much talk of competing 
causes is done in the absence of a clear understanding of what makes one cause distinct 
from another. As a result, we can find ourselves slipping between weak and strong 
notions of distinct, or between Exclusion 1 and Exclusion 2, arguing cross-purposes. Yet, 
as Stoljar puts it, “It is as if someone has made an argument about riverbanks and 
suggested it applied to piggybanks […] premises about strong modal distinction don’t 
give you conclusions about numerical distinctness.” (p. 273)  
 The challenge to those who say determinates and determinables provide distinct and 
competing causes is to define distinct. If Stoljar is right they risk requiring such a weak 
notion of distinct that counterexamples are abundant and overdetermination pops up all 
over the place.  
7.4.4 Loose ends 
In this section I will shed light on some lingering issues for the account of determinate 
and determinable properties and laws. The first issue has to do with the fact that some 
of these seem like ontological free lunches or can be deduced from others. The second 
pertains to Wilson’s claim that determinates give us the non-modal information about 
reality whereas the determinables give us the modal information. This allows me to 
move onto to the second half of the chapter where I talk about symmetric dependence 
and the many ways properties and laws are entwined. 
The first issue that springs to mind with my account is that some of the four categories – 
determinate properties, determinate laws, determinable properties, determinable laws – 
might seem to be ontological free lunches. I say this because having information about 




- If I know the determinable property, determinable law and what determinate 
property is instantiated, I can deduce the determinate law. 
- If I know the determinable property, determinable law and what determinate 
law is instantiated, I can deduce the determinate property. 
This might lead us to think that the determinate property or law is less fundamental or 
warrants less of a metaphysical commitment. It might seem like an ontological “free 
lunch”. However, things are not so simple. 
- If I know all the determinate properties, I can know the determinable 
property 
- If I know all (or perhaps even many) of the determinate laws, I can infer the 
determinable law 
It goes both ways. It is not just that we can infer determinate properties/laws but we can 
also infer determinable properties/laws given the right circumstances. Of course, there 
are some disanalogies here. For instance, we can infer the determinable from the set of 
all determinates alone. However, to infer a determinate law we need information from 
both levels i.e. we need to know the determinable law in addition to the determinate 
property. 
I have argued at length in this thesis that we need both determinates and determinables 
in our fundamental base. I will not resolve how exactly determinate properties, 
determinate laws, determinable properties, and determinable laws relate to each other. 
However, I hope to have shed light on the relationship between them. At the same time, 
I hope to have shown that it is not a relationship of ontological priority. Determinates 
and determinables share a close relation whereby determinates instantiate limiting 
conditions of determinables. Determinates must behave accordingly. Their close relation 
is seen by the examples of how we can, at times, deduce one from the other. However, we 
cannot fully explain determinates in terms of determinables or vice versa. 
As we have seen, attempts to do away with determinates or determinables fail. They 
leave something unaccounted for. We need fundamental determinates to act as 
‘existential witnesses’ to our universe. Without determinates there is nothing to 
differentiate our world from other worlds with the same functional laws. We need 




between determinates and determinables is not one of ontological priority. But what 
about the relationship between the properties and laws? 
As we have seen, those of a dispositionalist leaning take properties to be primary and 
laws to be secondary. Those of an ontic structural realist leaning will do the reverse. I 
will not advocate for either of these as I will be arguing for an alternative position: that 
properties and laws mutually depend on each other for their identity and existence. 
The other issue that needs addressing is Wilson’s (2012) claim that within power views 
of properties, determinables provide modal facts and determinates provide non-modal 
facts or ‘existential witnesses’. French (2014) echoes this view in the context of his Ontic 
Structural Realism. So, this view spans both the property debate and the structuralist 
debate, and I use it in constructing my hybrid view. However, some nuance and due 
diligence is needed here. While the idea that determinables give modal facts and 
determinates give non-modal facts gets at some truth, it risks oversimplifying matters. 
Let me clarify. 
We opposed determinates and determinables based on modality. Determinates are non-
modal and determinables are modal. While the second part may be true, the first is 
questionable. Can we really say that determinates are non-modal within a 
dispositionalist framework? I would argue that we cannot. After all, each determinate 
property will get its identity and essence purely from its dispositions i.e. its potential 
interactions with other properties. Modality seems written into its essence – modality is 
its nature. And, as Vetter points out, that modality may be unbounded given that 
maximally determinate properties are often multi-track (2015). A single charge can 
manifest in endless ways. It will manifest differently according to every possible set of 
other determinate charges that cross its path. 
On the other hand, there is an important insight in the view that determinables are 
modal and determinates provide non-modal facts. Determinables are pure potentiality. 
A set of determinables gives us no information about what is actually instantiated in our 
world. We cannot differentiate our world from other possible worlds with the same 
properties and laws based on determinables. Additionally, determinates do tell us what 
is instantiated in our world. They give specific initial conditions from which to explain 




The take-home message here should not be that determinates are non-modal, but that 
they provide non-modal facts or information. So, I take non-modal here to mean non-
modal in a qualified way. I do not mean that they are not modal in the sense that they 
are not dispositional. We cannot have entirely non-modal properties within the kind of 
dispositionalist/structuralist frameworks I have been looking at. However, we can have 
non-modal facts i.e. we can know which determinates are actually instantiated. So, the 
non-modality of determinates refers to this - to their providing these non-modal facts. 
With these loose ends behind me, I can finally proceed to my discussion of symmetric 
dependence. In the next section I will argue that symmetric dependence is a live option 
and, further, that properties and laws symmetrically depend on each other.  
 
7.5 Properties and laws: a case for symmetric dependence 
Earlier I looked at the ontologies of Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 
Realism. In their standard form both explain modality via two categories: determinate 
properties and determinable laws. However, they differ on which takes ontological 
priority. I argued that both sides had oversimplified ontologies. First, I argued that 
determinable laws require determinable properties. Laws are relations between 
properties. Determinable laws are relations between determinable, not determinate, 
properties. Determinate properties are too narrow to explain the determinable laws or to 
be what those laws are about. Second, I argued that if determinate properties exist, 
determinate laws exist. This seems almost trivial within a dispositionalist/structuralist 
framework. In this section, I dive further into the reason why properties seem to require 
laws, and vice versa. I look at how properties and laws depend on each other for their 
very identity and existence. 
Is the dispositional essentialist right to say that the modality runs from properties to 
laws? Is French right to say that the modality runs from laws to properties? I will argue 
that both are wrong. Properties and laws are entwined. Neither can be prior to the 
other.  In this section, I will look at different kinds of dependence. I start by looking at 
dependence for explanation in epistemology. I lay out three ways chains of reasoning 
can be founded: foundationalism (they end in a foundational reason), coherentism (they 




show the parallel in metaphysics where chains of ontological dependence can either 
bottom out (foundationalism), interdepend or go on forever (infinitism). I argue that the 
dependence between properties and laws is of the second kind – they depend on each 
other for their identity and existence. The connection between the two is such that we 
cannot establish links of ontological priority between them.  
7.5.1 Dependence in Epistemology 
The Agrippan Trilemma is one of the oldest problems in epistemology. According to this 
argument, when asked to justify any proposition we must choose between three options: 
A. We can rest our argument on a proposition that is not justified on the basis of 
any other proposition. This position is problematic because it bases knowledge on 
a dogmatic assumption, wh ich goes against the intuition that all knowledge-
claims are, in principle, justifiable. 
B. We can argue in a circle, so that we give the same criterion as before or use 
our conclusions to justify our premises. This option is problematic because 
circular reasoning is generally considered fallacious. 
C. We can give an infinite chain of reasons since every reason given "needs 
another such source [reason], which needs another, and so on ad infinitum, so 
that at no point do we establish anything.” (Empiricus, 2000, p. 166) 
Since each of these options is problematic, ancient sceptics like Sextus Empiricus used 
Agrippa's Trilemma to argue for the suspension of judgement (for we have no way to 
determine the truth or falsity of propositions without attempting to justify them in one 
of the aforementioned ways). However, epistemologists determined to salvage 
knowledge have proposed three "solutions" to the Agrippan Trilemma: Epistemic 
Foundationalism, Epistemic Coherentism and Epistemic Infinitism. 
The first possible solution to the Agrippan Trilemma is to bite the first bullet and 
endorse Epistemic Foundationalism. " According to the epistemic foundationalist, the 
human belief-structure is hierarchically arranged and well-founded: chains of beliefs 
ordered by a linear justification relation terminate in basic, non-inferentially justified 
beliefs” (Bliss, 2011, p. 61). Historically this has been the most popular option with 




be justified. Ernest Sosa (1980) proposes that there are levels of reasons. If we want to 
know why a proposition is justified, we move down from one level to another until we 
find the bottom level of indubitable propositions. Some philosophers favour isolating a 
kind of proposition which functions as our indubitable foundation e.g. propositions about 
our direct sensory experience. Most famously, Descartes attempted to find one 
indubitable proposition which he could not doubt - “I think therefore I am”. However, 
the way in which he went about building his system of knowledge is quite controversial. 
While Epistemic Foundationalism may be the most popular horn of the Agrippan 
Trilemma it is receiving increasing criticism. Critics claim that it either leads to 
dogmatism or falls into Epistemic Infinitism. At some point we reach the hopeful 
foundational reason or proposition. This will either be justified or will not be justified. If 
it is justified then we have not found a foundational belief. If it is not justified then, 
well, it is not justified. Further, given that there is no consensus on which beliefs don’t 
require further justification it seems arbitrary which ones we pick. “Pick your favourite 
property, F, that marks off basic propositions from non-basic ones.” (Klein, 2007, p. 4) If 
the epistemic foundationalist wishes to avoid the charge of being arbitrary he must 
attempt to justify his belief that b is justified because it has F which lands him in 
another regress. "Call this the meta-regress problem - any time you propose a regress-
ender, you do so on the basis of an argument, which needs due diligence. And that puts 
us back on the road to regress." (Aikin, 2009, p. 56) In light of this there has been a 
revival of alternative positions, namely Epistemic Coherentism and Epistemic 
Infinitism. 
The second solution to Agrippa's Trilemma is Epistemic Coherentism where justification 
depends on coherence with a particular set of beliefs, for instance, all of the agent’s 
other beliefs about the matter. This view is often criticised for involving circular 
reasoning, which is considered fallacious. However, BonJour argued that the charge of 
circularity was misleading since it relies on a linear conception of justification (where 
justification is transferred from one belief to another via inference in a linear sequence). 
So, in order to escape the circularity charge, he proposes a non-linear "holistic" view of 
justification where "there is no ultimate relation of epistemic priority" among the beliefs 
in a set (BonJour, 1976, p. 287). On this view, "The component beliefs are so related that 
each can be justified in terms of the others; the direction in which the justifying 
argument actually moves depends on which belief is under scrutiny" (Ibid). Whether this 




concern is up for debate, however a thorough consideration of Coherentism is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.14 
Finally, we have Epistemic Infinitism. Like epistemic foundationalists, epistemic 
infinitists view chains of reasoning as hierarchical and linear but, unlike 
epistemological foundationalists, they allow those chains to extend infinitely. This has 
been criticised for obvious reasons. First, we are finite beings who cannot possibly go 
through the infinite series of reasons needed to justify a proposition.  Second, it is 
difficult to see how a proposition can obtain justification from an infinite chain of 
reasoning. However, Epistemic Infinitism has become more sophisticated since 
Agrippa’s time.  
Peter Klein (2007) forwards a version of Epistemic Infinitism which he believes avoids 
the traditional criticisms of this view. Inspired by Wittgenstein, he argued that, in order 
to justify our claims, we need only provide as many reasons as the context demands. If 
someone asks me how I know there was an earthquake in Nepal, my answer - "because I 
saw it on the news" - should satisfy them.  I do not need to demonstrate, say, that the 
earth exists in order to prove my point. "The existence of the earth is rather a part of the 
whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me" (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 
28e). Jeanne Peijnenburgh and David Atkinson (2013) defend yet another sophisticated 
version of Epistemic Infinitism. They are inspired by the Bayesian Theory of 
Confirmation, where the more reasons we give for our claim the closer we get to the 
probability of it being true. Their view allows justification to emerge from the chain of 
reasoning itself, getting stronger as the number of reasons increases (Ibid, p. 559), as 
opposed to being transferred from one initial proposition onwards. 
7.5.2 Dependence in Metaphysics 
In the previous section we looked at three ways chains of reasoning can be founded: 
Epistemic Foundationalism, Epistemic Coherentism and Epistemic Infinitism. We saw 
that philosophers tend to prefer Epistemic Foundationalism – the view that chains of 
reasoning must end somewhere. However, problems have surfaced with this view 
leading to increasingly sophisticated versions of Epistemic Coherentism and Epistemic 
 
14 These thorns of the Agrippan Trilemma are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Haack 
proposed a hybrid between Epistemic Foundationalism and Coherentism where there is a web of 




infinitism. Recently metaphysicians have been drawing a strong metaphysical parallel 
with the Agrippan Trilemma. The formal structure of chains of ontological dependence 
is increasingly debated. Philosophers like Ricki Bliss (2011), Matteo Morganti (2014), 
Jonathan Schaffer (2010) and Naomi Thompson (2016) have pointed out that there are 
three options here too: Metaphysical Foundationalism, Metaphysical Interdependence or 
Metaphysical Infinitism.  
Metaphysical Foundationalism is the view that chains of ontological dependence 
terminate with something fundamental which does not ontologically depend on anything 
else. It is "orthodoxy in contemporary metaphysics" going "largely unchallenged" (Bliss, 
2011, p. 71) for it fits with the intuitive view of the universe as hierarchically 
structured. Or, in metaphysical jargon, the view that chains of ontological dependence 
are partially ordered and well-founded. By well-founded we mean that these chains 
terminate. By partially ordered we mean that these chains are asymmetric (two things 
cannot depend on each other), irreflexive (a thing cannot depend on itself) and transitive 
(if x depends on y, and y depends on z, x depends on z).  
Metaphysical Infinitism allows for chains of ontological dependence to go on infinitely. 
So, nothing is fundamental. This position allows for the foundationalist view that 
ontological dependence is asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive, however it does not 
agree with the idea that it must terminate (Bliss, 2011, p. 17). While I will not be 
concerned with this position here, it is worth noting that it is growing in sophistication 
and popularity. This is largely because of the recent interest and argumentation for the 
possibility of gunk (infinitely divisible substance). 
Metaphysical Interdependence entails a holistic view of reality where entities are 
symmetrically dependent. Entities are able to ontologically depend on each other. 
Historically, this has been the least popular solution to the trilemma. "Metaphysical 
coherentism [interdependence] offends the sensibility in a way that metaphysical 
Infinitism does not" (Bliss, 2013, p. 246). It requires us to question the idea that reality 
is partially ordered i.e. that chains of ontological dependence are asymmetric, transitive 
and irreflexive. Further, the idea that entities ontologically depend on each other is so 
odd that it can seem unintelligible. Yet there are good scientific and philosophical 




We have already covered the scientific motivations for metaphysical holism in earlier 
chapters. To recap, the idea that reality is built out of discrete and discernible individual 
objects fails. On further scrutiny quantum objects, particularly electrons, have been 
shown to be utterly indiscernible. They share all the same properties – mass, charge and 
size. Further, they cannot be spatiotemporally differentiated because they do not have 
well defined spatio-temporal trajectories. At most they can be quantified – we can say 
how many electrons are in a particular system. This squeezes traditional views, where 
reality is composed of a bottom level of atomistic entities, out of the picture. 
Quantum entanglement is responsible for increasing numbers of philosophers of science 
turning to the idea that reality is non-separable and holistic (Esfeld, 2009; Healey, 1991; 
Teller, 1986; Schaffer, 2010). As we saw, quantum objects are often entangled. They 
share certain properties which their parts lack.15 The classic example is that of two 
electrons with a joint spin of zero. They do not have individual spins. Rather, their 
individual spins are fixed at the exact moment we measure them at which point the 
entanglement breaks. If the first has positive spin, the second is instantly determined to 
have negative spin (or vice versa). Importantly, this is just the toy example. 
Entanglement is widespread, challenging pluralist foundationalist intuitions and 
breathing new life into the debate on metaphysical holism. I set aside the scientific 
motivations for metaphysical holism. These cannot be settled here. However, they are 
worth bearing in mind before dismissing holism out of hand.  
7.5.3 Symmetric Dependence 
Symmetric dependence is a case of Metaphysical Interdependence. If two entities are 
symmetrically or mutually dependent, neither can exist without the other. However, 
symmetric dependence is different from holism. Holism implies that all of reality is 
intertwined. I will not argue for this. My aim is humbler. I argue that at least in the 
case of properties and laws we have good reason to think that there is symmetric 
dependence. 
While Metaphysical Interdependence is unpopular, and few consider it to be an option, 
increasing numbers of philosophers have been flocking to this view. We have already 
 
15 Of course, there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics and this may not hold of 
some of the more exotic ones. However, quantum entanglement is widely accepted in the 





seen that there is increasing pressure from current physics to discard our ordinary 
foundationalist intuitions about dependence and consider holistic alternatives. However, 
there is also growing advocacy for symmetric dependence within metaphysics. Barnes 
(2018) and Naomi Thompson (2016) both argue that we should drop the expectation that 
ontological dependence is asymmetric. That is not to say that all ontological dependence 
is symmetric. Rather, ontological dependence could be asymmetric in some cases and 
symmetric in others. (A)symmetry does not enter the definition of ontological 
dependence. 
When people talk about ontological dependence, they often assume that it is 
asymmetric. However, Barnes and Thompson argue that this assumption is 
unwarranted (2018; 2016). The asymmetry assumption is partially due to a fear of 
circular reasoning. The issue is that, if A explains B and B is then used to explain A, 
there is a sense in which no new information is gained. Lowe (2012) argues against the 
power view of properties on the basis that properties get their identity from their 
relations to further properties. He takes this kind of symmetric dependence to indicate 
circular explanation which is not acceptable. The flip side is that many philosophers do 
not see this circularity as vicious at all. As we have seen, dispositional essentialists can 
argue that the modal nature of properties justifies them being identified in relation to 
each other. In addition, the circularity is not problematic because each property has a 
unique profile – a unique set of relations to further properties or a unique place in the 
property structure.  
More broadly, using the unpopularity of circular explanations in epistemology to argue 
against symmetric dependence in metaphysics is often deemed fallacious. One issue is 
that circular explanations are sometimes satisfactory. There are various sorts of 
examples for this. First, Thompson gives Achinstein’s examples of identity explanations 
“such as explaining the fact that the pH value of a solution is changing by appeal to the 
fact that the concentrations of hydrogen ions in that solution is changing, or explaining 
the fact that ice is water by appeal to the fact that ice is composed of H2O molecules.” 
(2016, p. 45) Another kind of example would be where ordinary beliefs support each 
other. For instance, I may believe that today is Wednesday because I believe that 
yesterday was Tuesday and Wednesday comes after Tuesday. If someone asks: “why do 
you think today is Wednesday?” and I say: “because yesterday was Tuesday”, it seems 




Another issue is that the epistemological debate on circularity does not necessarily map 
onto the metaphysical one. We cannot simply import conclusions on circularity in 
epistemology to metaphysics. One can accept one horn of the Agrippan Trilemma in 
epistemology but a different one in metaphysics. For instance, I can be sure that 
explanations go on forever (Epistemic Infinitism), and that humans have no 
foundational beliefs, but be persuaded that chains of ontological dependence must 
bottom out (Metaphysical Foundationalism). This is because I can have metaphysical 
reason to believe that reality is hierarchically structured without believing that humans 
have access to foundational reasons. Ultimately, we will have to weigh the evidence for 
metaphysical interdependence or symmetric dependence before dismissing it. And, as we 
shall see, Barnes argues that there are many examples from metaphysical debates 
where metaphysical interdependence appears to be the most plausible explanation for 
what is going on. 
A final reason why philosophers tend to assume that ontological dependence is 
asymmetric is because ontological dependence is often spoken of in the context of 
fundamentality, grounding, or in virtue of relations (Barnes, 2018, pp. 54-5). These 
notions arguably have asymmetry built into them. However, we saw that ontological 
dependence is the broader notion which incorporates any kind of dependence of one 
entity, or kind of entities, on another (or others). If one thing ontologically depends on 
another, it cannot exist independently of that thing. However, that does not tell us 
whether the dependence must be asymmetric at all. On the contrary, Barnes uses many 
examples from metaphysics to argue that we have reason to think that ontological 
dependence is non-symmetric. This is because there are many cases scattered across 
metaphysics where symmetric dependence may well be the best way to explain the 
phenomenon. 
- We looked at Barnes’ first example of symmetric dependence above. This is the 
relationship between immanent universals and their instantiations. Advocates of 
immanent universals take only universals with instantiations to exist. As a 
result, the existence of the universal appears to depend on the existence of its 
instantiation. At the same time, the instances depend on their universals. The 
universal informs what kind of thing the instance is. The instance is what it is in 
virtue of being an instance of the universal. While the dependence of the 
universal on the instance is a bit different from the dependence of the instance on 




other. The existence of the immanent universal requires that of the instance and 
vice versa.  
- Another example comes from trope theory. Trope theorists reject universals, 
seeing properties as particulars. If these resemble each other that resemblance is 
brute and not the result of them partaking in the same universal. A big problem 
for trope theory is the idea that there could be a free-floating mass. Yet we 
cannot imagine a free-floating mass without shape and size. “Part of what it is to 
have mass is to have shape and to have size, for example. And part of what it is 
to have shape is to have mass and to have size. And so on. These properties are 
all interdependent.” (pp. 58/9)  
- Finally, mathematical ontology – particularly non-eliminative structuralism – 
provides another case of possible symmetric dependence. On this view numbers 
are “nodes or positions in a mathematical structure. Non-eliminativist 
structuralists often say that each node of the structure depends on all the other 
nodes—and perhaps even on the structure itself as well.” (2018, p. 60) In this 
scenario the nodes (numbers) end up being dependent on the relations they bear 
to each other. At the same time, the relations are relations between numbers, so 
the relations are dependent on the nodes for their existence. This example is 
particularly interesting for our purposes. As we shall see, this kind of number 
differentiation shares striking similarities with how properties are differentiated 
within Dispositional Essentialism. 
In sum, Barnes gives a bunch of examples, across an array of topics in metaphysics, 
where dependence appears to be symmetric. She does not argue that any of these prove 
her view that dependence is non-symmetric. We may disagree with one or more of these 
examples. However, she argues that their “dialectical force when taken together is… 
greater than the sum of their parts.” (2018, p. 61) Barnes concludes that, against this 
array of examples, we simply cannot assume that ontological dependence is asymmetric. 
We have good reason to leave the possibility of symmetric dependence open. 
I agree with Barnes’ conclusions. I will not debate her examples here. Instead, my focus 
will be on another example: properties and laws within dispositionalism/structuralism. I 
argue that symmetric dependence is the best framework for understanding the 
relationship between properties and laws in these theories. Thus, if you are a 




7.5.4 The hybrid view – why properties and laws ought to be seen and symmetrically 
dependent in structuralism and dispositionalism 
In this section I return to my prime concern: accounting for modality. As we saw, 
Dispositional Essentialism takes properties to be fundamental and laws to be 
dependent. Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. It takes laws to be fundamental 
and properties to be dependent. Here I argue for a hybrid view, where properties and 
laws are both fundamental. Rather than one depending on the other, they symmetrically 
depend on each other. I will start by looking at the relationship between properties and 
laws in Dispositional Essentialism. This allows me to show that there is motivation for 
symmetric dependence within this view. After, I turn my attention to Ontic Structural 
Realism. I show that structuralism shares important similarities with dispositionalism. 
In both views properties and laws rely on each other for their identity and existence. 
Thus, there is motivation from structuralism for my symmetric dependence view. 
This view is a hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 
Realism’s views on modality. Dispositional Essentialism took the ontological dependence 
arrow to go from laws to the properties on which they depend. Ontic Structural Realism 
took the ontological dependence arrow to go from properties to the laws on which they 
depend. I reject both in the sense that I reject the ontological priority of one over the 
other. However, I do not reject the arguments for fundamental properties or 
fundamental laws. I take on board the points of both views, arguing that we need both 
properties and laws in our fundamental base. In my view, the necessity of the existence 
of properties for the existence of laws (and vice versa) is too strong to choose one as 
fundamental over the other. Properties and laws are interconnected and interdependent. 
7.5.4.1 Dispositional Essentialism 
According to Dispositional Essentialism properties give rise to laws. This claim is 
motivated by three things. First, it is motivated by the intuition shared by most 
metaphysicians that properties are fundamental. They are ways the world is, they 
cannot be explained away as dependent on laws or anything else.  Second, the rejection 
of Categoricalism and the view that properties are modal (explored at length in chapter 
2). Third, laws are relations between properties. This seems to require properties to be 
fundamental, and laws to be derivative. The laws are ontologically dependent on the 




depend on their relata for their existence. However, the apparent simplicity of this view 
disappears on further inspection. 
By putting properties first, and having them account for modality, the status of laws 
becomes unclear. Some argue that there is no role for laws as properties do all the work 
(Mumford, 2004). I will not be concerned with this view. The problems I highlight for the 
standard view are, if anything, more problematic for this view. The real issue concerns 
the fact that properties appear to be constituted by the relations they are supposed to 
give rise to or ground. This problem has been increasingly appreciated in the literature 
(Barker, 2013; Jaag, 2014; Tugby, 2015). This calls the very coherence of traditional 
Dispositional Essentialism into question. As we shall see, the idea that a thing is 
constituted by that which it grounds makes no sense.  
We saw that Barnes uses non-eliminative structuralism in mathematics as an example 
of possible symmetric dependence. For these structuralists numbers are seen as nodes in 
a graph. They get their identity via their relations to all other numbers. So, for instance, 
the number 2 is what it is because it is half of four, double 1, etc. Thompson argues, if 
this theory is true, we likely have symmetric dependence between the nodes (the 
numbers) and the relations between them. After all, the nodes get their essence from the 
relations. The nodes have no essence or existence beyond what relations they enter. At 
the same time, the relations are nothing more than connections between nodes. We need 
nodes to have the relations between them. While I won’t argue for any particular 
conception of numbers here, this very closely mirrors what happens in Dispositional 
Essentialism. 
Bird (2007) relies on graphs to illustrate the fundamental nature of properties within 
Dispositional Essentialism. He uses graphs to illustrate how properties can have 
separate essences and be individuated using only their relations to further properties. 
Where the mathematical structuralist takes the nodes in a graph to be numbers, Bird 
takes the nodes to be properties. He argues that these properties get their identity 
purely from their relations to further nodes. The relations are depicted as the arcs 
between nodes (see figure 1). The use of graphs thwarts criticism that we cannot 
individuate properties if they all rely on further properties for their identity. If the 
graph is asymmetric, each property will have a unique set of relations which 





Figure 1 (Bird, 2007, p. 146) 
Figure 1 depicts a couple of basic property graphs. The nodes represent properties 
within Dispositional Essentialism. The arcs represent the relations between the 
properties. Arrows are used to differentiate between stimuli and manifestations. An arc 
with an arrow pointing towards a node represents the stimulus of that property. An arc 
with an arrow pointing away from the node represents the manifestation of the node. 
The idea is that every property will have a unique stimulus/manifestation structure, so 
no two properties could be swapped. They each have a unique dispositional essence. This 
amounts to each property being individuated by a different set of relations (to further 
properties). 
Recall that Bird says that properties are dispositions to certain manifestations given 
certain stimulus. In other words, he says that properties are nothing over and above 
their stimulus manifestation relations. So, the arcs end up being constitutive of the 
nodes. It is worth acknowledging that some philosophers do not define dispositions this 
way (Vetter, 2015; Heil, 2017). They see properties as dispositions to certain 
manifestations, placing less emphasis on stimulus conditions. However, the key point 
remains. In Dispositional Essentialism the identity or essence of properties is entirely 
given by the relations that they enter into.  
The idea that properties get their essence and identity from their relations raises issues 
for Dispositional Essentialism. First, it challenges the idea that properties are 
fundamental and not laws. Dispositional essentialists want to say that the relata 
(properties) are fundamental but not the relations (laws). However, the relata here are 
entirely relationally constituted. So, we can never have relata without relations. It is not 
coherent to say that a thing can exist without the thing that constitutes it.  In other 
words, we cannot have a fundamental base of properties without laws. Properties cannot 




goes beyond properties and laws necessarily co-existing. They co-exist because the 
properties are constituted by the laws. 
The second problem concerns the idea that properties give rise to laws. Traditional 
dispositional essentialists have in mind a particular, asymmetric, kind of relationship 
between properties and laws. This relationship looks a lot like grounding. Hence, Jaag 
(2014) forwarded the objection in those terms. According to him the issue stems from the 
nature of the grounding relationship. Grounding is an asymmetric relation meaning 
that if one thing grounds a second thing, the second thing cannot in turn ground the 
first. Grounding is not circular. What happens if properties ground laws? If properties 
ground laws, and properties are constituted by laws, circularity ensues. This is because 
the very thing that grounds laws, is constituted by those same laws. Another reason 
why grounding looks irreflexive is that grounded entities are meant to be derivative, so 
they are less fundamental than their grounds. If properties ground laws, laws are less 
fundamental or derived from properties. Then it is not clear how properties can be 
constituted by those derivative laws. 
The idea that properties are constituted by the laws they give rise to is a massive 
problem for Dispositional Essentialism. One issue is that the circularity negates the 
grounding (or asymmetric dependence) claim, making traditional Dispositional 
Essentialism untenable. Other philosophers – like Stephen Barker (2013) and Siegfried 
Jaag (2014) - question whether Dispositional Essentialism can explain modality at all 
given this state of affairs. However, there is another way to get Dispositional 
Essentialism out of this pickle. In particular, we can argue that properties and laws 
symmetrically depend on each other (Ibid; Yates, 2018). Asymmetry may be written into 
the notion of grounding, but it is not written into the notion of ontological dependence. 
The option of symmetric dependence remains open and, as we saw, there are good 
motivations for it. 
David Yates (2018) picks up on these issues for Dispositional Essentialism. He points 
out that choosing to give ontological priority to properties or laws puts us in a chicken 
and egg scenario. Which comes first? The property or the law? The chicken or the egg? 
Taking the relations to be prior raises the issue of what they are relations of. Taking the 
properties to be prior clashes with the view that they are relationally individuated 




preferable here” (2018, section 4). In his view, symmetric dependence best makes sense 
of the situation:  
“Symmetric grounding [read ‘symmetric dependence’] is a promising way of 
making sense of relational individuation, and should be seen as a cornerstone of 
structuralist ontologies in general, rather than an additional commitment of the 
particular ontology I have defended here.” (Ibid) 
Here structuralism is used broadly to refer to all views where there is relational 
individuation i.e. where things are individuated purely based on their relations to 
further things. Thus defined, Dispositional Essentialism is definitely a form of 
structuralism. Yates’ view is that symmetric dependence not only ought to be accepted 
within structuralist views but ought not be seen as an additional commitment to a 
structuralist view. In other words, he sees symmetric dependence as built into 
structuralism. I take this natural segue into the discussion of properties and laws within 
Ontic Structural Realism. Showing that there is good reason to think that properties 
and laws are symmetrically dependent within Ontic Structural Realism (as well as 
Dispositional Essentialism) lays the foundation for my hybrid view.  
7.5.4.2 Ontic Structural Realism 
I ended the previous subsection with Yates’ claim that structuralism and symmetric 
dependence go hand in hand. This is because, within structuralism, objects are 
relationally individuated. As such, they rely on their relations for their identity and vice 
versa. The idea that relations depend on relata may not sound new. We expect relations 
to depend on their relata in the way “being 5 metres apart from” depends on the things 
which are 5 meters apart from each other. However, the relation “being 5 meters apart 
from” and the things which bear that relation do not depend on each other for their 
identity. Many different relata could fulfil this relation, and then cease to fulfil it. 
Neither the relation nor the relata would have fundamentally changed. This is not what 
is meant by relational individuation. Within structuralism relata have no content, 
identity or existence beyond their relations and vice versa. 
We looked at relational individuation and symmetric dependence in Dispositional 
Essentialism. On this view, properties are nothing over and above their dispositions to 




instance, charge is nothing more than its disposition to repel like charges and attract 
opposite charges at a certain rate. Here I will consider relational individuation and 
symmetric dependence in the context of Ontic Structural Realism. I will start by looking 
at Esfeld and Lam’s (2011) incorporation of symmetric dependence into the view. They 
argue that objects and properties are symmetrically dependent. I lay this out as a 
precedent and example of taking symmetric dependence into Ontic Structural Realism. 
However, contra Esfeld and Lam, my interest is not in objects (I remain neutral on the 
status of objects in this thesis). Thus, after laying out the precedent, I turn my attention 
to my object of study: modality. I argue that we ought to view properties and laws as 
symmetrically dependent within Ontic Structural Realism. 
Current science is hostile to traditional objects, which are discernible and have separate 
properties (for more details see section 6.2.1). This has led to revisionary views of 
objects. On the farthest end of the spectrum we have ontic structural realists like 
Ladyman and Ross who claim that there are no objects, structure is all there is (2007). 
However, their ontology is unclear. At times it appears that they only posit abstract 
structure but have yet to account for what is concretely instantiated in our world. I have 
focused on French (2014), Esfeld (2004, 2009) and Esfeld and Lam (2011), as French is a 
leading figure of the movement, and these philosophers are highly metaphysically 
engaged. They aim to shed light on the ontological underpinnings of the views, showing 
how exactly “structure” – a slippery term - can give rise to reality as we know it. 
What French, Esfeld and Lam can all agree on is that there is no room for traditional 
objects in our ontology. They also agree that the distinction between objects and 
properties is conceptual rather than ontological (French, 2010; Esfeld and Lam 2011). 
However, they do this within different frameworks. French is eliminative about objects. 
He proposes that we do away with them altogether, having only determinable laws and 
determinate properties (their instantiations) in our fundamental ontology. Esfeld and 
Lam, on the other hand, accept objects in a qualified sense. 
Esfeld and Lam (2011) make the link between structuralism, relational individuation 
and symmetric dependence that Yates alludes to (2018). Recall that Ontic Structural 
Realism is the view that only structure exists. Structure can mean different things 
depending on the context. It can mean mathematical structure, abstract structure and 
concrete structure for instance. Esfeld is clear to define structure in terms of properties. 




properties, namely relations instead of intrinsic properties, requiring more than one 
object in order to be instantiated.” (2009, p. 184) 
The idea that structure is relational fits with the critique of structuralism given before. 
In mathematical structuralism or dispositionalism, the things in question (numbers or 
properties) are identified by their place in the structure i.e. by their relations to further 
numbers/properties. This is where the notion of relational individuation comes in. On 
these views, what is distinctive about the object of study is how it relates to its peers, or 
its place in a wider structure, there is no transcendent individuation to be had. This is 
how Esfeld and Lam (2011) view objects. 
Traditional metaphysics takes objects to be prior to properties or relations. Esfeld and 
Lam reject this. However, they do not go as far as other ontic structural realists who 
take the relations to be prior to the objects. Esfeld and Lam see objects and relations as 
equally fundamental and symmetrically dependent. For Esfeld structures are 
properties, more specially relations. And, these relations require more than one object to 
exist to be instantiated (2011). This is because relations are, necessarily, relations 
between things. We cannot have relations without things which relate.  
Not only do relations (here properties) need relata (objects), but the reverse holds too. 
Given Esfeld and Lam’s wider scientific and metaphysical commitments they cannot 
prioritise objects over relations. To do so would require the objects to be primitively or 
transcendently individuated. As we saw, quantum objects are not discernible from each 
other. Further, they are often entangled making their independence and separability 
questionable. In their view, there is no transcendent individuality of objects. Nothing 
differentiates one object from another (2011, p. 152). They accept a numerical plurality 
of objects but that is about it. This lands objects in an interesting position. They are no 
more than nodes in a structure of relations. “Objects are ontologically dependent upon 
relations because they don’t have any intrinsic properties, so primitive modal relations 
are the only natures they get to have” (Yates, 2018, p. 22). Esfeld and Lam see 
properties and objects as mutually dependent. Properties are ways objects are, objects 
are the things that are the ways (that bear the properties). 
In sum: Yates (2018) claimed that structuralist ontologies are naturally committed to 
symmetric dependence. This is because structuralist ontologies share a common feature: 




are individuated by their relations to other numbers. In Dispositional Essentialism 
properties are individuated by their relations to further properties. Esfeld and Lam 
(2011) argued that in Ontic Structural Realism objects are symmetrically dependent on 
the relations they enter into too. However, my focus in this thesis is not on objects. As I 
move between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism, I remain 
neutral on how to conceptualise objects. Instead, my focus has been on modality. In 
particular, I have focused on properties and laws. In my view, these two follow the same 
pattern of relational individuation and, as such, ought to be viewed as symmetrically 
dependent within Ontic Structural Realism. 
In order to simplify our discussion of properties and laws within Ontic Structural 
Realism, I set Esfeld and Lam (2011) aside for now. I return to French’s work as it 
isolates the topic of properties and laws. French sees Ontic Structural Realism as a 
reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism. For French determinables – or 
laws/symmetries - are fundamental (2014, p. 290). Determinates or properties are 
referred to as “dependent” upon the laws (ibid, p. 264) or metaphysical by-products of 
the laws and symmetries (p. 285). Of course, as we saw, he also says that the 
fundamental basis of the world cannot be fully determinable, so that there are 
determinates in his fundamental base (p. 290). However, I set this tension aside for the 
time being. 
In section 7.3 I revised Ontic Structural Realism so that there were also determinable 
properties and determinate laws in the ontology. This is because, I argued, that 
determinable laws are relations between determinable properties. Determinate 
properties instantiate determinate laws. This section will argue that the properties and 
laws should be viewed as symmetrically dependent. I have in mind that determinable 
laws are symmetrically dependent on determinable properties, and determinate 
properties are symmetrically dependent on determinate laws. My argument for this 
dependence will help shed light on why we need determinable properties and 
determinate laws in addition to determinable laws and determinate properties.  
My proposal is that we move from determinable laws grounding determinable 
properties, to these two being symmetrically dependent. The root of this argument stems 
from the very nature of laws. First, we must ask ourselves what French means by laws. 
In particular, does he mean completely abstract mathematical relations or ordinary laws 




Newton’s laws and Coulomb’s law (2014, chapter 9). Thus, I take it that by laws he 
means the same thing as the dispositional essentialist: laws of nature or scientific laws. 
French wants to fundamentalise ordinary laws of nature – or scientific laws. In chapter 
2 we saw that these are functional or determinable laws. So far so good. Where I diverge 
from French is with regards to his simple picture of modality where determinable laws 
give rise to determinate properties. In my view, fundamental determinable laws require 
fundamental determinable properties. After all, laws of nature like Coulomb’s law, the 
law of gravitation, the law of thermodynamics, and even the symmetries French 
mentions separately, all share a common feature. The laws all relate determinable 
properties. 
Coulomb’s law relates the determinable properties of charge and distance to give us a 
general recipe for how charged objects interact. Newton’s law of gravitation relates the 
determinables of mass and distance to give us a general equation outlining how objects 
attract each other. This is the recipe of a law of nature, it relates determinable 
properties to give a determinable insight into their behaviour – an equation that we can 
apply to know how an object of any magnitude of the determinable in question will 
behave. 
If French’s determinable laws are relations between properties, then their existence 
requires the existence of the properties they relate. Let’s assume that Coulomb’s law is a 
real law, that it captures the relations between real properties and will not be 
overturned in future. If “charge” and “distance” did not exist it is not clear how 
Coulomb’s law, as a relation between these quantities, could exist. Further, these 
properties rigidly designate the law. Coulomb’s law could not simply hold between any 
properties. In structuralism, the laws are almost internal to the properties because the 
properties have unique relational essences which the laws codify. Further, it is worth 
noting here that the determinable law requires the existence of the determinable 
property. Coulomb’s law is about “charge” not about a collection of charges. After all, 
within French’s framework the only way to account for modality is from the top – from 
the generality – down. He would not allow bottom-up explanations of determinables in 
terms of collections of determinates. He believes that the collection of cases cannot 
adequately ground the high-level modal regularity (2014, p. 247). Indeed, this is at the 




At the same time, the existence of determinable properties will depend on that of 
determinable laws – hence we have symmetric dependence. This is because, in keeping 
with ontic structural realist ideals, French cannot resort to Categoricalism or 
transcendent individuation for his properties. Properties have no essence or existence 
beyond their relations. Such is the nature of structuralism. Properties cannot get any 
identity if not from relations, so they depend on laws.  
I have shown that within Ontic Structural Realism determinable laws require 
determinable properties and vice-versa. I will not give a detailed explanation for why 
the same will hold of determinate properties and determinate laws because it repeats 
what has been said before. Determinate properties are what they are in virtue of their 
place in a structure. There is no transcendent individuation. Thus, determinate 
properties will be individuated relationally (via determinate laws). Determinate laws 
are relations between determinate properties. Thus, determinate laws can only exist 
and be legitimate if the determinate properties they relate exist. 
 
7.6 The hybrid, detailing the view and tying up loose ends 
In this chapter I have argued for a number of changes to Dispositional Essentialism and 
Ontic Structural Realism which I say constitute a hybrid view. In particular, I argued 
that their modal ontologies of determinate properties and determinable laws were 
incomplete. I also argued that the idea that laws asymmetrically depend on properties 
or vice versa does not work. I argued for a hybrid view by showing that properties and 
laws depend on each other for their identity and existence. In my view, both are 
equifundamental and mutually dependent. In this section I will recap some of these 
arguments, elaborating on my view and why it is a hybrid view between Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. 
I will start by sketching a hybrid view between Standard Dispositional Essentialism 
(figure 3) and Ordinary Ontic Structural Realism (figure 7). This view involves a 
symmetric dependence between determinate properties and determinable laws (see 
figure 10). This allows me to recap some of my arguments from 7.1 and 7.2 in justifying 
why I do not go for this obvious kind of hybrid view on the basis that it is incomplete. 




depend on determinate laws, and determinable properties symmetrically depend on 
determinable laws (figure 11). I will explain why I take this view to be a hybrid between 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. I will also clarify its status 
regarding objects. It is neutral on objects - compatible with anything from traditional 
views to radical eliminativist views of objects. 











Figure 10. This depicts the overlap, or merger, between Standard 
Dispositional Essentialism’s modal ontology and Ordinary Ontic 
Structural Realism’s (figures 3 and 7). Without further argumentation, 
it could look like what I mean by a hybrid view. 
Talk of a hybrid view between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism 
could bring figure 10 to mind. Figure 10 is what you would get if you superimposed 
figure 3 (Standard Dispositional Essentialism) and figure 7 (Ordinary Ontic Structural 
Realism). Standard Dispositional Essentialism takes determinable laws to ontologically 
depend on determinate properties. Ordinary Ontic Structural Realism takes 
determinate properties to ontologically depend on determinable laws. Thus, it could 
seem like a hybrid view would have determinate properties and determinable laws 
symmetrically depend on each other. 
The basic hybrid view (figure 10) is not my hybrid view. It is incomplete because the 
views it is a hybrid of - Standard Dispositional Essentialism and Ordinary Ontic 
Structural Realism – are incomplete. These views use two categories to explain 





In 7.2 I looked at the problem from Dispositional Essentialism’s point of view. 
Dispositional properties naturally generate laws within this view. However, determinate 
properties cannot generate the determinable laws. I argued that determinable 
properties were necessary to explain determinable laws, on the basis that determinable 
laws are relations between determinable – not determinate – properties. Determinate 
properties simply cannot fulfil this role. That said, determinate properties will still be 
modal/dispositional and generate the corresponding determinate laws. This is because 
the lawlike relations are internal to the properties at hand. 
In section 7.3 we saw that this holds of Ontic Structural Realism as well. Determinable 
laws seem to require determinable properties. This is because determinable laws are 
relations between these determinable properties. At the same time, we will need 
determinate laws. This is because determinate properties almost trivially, or by 
definition, instantiate determinate laws. What makes a determinate property what it is 
is its structural or relational profile, that profile is the determinate law. Again, we 
cannot have a property without a corresponding law. This set the scene for the previous 
section where I argued that properties and laws are symmetrically dependent. 
In 7.5 I argued that both Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism are 
inadequate. They differ over whether properties or laws come first, and over which 
explains which. However, as we have seen, for every property there is a law and for 
every law there is a property. I argued that these ought to be viewed as equally 
fundamental and symmetrically dependent. This is because properties get their identity 
from their relations to further properties or, in other words, the laws they partake in. At 
the same time, laws are relations between properties and so they get their identity and 
existence from the properties in question. Properties and laws depend on each other for 
their identity and existence. Asking which came first is like asking “Which came first? 
The chicken or the egg?” Hence, my hybrid view is the one depicted in the following 

















Figure 11 depicts my hybrid view. Determinable properties and laws 
are symmetrically dependent, as well as determinate properties and 
laws. The traced line represents the relationship between determinates 
and determinables. 
Figure 11 depicts my hybrid view. Determinate properties and determinate laws are 
symmetrically dependent. They are also equifundamental because one cannot be deemed 
prior to the other. Determinable properties and determinable laws symmetrically 
depend too. They are equifundamental because one cannot be deemed prior to the other. 
The relations of symmetric dependence are depicted by the two-way arrows.  
The traced lines represent the relationship between the determinable and determinate 
levels, discussed in section 7.4. I did not attempt to work out all details of the 
relationship here. Rather, I highlighted the ways in which they are related and, more 
importantly, the ways in which they are not related. On the one hand, determinates 
under the same determinable resemble each other in a way they cannot resemble other 
determinates. Further, they are determinates or instantiations of determinables. 
However, I argued that this relationship is not one of ontological priority or relative 
fundamentality. We cannot metaphysically explain the determinate level via the 
determinable level or vice versa. We cannot say that one level is ontologically dependent 
on the other, or eliminate one level from our fundamental base, without leaving 
something out. 
My symmetric dependence view can be seen either as a rejection or a merger of 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. Dispositional Essentialism 





on laws. In a sense I reject both claims. I reject them insofar as the dependence is meant 
to be asymmetric. I have shown that it is extremely difficult to establish ontological 
priority among properties and laws. Properties and laws depend on each other for their 
identity and existence.  
Esfeld and Lam (2011, p. 150) claim that objects and properties can only be separated in 
thought not reality. Similarly, I claim that properties and laws can only exist separately 
in thought, not in reality. We cannot have a property be instantiated without a 
respective law being instantiated and vice versa. Even at the determinable level, for a 
determinable law to exist its counterpart determinable properties must exist.  
My view can be seen as a rejection of Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 
Realism. However, I see it as a merger. I take the insights of both views and bring them 
together. I reject the dispositional essentialist view that properties metaphysically 
explain or give rise to laws. However, I completely accept that laws depend on properties 
for their identity and existence. Similarly, I reject French’s claim that properties are 
dependent on laws. I reject it because the dependence only runs one way with properties 
being ontologically secondary to laws. However, I completely accept that properties 
depend on laws in a broader sense (without the assumption that that dependence is 
asymmetric). 
In my view Dispositional Essentialism is right to say that laws depend on properties and 
Ontic Structural Realism is right to say that properties depend on laws. Once we remove 
the assumption that the dependence is asymmetric, these two claims are compatible 
with each other. On my view, properties depend on laws and laws depend on properties. 
Whereas Dispositional Essentialism’s dependence arrow goes from laws to the 
fundamental properties on which they depend, and Ontic Structural Realism’s goes from 
properties to the fundamental laws on which they depend, on the hybrid view the 
dependence arrow goes both ways (see figure 11). Properties and laws are on equal 
footing. They are equifundamental and mutually dependent. 
As I draw this chapter to a close it is worth restating that my interest has been in 
modality – properties and laws. As such, my view is a hybrid between Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism with regards to properties and laws. I merge 
their ontological underpinnings for modality. In that sense the merger is qualified. I 




settling the issue of how we ought to view objects across these theories is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. I am partial to the scientific arguments for a rejection of traditional 
or classical objects, but a positive account of how to view objects in light of these 
arguments is a topic for another thesis.  
The second reason why I have avoided the topic of objects is that I do not see it as 
important for my view. My hybrid view is consistent with both an acceptance of 
traditional objects (as is often the case within Dispositional Essentialism), a qualified 
view of objects (e.g. Esfeld and Lam’s (2011)), or a total elimination of objects (as French 
proposes). These stances are all separate and compatible with the view of modality 
forwarded in this thesis. After all, the hybrid view is about modality – properties and 
laws – and does not touch on objects. In fact, I could argue that the hybrid view is an 
umbrella, opening the way for a spectrum of hybrid views to emerge. In philosophy there 
are often as many variations of a view as there are philosophers. Here I leave room for a 
variety of hybrid views depending on the specific stances taken on objects. The core of 





8. The hybrid view –  a summary and why it is the best of both 
worlds 
In the previous chapter I introduced my hybrid view. It is a hybrid between 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. Dispositional Essentialism 
takes determinate properties to be fundamental, and determinable laws to be 
ontologically dependent on them. Ontic Structural Realism reverses the dependence. It 
takes determinate properties to ontologically depend on determinable laws. I filled out 
the ontologies of both, to include determinate laws (as well as properties) and 
determinable properties (as well as laws). I argued that properties and laws 
symmetrically depend on each other. In particular, I argued that determinate properties 
and determinate laws are symmetrically dependent, and that determinable properties 
and determinable laws are symmetrically dependent. My argument was based on the 
fact that, within structuralism and dispositionalism, properties and laws depend on 
each other for their identity and existence. 
I addressed many of the objections to my hybrid view at the end of the previous chapter. 
I addressed two major concerns:  the causal overdetermination from realism about 
determinates and determinables (7.4.1-7.4.3) and concerns about symmetric dependence 
(section 7.5). Additionally, I explained why my view can be said to be a hybrid and how 
it differs from Esfeld and Lam’s symmetric dependence view (section 7.6). In this 
chapter, I will address a few lingering concerns which have only been briefly 
acknowledged so far. In section 8.1, I look at the potential worry that my hybrid view 
will be a bad combination of the previous two views. The worry is that it would be 
subject to the problems of both views, so it would be the worst of both worlds. Both 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism have unique selling points and 
shortcomings. I will be arguing that the hybrid view avoids the shortcomings of these 
views while retaining and superseding the best they have to offer. The hybrid view is 
the best of both worlds. 
In section 8.2 I address a final concern for my view. The concern is that my view is less 
parsimonious than Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. This is 
because my view posits determinate properties, determinate laws, determinable 
properties and determinable laws. However, Dispositional Essentialism and the French-




determinable laws. All else equal, more parsimonious explanations are considered 
preferable, so this is problematic for my view. I respond by saying that all else is not 
equal; the hybrid view has a strong explanatory edge over the other two or a simple 
combination of both. What the others have in apparent parsimony, they lack in 
explanation. Further, I argue that this parsimony is only apparent. Properties and laws 
are flipsides of the same coin. They are entwined such that we cannot really have the 
one without the other. We cannot have the determinate property without the 
determinate law, or vice versa. And we cannot have the determinable property without 
the determinable law, or vice versa. 
 
8.1 The best of both worlds 
One potential worry for the hybrid view is that it will absorb the problems of the views it 
is a hybrid of – it will be the worst of both worlds so to speak. It will not have the 
explanatory edge Dispositional Essentialism claims over Ontic Structural Realism nor 
the explanatory edge Ontic Structural Realism claims over Dispositional Essentialism. 
Both views have unique selling points and there is a risk that merging them into a 
hybrid view will see those benefits lost. Worse, it might inherit the problems of both the 
previous views. In what follows I argue that this is not the case. The hybrid view avoids 
the problems associated with these views. Additionally, it has the explanatory benefits 
of both views and more. It is the best of both worlds. 
I start by surveying the benefits and problems associated with the Bird-style 
Dispositional Essentialism and French-style Ontic Structural Realism we have looked at 
in this thesis. As I have already been through these throughout the thesis, my 
exposition will be brief. I give a summary, highlighting where one view has a problem 
and how the other view has been said to solve it. This allows me to get to the core of 
what motivates these views, showing that my hybrid view is a match for them. The 
hybrid view retains the advantages of the previous two while avoiding the pitfalls 
associated with them. 
8.1.1 Problems for Dispositional Essentialism 
The two main relevant problems for Bird-style Dispositional Essentialism are: 




properties give rise to laws. Regarding the first difficulty – accounting for modality – 
recall that Bird-style Dispositional Essentialism takes determinate properties to be 
fundamental and account for laws of nature. It is appealing as a way to do away with 
regularity views of laws which leave modality brute. Rather than leaving modality brute 
or unexplained, laws are metaphysically explained by the properties. The dispositions of 
properties generate laws of nature. As we saw in chapter 2, this view faces serious 
challenges. In its traditional form it fails at doing what it set out to do – account for 
modality. It is not clear how determinate properties can account for determinable laws. 
This is because it is not clear how the specific instances could band together to generate 
the abstract, general law. Rather, we might expect the dependency to run in reverse. 
Rather than the general law depending on its instances, we might expect the instances 
to depend on the general law (Wilson, 2012; French, 2014). 
The issue accounting for determinable laws stems from the fact that standard (Bird-
style) Dispositional Essentialism has determinate properties accounting for 
determinable laws. The issue is that determinate properties only encode their 
determinate dispositions. They at best explain determinate laws. Determinate 
properties cannot explain the dispositions of all other determinates under the same 
determinable. They cannot explain the determinable law. We can modify Dispositional 
Essentialism to cope with the issue of accounting for determinable laws. As we saw in 
chapter 3, if the dispositional essentialist adds determinable properties to her ontology 
the problem is fixed (Wilson, 2012).  
Determinable laws are relations between determinable (not determinate) properties. By 
adding determinable properties to our fundamental base, we have a plausible 
explanation for determinable laws. Determinable laws can be explained as ontologically 
dependent on determinable properties.  Within Dispositional Essentialism determinable 
properties will have dispositions. Those dispositions will give rise to laws. In the case of 
determinable properties, they will give rise to determinable laws which encode the 
determinable dispositions. That said, this sort of move has not received much attention 
in the literature. In the absence of debate about introducing determinable properties, 
French’s presents his Ontic Structural Realism as the way out of this conundrum. 
Ontic Structural Realism and Dispositional Essentialism share a project: giving a solid 
metaphysical account of natural modality. According to French, Dispositional 




succeeds. Thus, if we want to account for modality within a dispositionalist/structuralist 
framework we ought to favour Ontic Structural Realism. French solves the issue by 
inverting the ontological dependence. Rather than explaining the laws as dependent on 
the properties, he does the reverse. In his Ontic Structural Realism, laws are part of the 
fundamental base of reality and need no explaining. Rather, the properties are what 
needs explaining. They are “metaphysical by-products” (2014, p. 285) or “dependent” 
(ibid, p. 264) on the laws. He avoids the issue of explaining the general law via its 
instances by explaining the instances via the general law. Ontic Structural Realism is a 
controversial view but, on this point, it does have an explanatory edge over Dispositional 
Essentialism.  
The second difficulty for Dispositional Essentialism was covered in 7.5.4. Briefly, it is 
the incoherence with the idea that dispositional properties generate laws. Laws are 
ontologically dependent on properties for their existence. Yet, the properties in question 
seem to be entirely constituted by their relations to further properties (laws). Recall that 
dispositional properties have no categorical basis. They get their essence and identity 
entirely from their dispositions, or their relations to further properties. This seems 
incoherent as a thing cannot ground something on which it is dependent (Barker, 2013; 
Jaag, 2014; Tugby, 2015).  
As we saw in chapter 7, grounding is by definition asymmetric, transitive and 
irreflexive. While dispositional essentialists do not necessarily use that term, there is a 
presupposition that this is the case with all ontological dependence. It is assumed that if 
properties ground laws, they cannot be dependent on the laws. However, in the previous 
chapter I argued against the assumption that dependence is asymmetric. Ontological 
dependence is an umbrella term for a variety of relations, some of which may be 
asymmetric. However, the possibility of symmetric dependence is well motivated and 
becoming well established in the literature (Esfeld, 2009; Thompson, 2016; Barnes, 
2018; Yates, 2018). 
Ontic Structural Realism does not necessarily come across better than standard 
Dispositional Essentialism when it comes to the explanation of properties/laws. 
Dispositional Essentialism suffers from incoherence if it takes laws to be asymmetrically 
dependent on properties. French’s Ontic Structural Realism inverts the dependence. 
However, inverting the dependence so that relata are asymmetrically dependent on 




they rely on relational individuation (see 7.5.4). Briefly, in both Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism relata are individuated purely via their 
relations to further relata. As such both have difficulty establishing ontological priority 
between relations and relata. 
Views which embrace relational individuation struggle when they try to explain 
relations via relata or vice versa. Relations require the relata to exist, yet the relata are 
themselves constituted by the relations. It is hard to say which came first – relations or 
relata, chicken or egg. As we saw in section 7.5.4, the problem goes away in views where 
relations and relata are symmetrically dependent (Yates, 2018). This is the motivation 
for Esfeld and Lam’s view (2011) where objects and relations symmetrically depend. It is 
also the motivation for my hybrid view. My hybrid view, unlike Esfeld and Lam’s view, 
is not concerned with objects. It is neutral on that front (see section 7.6 for a full 
discussion of how my view differs from Esfeld and Lam’s). My view is concerned with 
modality, allowing properties and laws to be symmetrically dependent on each other. 
 
8.1.2 Problems for Ontic Structural Realism 
The main objections for Ontic Structural Realism stem from its revisionist ontology. In 
particular, it requires a radical reconceptualisation of objects. It also requires a 
counterintuitive top-down approach to modality. Starting with the issue of objects, every 
iteration of this view is radically revisionary. In its most radical form, it eliminates 
objects altogether. Its less radical form takes objects to depend on properties (French, 
2010, 2014). Even moderate Ontic Structural Realism is revisionary, seeing objects 
equifundamental and mutually dependent on properties (Esfeld and Lam, 2011). 
The revisionary stance on objects is well justified to the ontic structural realist. After all, 
their departure point is an aversion to Categoricalism coupled with the work that has 
gone on in quantum mechanics covered in chapter 6. That said, the idea that objects are 
prior to their properties, or exist independently in their own right, is one of the most 
intuitive and widespread of philosophical assumptions. Few philosophers are willing to 
be deflationist or eliminative about objects. It clashes with how we experience the world, 
the language we use to describe our experience of the world and hence how we have 




for the view of course – our intuitions are often wrong. Further, the ontic structural 
realist would argue that we have good reason to discard our intuitions here. 
Nonetheless, the radical revisions Ontic Structural Realism requires keep many 
philosophers at bay. Let’s see how Dispositional Essentialism and my hybrid view fair 
on this count. 
Dispositional Essentialism does not require revisions to our concept of objects. It is 
primarily a view about properties. In particular, it is the view that dispositional 
properties account for modality. However, by and large dispositional essentialists 
appear to have traditional ontologies. They never challenge fundamental objects or 
engage with the literature on this matter. Further, they generally take properties to be 
universals (e.g. Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2007) which, again, reinforces the association with 
a traditional ontology. The fact that Dispositional Essentialism does not require a 
radical and revisionary ontology on every count is a plus for many (again, that is not to 
say that they are right or that our intuitions are a guide to truth here). 
Similarly, my hybrid view is a view about modality. It is the view that properties and 
laws are symmetrically dependent. The hybrid view is entirely neutral on the nature of 
objects. However, this neutrality is more purposeful than the dispositional essentialist’s. 
It takes into account the literature on quantum mechanics that inspires Ontic 
Structural Realism, allowing for that sort of reading, without committing either way. As 
noted at the end of the last chapter, the hybrid view can be seen as an umbrella term for 
multiple hybrid views. This is because the hybrid view of modality can be paired with all 
sorts of views about objects. There can be versions which are eliminative about objects, 
traditional about objects, and everything in-between. As such, it can appeal to 
philosophers all over the dispositionalist and structuralist spectrum. 
The other way in which Ontic Structural Realism is revolutionary is in its approach to 
modality. Many philosophers have properties in their fundamental ontology, with laws 
being secondary. For categoricalists, laws may be contingent relations between 
universals or regularities. Our concern has been with Dispositional Essentialism which 
takes dispositional properties to generate laws. Here modality is explained from the 
bottom-up - from properties to laws. While not all philosophers agree with the need to 





Dispositional Essentialism has a bottom-up approach to modality with laws being 
ontologically dependent on properties. Ontic Structural Realism reverses this 
dependence. Properties depend on laws. Some properties may need to be included in the 
fundamental base (French, 2014, p. 290). However, this is because French sees 
properties as determinates, so that the properties in the fundamental base represent 
how the laws happen to be instantiated. French still sees these properties as dependent 
or as metaphysical by-products of laws (2014, pp. 264–285). 
French reverses the intuitive order of things. Where most philosophers take properties 
to be fundamental and laws to need explaining, he does the reverse. Few philosophers 
have been willing to take Ontic Structural Realism seriously because it is so radical and 
counterintuitive. On one hand, this gives Dispositional Essentialism the edge. On the 
other hand, French can argue that the counterintuitive nature of Ontic Structural 
Realism cannot and should not be held against it. His view is based on fundamental 
physics.  Fundamental physics is highly counterintuitive. We cannot simply ignore 
science to save our ontology. If anything, we should be questioning our ontology if it is 
not compatible with our best science. 
As we saw, the hybrid view does not force us to take a stand on objects. It does not force 
the choice between bottom-up and top-down approaches to modality either. However, 
that is not to say that it is neutral on modality (as with objects). Rather, properties and 
laws are on the same level. They mutually depend on each other. The hybrid view does 
not suffer from the problems the bottom-up approach – Dispositional Essentialism - 
faced of accounting for modality. The laws are part of the fundamental base. It is 
compatible with the scientific concerns of Ontic Structural Realism without requiring 
the unpopular top-down approach to modality. Properties retain their place in the 
fundamental level without being second-class citizens relative to laws. Additionally, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, it offers a much more thoughtful framework for 
understanding properties and laws within dispositionalism/structuralism. 
Dispositionalism and Structuralism relationally individuate properties and laws. The 
hybrid view avoids the contradiction between relational individuation and asymmetric 
dependence by accepting that properties and laws are equals. They are equifundamental 





Dispositional Essentialism has some persistent problems. It has difficulties accounting 
for modality. Specific properties are supposed to account for the general laws they obey. 
Yet the modality of the laws is too broad for an explanation in terms of specific 
properties. At the same time, Dispositional Essentialism struggles with coherence. It 
takes properties to be fundamental and to generate laws. Yet, those same properties 
appear to be constituted by the laws. A thing cannot ground a thing on which it depends. 
So, we cannot have a grounding-type asymmetric relationship here. Rather, and contra 
Dispositional Essentialism, we seem to have symmetric dependence. Ontic Structural 
Realism claims superiority on the modal point. It takes general laws to be fundamental, 
so they do not need explaining by lower level properties. However, this view has its 
downsides too.  
Ontic Structural Realism suffers from a highly revisionist ontology. It may have very 
good reasons for this, but the revisions are too much for most philosophers. Extreme 
versions eliminate objects altogether, moderate versions have objects and properties 
symmetrically depending on each other. Additionally, Ontic Structural Realism reverses 
the intuitive order of explanation between properties and laws. How does the hybrid 
view compare? 
My hybrid view is the best of both worlds. By having properties and laws as 
equifundamental and symmetrically dependent, these problems go away. Regarding 
modality, it avoids Dispositional Essentialism’s difficulty accounting for laws by having 
them in the fundamental base. At the same time, it does this without making properties 
second-class citizens as Ontic Structural Realism does.  
The hybrid view also avoids the coherence concerns around relational individuation. As 
we saw, views like Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism use 
relational individuation. Here relata are individuated by their relations to further 
relata. This makes it very hard – if not impossible – to justify the primacy of relata over 
relations (or vice versa). The relata cannot come first because they are relationally 
individuated. The relations cannot come first because they necessarily hold between 
relata. The relations are nothing without the relata in question. My hybrid view avoids 





I have shown that the hybrid view avoids the biggest pitfalls of Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. Clearly it is not the worst of both worlds. At 
the same time, it does as good if not a better job at meeting the goal of these views – 
accounting for natural modality. This, to me, makes it the best of both worlds. What is 
the catch? As we saw in the previous chapter, it has a slightly less sparce ontology and 
involves symmetric dependence. I defended the use of symmetric dependence in section 
7.5. I showed that it is well motivated and makes most sense of the relationship between 
properties and laws in dispositionalism/structuralism. As for the added categories 
(determinate laws and determinable properties), I turn my attention to these in the next 
section where I look at parsimony concerns for the hybrid view. 
 
8.2 Parsimony and explanation 
The final objection to my hybrid view is that it is less parsimonious than the 
alternatives. This can be raised in two ways. First, it is less parsimonious than standard 
Dispositional Essentialism and French’s Ontic Structural Realism. Second, it is less 
parsimonious than an alternative hybrid view. These other views all account for 
modality using determinate properties and determinable laws. My view uses 
determinate properties, determinate laws, determinable properties and determinable 
laws.  
Ockham’s razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. Most philosophers 
agree that, all else equal, the more parsimonious (the simpler) of two explanations is to 
be preferred. Here we can distinguish between two kinds of parsimony. An explanation 
is more quantitively parsimonious if it postulates fewer individual things. Another sense 
in which an explanation can be parsimonious is if it postulates fewer kinds or types of 
things; this is called qualitative parsimony. All else equal, the simpler explanation is 
preferred. However, simple explanations are often worse. So, for instance, ancient 
philosophers might have believed that the world was made up of identical atoms, or four 
elements, but the periodic table has 118 elements and standard model particle physics 
includes 38 distinct elementary particles. The latter do a much better job of explaining 
reality. Hence, Ockham’s razor says don’t multiple entities beyond necessity or all else 





Parsimony is one of many theoretical virtues used to evaluate theories (two if you 
disambiguate between quantitative and qualitative parsimony). Others include 
evidential accuracy, explanatory depth, internal consistency, universal coherence, 
unification, durability and fruitfulness (Keas, 2018). Thus, the simplicity (or lack of 
simplicity) of a theory is just one reason to accept (or reject) that theory. Let’s say that 
we could quantify a theory’s theoretical virtue. If two theories seem equally virtuous, 
parsimony can be used as the deciding factor. Parsimony may sway us one way rather 
than another. However, all else is rarely equal. It is very hard to measure theoretical 
virtue. And, even if we could measure it, competing theories score very differently on 
different virtues. So, one might be very parsimonious but not very unified. Another may 
have excellent internal consistency but score low on parsimony. Rarely does parsimony 
prove the deciding factor. Parsimony is desirable, but if a theory has a problem with 
“evidential accuracy” that probably outweighs the parsimony concern. 
The issue for the hybrid view is that Bird-style Dispositional Essentialism and French-
style Ontic Structural Realism are more parsimonious than my hybrid view. Standard 
Dispositional Essentialism takes determinate properties to explain all modality (Bird, 
2007; Wilson, 2012; Vetter, 2015). Determinable laws ontologically depend on 
determinate properties. Ontic Structural Realism takes determinable laws to be 
fundamental. Determinate properties are fundamental too as they give us non-modal 
information, differentiating our concrete world from a world where nothing is 
instantiated. We need determinates to account for the world as we know it, its causal 
sequences, and concrete goings on. However, we have also seen that they are 
“metaphysical by-products” of determinable laws (French, 2014). Despite their 
fundamentality, determinate properties are dependent. They ontologically depend on 
determinable laws. In both cases, we have determinate properties and determinable 
laws accounting for modality (as I have said, I am leaving objects out).  
Not only are Standard Dispositional Essentialism and Ordinary Ontic Structural 
Realism more parsimonious, a basic hybrid view between the two would also be more 
parsimonious than my hybrid view. Let’s briefly set aside the arguments for my specific 
hybrid view set out in the last chapter. If I say that my view is a hybrid between 
standard Dispositional Essentialism and French’s Ontic Structural Realism, and that 
what makes it a hybrid is the symmetric dependence between properties and laws, 















Figure 10. This depicts the overlap, or merger, between Standard 
Dispositional Essentialism’s modal ontology and Ordinary Ontic 
Structural Realism’s (figures 3 and 7).  
Figure 10 – Basic Hybrid View – is what you get when you superimpose figures 3 and 7 
(Standard Dispositional Essentialism and Ordinary Ontic Structural Realism). The 
categories – determinate properties and determinable laws – remain the same. The 
ontological dependence of determinable laws on determinate properties of Dispositional 
Essentialism is kept. At the same time, the ontological dependence of determinate 
properties on determinable laws of Ontic Structural Realism is kept. So, the only change 
is to the ontological dependence arrow. Rather than asymmetrically pointing one way, it 
points in both directions. This symbolises the symmetric dependence of determinate 
properties on determinable laws. Yet this is not my hybrid view. My hybrid view is 














Figure 11 depicts my hybrid view. Determinable properties and laws 





laws. The traced line represents the relationship between determinates 
and determinables (discussed in 7.4). 
In the last chapter I detail and argue for my hybrid view as depicted in Figure 11. 
However, I did not address the issue of parsimony. My hybrid view is less parsimonious 
than the Basic Hybrid View. It takes determinable properties and determinable laws to 
symmetrically depend. It also takes determinate properties and determinate laws to 
symmetrically depend. This symmetric dependence is represented by the ontological 
dependence arrow. In addition, the traced lines represent the relationship between the 
determinable and determinate levels. We know there must be some such relationship, 
but that relationship will be different from the symmetric dependence relationship (see 
section 7.6 for more details).  
My hybrid view is less parsimonious than the basic hybrid view because it has more 
categories and it invokes more than one kind of relationship between those categories. I 
have argued extensively for the need for this added nuance (section 7.2 and 7.3), 
however I will recap those arguments here to show that lesser parsimony is not a 
problem for my view. The explanatory benefits of fleshing out the ontology of the other 
views – Standard Dispositional Essentialism, Ordinary Ontic Structural Realism and 
Basic Hybrid View - outweigh the negatives. Further, I argue that no radically new 
kinds of entity are added to my hybrid view to get that that benefit. 
Early in this thesis, in particular in chapter 3, we saw that Standard Dispositional 
Essentialism failed to give an account of determinable laws. I will not go into details 
here as this problem has been a focus of the thesis, rehashed in sections 7.2 and 8.1. 
Broadly, we saw that the modality of determinable laws outruns that of determinate 
properties, so determinate properties cannot account for determinable laws. Without the 
addition of determinable properties, Dispositional Essentialism fails to deliver on its 
promise of accounting for all modality. Laws are left brute. The addition of this new 
category is of such explanatory benefit to Dispositional Essentialism, I would say it is 
explanatorily necessary in the sense that it is needed to meet the explanatory aims of 
the theory.  
The fact that determinable laws cannot be accounted for via determinate properties is 
appreciated by French (2014). As we saw, he proposed we fundamentalise determinable 




dispositional essentialist here. We still need determinable properties because 
determinable laws are relations between determinable properties. It is not clear how we 
can have a rich plethora of different relations (laws) without the things they relate 
(properties).  
When I say that determinable laws are relations between determinable properties, I do 
not mean that they are relations like the relation of being 6 meters apart from, where 
any two relata can fulfil that relation. The law of gravitation relates mass and distance 
in a much more intimate way. From a dispositional or structural perspective, the 
property of mass is intimately tied to its disposition to manifest a gravitational force. 
Mass cannot be understood separate from the effects of mass – to exert said force. At the 
same time, the law of gravitation depends on mass and distance. The idea that the law 
of gravitation can be prior to mass is bizarre.  
The core of the problem for Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism is 
relational individuation. Dispositionalism and Structuralism relationally individuate 
properties. Additionally, laws are relations between properties. The natures of 
properties and laws are entwined as they depend on each other for their identity and 
existence (Yates, 2018). There can be no determinable law without the determinable 
properties. These rigidly designate the law. Coulomb’s law is a relation between charge 
and distance. It makes no sense to say that the law exists prior to the properties it 
relates. 
The entwined nature of properties and laws also applies at the determinate level. 
Determinate properties are relationally individuated in structuralism/dispositionalism. 
As such, they are nothing more than their relations or their dispositions to their specific 
manifestations. They are individuated and their existence is dependent on those 
relations. Those relations are determinate laws. In other words, the relations are the 
limiting case of the determinable laws which apply to the property in question. We 
cannot simply individuate determinate properties via determinable laws, as these do not 
favour any one determinate property over any other determinate property of the same 
determinable. 
My theory may well be less parsimonious than Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic 
Structural Realism (or a basic hybrid of the two). However, in my view it is very 




seems even more sparse from the perspective that we already had determinates, 
determinables, properties and laws in the previous views. So, I am not necessarily 
introducing a completely new kind of thing (which would be a bigger violation of 
qualitative parsimony). Rather, I am fleshing out the ontology that was already there. 
From the perspective of a Humean regularity theorist or a philosopher who aims to have 
the sparsest possible ontology, my view may not seem like an improvement. However, 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structuralism have the explicit goal of accounting 
for modality (Bird, 2007; French, 2014). I have shown that their views fall short of their 
aims. My hybrid view presents a solution to the problem of accounting for modality. At 
the same time, the motivation for my view runs deeper than that. 
Standard Dispositional Essentialism, French’s Ontic Structural Realism, and a “basic” 
hybrid view leave gaping holes in their ontology. These holes are left by relational 
individuation. Properties are individuated by their relations. Yet, in Dispositionalism, 
any relations are ontologically secondary to the properties themselves. At the same time, 
laws of nature are relations between properties, yet in both views the things they relate 
(determinable properties) don’t exist. This places the very coherence of Dispositional 
Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism in question. A very healthy respect for 
parsimony would not have us choose an incoherent view over a coherent one, with more 
explanatory power, for the sake of a slightly more austere ontology. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
I dealt with the most pressing objections to my hybrid view at the end of chapter 7. 
These included the concern over symmetric dependence (section 7.5), how my view can 
be said to be a hybrid and how it differs from Esfeld and Lam’s symmetric dependence 
view (section 7.6). In this chapter I addressed a couple lingering concerns for the view: 
that it might have all the problems of Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 
Realism and that it is less parsimonious than these views. 
Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism suffered from two main 
ailments. First, they suffered from an incomplete ontology of determinate properties and 
determinable laws. As we saw, determinable laws require the determinable properties 




identity and existence. The second and related ailment came from a forced choice 
between placing properties or laws first. Given their entwined nature such a choice 
comes at the cost of coherence. My hybrid view avoids both these difficulties.  
The problems associated with Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism 
go away once we allow properties to be symmetrically dependent on laws. With 
determinate properties symmetrically depending on determinate laws, and 
determinable properties symmetrically depending on determinable laws, the coherence 
problem goes away and the ontological gaps are filled. The fact that properties and laws 
depend on each other for their identity and existence is no longer a problem but a 
natural consequence of the structuralist worldview. This, in my view, outweighs the 
parsimony concern. Having a slightly less austere ontology is a small price to pay for a 






At first glance Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism have little in 
common. Dispositional Essentialism is a view about properties. It is the view that there 
are dispositional properties which account for laws of nature. It circulates in the 
metaphysics literature as the solution to quidditism and humility about properties. 
Ontic Structural Realism is debated in the philosophy of science literature, taking 
inspiration from quantum mechanics for massive revisions in our understanding of 
objects. These two appear to have little in common but look beneath the surface and 
similarities start to emerge.  
I used Bird’s (2007) Dispositional Essentialism and French’s (2014) Ontic Structuralism 
as my starting point in this thesis. We saw that both these views aim to explain 
modality. They do so in remarkably similar ways. Bird’s Dispositional Essentialism 
takes determinate (dispositional) properties to explain laws of nature. Yet laws of 
nature are determinable. French’s Ontic Structural Realism takes determinable laws to 
be fundamental, and determinate properties to be what needs explaining. The 
dependence is inverted. This leads French to claim that Ontic Structural Realism is a 
reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism (2014, p. 264). It also led 
Chakravartty to differentiate between the two views by saying that Dispositional 
Essentialism gives a bottom-up explanation of modality whereas Ontic Structural 
Realism’s is top-down (2019). 
There are challenges for both views. Dispositional Essentialism has difficulties 
accounting for laws of nature. It is unclear how we can explain determinable laws via 
determinate properties, while avoiding any sort of regularity view. The fact that so 
many determinates obey a single law calls out for explanation. If anything, it looks like 
the determinable law explains why the determinate properties manifest in the ways 
that they do. Worse, global principles are particularly hard to give a bottom-up account 
of.  Global principles are high-level laws like symmetry principles, conservation laws 
and the principle of least action. They apply to a wide range of properties, if not the 
whole world. As a result, it is hard to see how global principles can be accounted for via 
the dispositional essences of individual properties. Ontic Structural Realism presents 
itself as the solution to Dispositional Essentialism’s problems. It takes laws (including 
those troublesome global principles) to be fundamental. Thus, determinable laws need 




I argued that we need to add determinable properties to our ontology. Determinable 
properties help both views make better sense of laws of nature. Within Dispositional 
Essentialism, determinable properties could be dispositional and so account for 
determinable laws (Wilson, 2012). As I showed in chapters 4 and 5, the dispositional 
essentialist can use these to deal with even the most elusive laws: global principles. At 
the same time, Ontic Structural Realism is problematic if it has fundamental 
determinable laws but no determinable properties. Laws are relations between 
properties, so it is not clear what these determinable laws amount to if they have 
nothing to relate. I make a similar case at the determinate level. Dispositional 
properties require dispositional laws. So, I argue that each instantiated determinate 
property will instantiate a determinate law. By adding determinable properties and 
determinate laws, the first step towards my hybrid view is accomplished.  
My hybrid view merges Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s 
ontologies with respect to modality. It does this by taking properties and laws to be 
symmetrically dependent. Properties are individuated by their relationships to further 
properties. So, it is not clear how they can be metaphysically prior to, or more 
fundamental than, the very relations which individuate them (the laws of nature). At 
the same time, laws are relations between properties. So, it is not clear how the 
relations can exist without relata. My proposal is that properties and laws 
symmetrically depend. Laws of nature depend on the properties they are about, and the 
properties depend on the laws which constitute them. Determinable properties and 
determinable laws symmetrically depend, determinate properties and determinate laws 
symmetrically depend. 
Symmetric dependence is a controversial matter. However, as I argued in chapter 7, 
there are cases where symmetric dependence is warranted. In my view, there is no 
clearer example than in the case of properties and laws. Within dispositionalism and 
structuralism, properties are individuated by their relations to further properties. They 
get their identity, and their existence depends on, those relations. So, they cannot be 
prior to those relations. Similarly, laws of nature are the relations between properties. 
Any theory which requires us to accept that the laws are prior to the properties they are 
about will be more controversial than mine.  
Relational individuation is core to Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 




this relational individuation with a traditional hierarchy of fundamentality whereby 
either properties depend on laws, or laws on properties. This has landed both views in a 
chicken-egg argument. My hybrid view presents a way out of this chicken-egg-property-
law dilemma. Further, given how Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural 
Realism can seem like mirror images of each other, it strikes me as quite bizarre that 
this avenue has not yet been explored.  
My hybrid view brings a fresh perspective on the tensions of dispositionalism and 
structuralism. It forwards a new way of seeing dispositional properties and laws. At the 
same time, it is important to stress that this is just a view about modality. It takes 
inspiration from Dispositional Essentialism’s metaphysics of modality and Ontic 
Structural Realism’s metaphysics of modality, fleshing out their ontologies so that they 
can be merged. The hybrid view is neutral on objects. In that sense it is not a full hybrid 
of the two views.  
The hybrid view is compatible with multiple takes on objects, from traditional objects 
(usually associated with Dispositional Essentialism), to the revisionary objects of radical 
Ontic Structural Realism, and everything in between.  
I have said before that there are as many Dispositional Essentialisms as there are 
dispositional essentialists. There are as many Ontic Structural Realisms as there are 
ontic structural realists. Perhaps my hybrid view is just one more of these voices. 
However, it has the potential to open the door to a new set of positions where 
dispositional essentialists and ontic structural realists are no longer pitted against each 
other. It has the potential to reconcile two fruitful camps of philosophical debate and 
innovation – Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism – so that they 
may spend less time arguing with each other and join forces to tackle new problems. 
Either way, it seems clear to me that these two views are much closer than they seem. 
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